



**Class Analysis
of
the Afghan Society**

**Afghanistan Revolutionary Organization (ARO)
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Preface

The two practical and class characteristics distinguished the scientific philosophy of Karl Marx, the leader of world proletariat, from all other philosophies. This knowledge was not meant to only interpret the phenomena, but to change them; that is why any assessment of phenomena in light of this knowledge, has class characteristic and it believes nothing in the world is non-class.

Revolution, which means the replacement of one class by the other, is not possible without practical actions. Also, a revolution can only triumph when its vanguard draws an accurate distinguishing line between the friend and the foe. This is only possible through a class analysis. In the absence of class analysis, triumph of the proletarian revolution will remain impossible.

These classes consist of friends, foes and intermediary forces. Following a thorough assessment, communists expand the size of friendly forces, attract the intermediary forces, and isolate the enemy to the possible extent. Hence, for a practical action, there is need for thorough class analysis of the society where revolutionaries launch their revolution. This enables revolutionaries to tell who their class friends and enemies are; where to trigger revolution; and what stages the revolution is supposed to pass through.

Afghanistan Revolutionary Organization (ARO), a Marxist organization, is committed to world proletarian revolution. It aims at successfully bringing about a revolution in Afghanistan as part of the world proletarian revolution based on scientific analysis of a given situation. To do so, ARO sees the urgent need to thoroughly analyze the overall status of classes in Afghan society. Without such an analysis, it is impractical to achieve revolutionary objectives.

Historically, it has been a major handicap that various organization of the left movement in Afghanistan never did a class analysis of the Afghan society. These organizations were content with the 'Analysis of Classes in Chinese Society' by Comrade Mao Tse-Tung written in March 1926. These organizations still find it adequately relevant for guiding a modern democratic revolution and socialist revolution in Afghanistan. The leftist organizations should have analyzed their own society rather than modeling on the Chinese pattern of the modern democratic revolution in view of major dissimilarities between the Afghan society and the then Chinese society. True, there was the need to study the class analysis of Chinese society as there were also innumerable similarities between the then Chinese society and the Afghan society. Though the book *Historical Process of Development of Bourgeoisie in Afghanistan* was presented to the revolutionary movement in Afghanistan by SORKHA (Liberty Organization of Afghan Masses) and contributed a lot to the understanding of some of the class dynamics of the Afghan society yet the book could in no way address the vital issue of class analysis. As part of its theoretical work, ARO decided to focus completely on the issue of class analysis of the Afghan society in the third issue of its publication *March On*. We realize the fact that social changes, internal displacements, issue of refugees, economic miseries on the countryside, and change in the class fabric of urban areas over the past three decades, have further complicated the class formation of the Afghan society. Nonetheless, we are sure this class analysis is a step forward, in spite of its numerous shortcomings.

A number of leftist organizations in Afghanistan have already capitulated to Trotskyism, or have slyly adopted some of its elements. They analyze the Afghan society as a capitalist society, and consider socialism as the revolution stage. But ARO believes the Afghan society is a colonial-semi feudal society which has a long walk to capitalism, let alone socialism. Following the pattern of other societies, our society, constantly tries to overcome the present semi-feudal hindrances and reach the capitalist phase. On the other hand, feudal culture is so prevailing in the Afghan society that impedes relentlessly the penetration of bourgeois culture,

coming either through natural capitalist means, or infiltrating through foreign capital. This obstruction comes to play in the form of extreme violence personified by feudal culture, customs and tribal beliefs, religious principles, opposition to knowledge, discrimination against women, rejection of liberal democracy as well as bourgeois civil society institutions so on and so forth. These components of bourgeois culture are also resisted through guns and bullets, theocratic regimes, demolition of schools, destroying broadcasting means, banning music, cutting off hands and slitting throats, and applying the strictest possible religious measure to limit the very basic individual liberties. In this encounter, on the one hand, the bourgeois culture is mainly reflected through the interests of the foreign occupiers in cultural, productive and services sector, trying to grab the state, capital and leadership of the society in league with big landlords, on the other hand, feudal forces stick to traditional culture (by propagating it as a genuine Afghan culture), maintaining the feudal relations and trying to maintain the status quo through theocracy, discrimination against women, and nationalist sentiments. This encounter will last till either feudal relations triumph over the capitalist process temporarily, or capitalism prevails completely.

Armed clashes paired with an extremely slow pace of capitalist development in Afghanistan underline the fact that semi-feudal relations in this country act more belligerently here than most countries in the world – particularly due to the fact that religion has succeeded to take advantage of ignorance of the masses. Thus feudal relations by combining religion with customs have rooted themselves in the society. Moreover, Afghanistan is the second poorest country after Somalia. None of Afghan cities resembles any of the modern cities in capitalist countries. Rural areas have the medieval social environment with mud-built houses, lacking power, drinking water, toilets and sewage, clinics and hospitals, standard schools and qualified teachers. Over 90 percent of girls and women are not allowed to work or leave house, and their marriages are arranged. Only modern democratic revolution followed by socialist revolution can eliminate such a reactionary culture and relations. By calling such a society a capitalist society overnight will not help. Calling Afghan society a capitalist society is a dogmatic and myopic assessment, which can only lead Afghan revolutionaries astray. This classification will only turn them away from their main revolutionary tasks and tactics such as encircling the cities by the countryside.

With the firm belief that Afghan society is a colonial-semi feudal society, ARO analyzes the Afghan society class structure. It believes that the Afghan society consists of working class, peasantry, petty bourgeoisie, big landlord class, national bourgeoisie and class of comprador bourgeoisie; all sections of the society fall within this class circle. The class analysis presented here will discuss the social and economic status of each of these classes, their role and stance vis-à-vis modern democratic revolution and socialist revolution.

Here we analyze these six classes, followed by historical conditions of Afghanistan and different stages of Afghan revolution. First the agriculture sector (before analyzing peasantry and landlords), and industry and commerce (before analyzing laborers, comprador bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie) will be analyzed followed by analyzing the petty bourgeoisie class. Finally an assessment of social forces will be presented.

Peasants and Landlords

During the primitive commune, slavery and feudalism, the majority of Afghan society has eked out a living using the least developed farm implements.

Slaves were exploited with cruelty in the slave phase, but the development of the means of production within slave society led to the prevalence of feudal relations with the two main classes of feudal lords and peasants, while slaves (slaves and concubines) remained a transitional class in the typical feudal society.

King Amanullah abolished slavery for the first time in 1923, and 700 slaves and concubines were emancipated from the residences of the nobility in Kabul alone. But the selling of girls continued in a limited way until recently – particularly in the case of poor peasants who had to sell their daughters when faced by challenging economic hardships, as a result of long spell of droughts or failure to repay their debts.

Following the abolition of slavery, it was no longer possible to regulate the selling of sons according to the rules of slavery, so it ceased. Many destitute Afghans were forced to sell their daughters during the drought of 1970, during the infighting of the fundamentalist parties between 1992 and 1996, and during the rule of the Taliban. This process continued even until 2008, when destitute families sold their daughters in order to support the rest of the family.

After the transition from slave society to the feudal order, peasants, shepherds and artisans lived similar lives. Peasants were exploited with maximum cruelty, paying land interest rate to the landlords who owned the land and farm implements, paying taxes to the feudal government, being forced to take part in *Begar* (unpaid compulsory labor) for the government and landlords, providing provisions to military barracks across the country, and being forced to fight in feudal wars.

The reforms of King Amanullah (from 1919 to 1929), which changed taxation in kind to cash, provided a degree of relaxation in the exploitation of the majority (peasants, artisans and shepherds): forced purchase of foodstuffs by peasants and its catering to military barracks was prohibited, government tax collection by the landlords and the passage of tax money through their hands stopped, and the government started to collect tax directly. Village level governance and taxation by the village rulers was abolished.

As a part of the reform, a population census and a livestock census were carried out, and taxation was regulated accordingly. Forced free labour was banned, and the heavy taxation of artisans was stopped. All these brought some relief for peasants otherwise cruelly exploited by landlords. These reforms paved the way for the partial emergence of capitalist relations. In other words, while the reforms of King Amanullah did not break the back of feudal relations, it weakened those relations and laid the foundation for capitalist relations.

The reforms of King Amanullah were dealt a severe blow when the government that overthrew him, with the support of British Empire, revived the dominant feudal relations. The government of the nobility that followed levied exorbitant taxation again, and pushed masses into a real inferno. Farmers termed taxation “grievance”, and in many parts of Afghanistan farmers also call their harvest and livestock “grievance”.

King Amanullah paved the way for capitalist relations by ordering the purchase of factory machines from European countries during his historic visit in 1927. A number of factories were established during his rule, while many machines were delivered to Afghanistan later. This led to the gradual growth of capitalist relations within the feudal order of the society.

Though Amir Sher Ali Khan had introduced certain elements of capitalism in late 1870s, importing a number of industrial machines that were installed in Machinkhana, it was only King Amanullah’s relatively radical reforms that let capitalism grow and flourish to an extent.

In the 1920s and 1930s workers emerged as a social class in Afghan society in commerce and state-run and private industries. This turned Afghanistan into a semi-feudal, semi-capitalist society.

The development of capitalist elements within the deep-rooted feudal society, marked by traditional customs, the dominance of religion, and patriarchy, was a puny challenge to the landlords who dominated the echelons of power in addition to their rural fiefdoms. Any sign of bourgeois culture gaining momentum, in particular with respect to civil liberties, access to schools and education (particularly for girls), independent voices from the press, or any trend towards creating political parties and social unions, was countered strongly by the feudal order. The clergy, finding its interests threatened by the nascent modern relations, fought back by issuing strong and angry *Fatwas* (Islamic verdicts).

Big landlords usually owned between 1000 and 75000 jeribs land (five jeribs equal one hectare), and exploited up to 150 peasants yearly, in different harvest seasons. In their fiefdoms, the big landlords also exploited artisans such as barbers, carpenters, ironsmiths and traditional fabric weavers. Such a structure completed the social hierarchy as a single unit, and in case any of the artisan strata was missing in a village, Friday prayers could not be offered in the village from a Sharia point of view.

These landlords possessed private armies and controlled every aspect of peoples' lives. No one dared submit a petition to the government without their prior approval. No one could decide about the marriage of a daughter or son without their consent. Government decrees could not be implemented without consulting or asking the landlords' permission. Some landlords even controlled the Kuchis (nomads). They imprisoned and tortured peasants and other subjects at will. A landlord could kill his subject without being responsible before any law. No one could dare disobey the landlord or nobility's order.

The frustrating taxation broke the back of peasants. The landlords dominated the parliament. Village elders and *Mirab* (regulator of water distribution for farmlands) were appointed by them. Landlords married up to four wives and fathered many children. They rode horses in order to go to their cultivating fields or to visit cities.

Prominent landlords supported by the central government after the fall of King Amanullah included Haji Sultan Mohammad Khan Farahi, Sardar Mohammad Alam Khan Sanjarani Nimrooz, Mir Zaman Khan Kunarri, Haji Amanullah Khan Nimrooz, Aminullah Khan Logari, Haji Shah Alam Khan Taheri Herati, Mojadadis, Gilanis, Sayed Kayan, the Ishan family of Ahan Dara Takhari, Hassan Khan Kamawi Nangarhari and others who had their own fiefdoms and embodied the class structure of that time. These landlords enjoyed their power to the land and means of production they possessed. In other parts of Afghanistan, particularly in the mountainsides where landlords did not possess large tracts of land, landlords maintained their fiefdoms through the power they inherited from their fathers and forefathers, and were considered as legitimate power centers by the government.

Such landlords included Khaibar Khan and Azam Khan in Shinwar whose land property did not exceed 20 jeribs each, but were still considered as sources of power. In some areas, border protection was handed over to landlords, who governed the border area with a free hand, assuring the government of border protection. For instance, Sardar Mohammad Alam Khan in the Charborborjak district of southwestern Nimrooz province and Shahnawaz Khan Bomadi in the Qalae Kah district of western Farah province were assigned the task of defending the border.

The government of the nobility steering the system considered the gentry its sole backer. Kings and Prime ministers met them during their provincial visits and did not forgo any effort to win the gentry's consent.

Though the ruling nobility supported all the landlords, and let them commit all sorts of heinous crimes against the peasant masses, their ethnic and tribal affiliation still mattered.

Pashtoon gentry received greater support from the palace than non-Pashtoon gentry did. Among Pashtoons, Durani gentry enjoyed greater respect from the royal court than Ghiljai gentry. Among Duranis, Mohammadzais and Barakzais enjoyed more power. Mohammadzais were given the title of “Sardar” and received monthly allowances from the government just for being Mohammadzais. The majority of the Royal Army generals and senior officers were comprised of Mohammadzais. The most fertile lands from other clans were given to Barakzai gentry in a royal decree. Efforts were made to resettle a number of Pashtoons from the south to the north so that lands possessed by other gentry could be given to Pashtoon landlords. The ruling nobility also held the sons of non-Pashtoon gentry in the palace and ostensibly raised and educated them, while in reality keeping them as hostages to prevent any rebellion of their fathers against the palace. It aimed to thus mold a new generation of gentry. Those boys were called Ghulam Bachagan-e Darbar (Servants of the Palace). But the same Ghulam Bachagan made up the bulk of the first Afghan constitutionalist movement during the reign of King Habibullah, who executed a number of them. Such constant ‘hostage taking’ on the one hand illustrated the conflicts and squabbles between the feudal landlords, and on the other hand showed the fear that the palace had of the feudal landlords.

In addition to getting support from the central government, the feudal gentry possessed weapons and ran private jails. They received unqualified support from the clergy in order to force themselves on the masses. In return, the gentry provided the clergy with food, accommodation and money, thus buying their support. That is why no single incident of clergy opposing the tyranny of the gentry was ever witnessed. Some clergymen possessed vast tracts of land and were big landlords themselves, including Miagul Jan Aqa Tagab, Zharro Jan Aqa Helmand, Pir Gilani, Sebghatullah Mojadadi, Sayed Kayan, Ishans of Ahan Dara, to name a few. Gilanis and Mojadadi have always remained close to the palace, have had close ties to the British imperialists and have always been used by them as prized assets. “Pir and Murid” (Saint & Disciple) loyalty was dominant nationwide and the Sehrwardya and Qaderia sects had large number of followers among the peasants and the national bourgeoisie. Later on, Baba Jan in Kabul (supported by the secret service of the Soviet-installed government in Kabul as a result of 27 April 1978 coup) found a large number of followers - - in particular amongst the retired army officers. The “Baba Jan Brothers”, led by Mullah Musa (a fugitive Iranian Sunni cleric who was later killed in a bomb attack staged by Iranian agents), whose main power base was in Herat province, recruited a large number of Afghan youth from petty bourgeois families, particularly in the western provinces of Afghanistan.

The Mullahs most often protected the interests of the landlords, and turned a blind eye to their ‘sins’. In some cases, a landlord would marry one of his daughters from a less favored wife to a mullah and hence would consolidate his own position. Whenever kings, princess, or landlords practiced polygamy beyond the four wives allowed by Islam, while keeping concubines in their harem and committing ‘counter-religious’ actions, mullahs justified these acts and defended them.

Amir Habibullah Khan held three hundred wives in his harem, and was so obsessed with his harem affairs that he could not attend the Darbar for days on end. While “Dr Allah Joyae Hindi” worked day in and day out to make sex-enhancing drugs for him, all the mullahs kept silent and never protested.

They in unison called the king: “Seraj Milat wa Din” (Torch of the Nation and Religion), mentioned his name in the Friday prayers, and called him “Zel Allah” (God’s Shadow). But as soon as King Amanullah Khan, the son of King Habibullah Khan cut their monthly allowances, the mullahs turned against him and excommunicated him. The mullahs later worked diligently to bring to power Nader Khan who had the support of the British empire. Hence, the clergy and the feudal order strengthened each other, and jointly exploited the destitute masses.

Following the 17 July 1973 coup and the declaration of a Republic, Daud Khan introduced the Progressive Taxation Law in order “to break the back of feudalism”. Based on this law, the tract of land of landowners exceeding the size of the titled land was seized. Moreover, as the piece of land increased, the amount of tax increased accordingly. Daud Khan wanted the big landlords to voluntarily give up the extra tracts of land and the land they had grabbed, so that the government could give the land to the farmers.

While many considered the law as anti-feudal, in reality, the Progressive Taxation Law intensified the peasants’ exploitation at the hand of the landlords. The landlords gave up only the land that was not cultivable while keeping the fertile tracts for themselves. In order for the landlords to reduce the damage of the high taxation, the landlords decreased the share of tenant-peasants from the crop harvest and intensified the level of peasants’ exploitation through increasing the land interest rate, particularly after the long spell of drought. Many peasants were forced to flee for Iran in order to make a living. The Progressive Taxation Law was initially designed to weaken the feudal landlords and their authority in the countryside and thus strengthen the central government, but it mentioned nothing in the support of peasants.

The Saur coup in April 1978 ended any chance of Daud’s Progressive Taxation Law being implemented. The puppet regime of the Khalq Democratic Party immediately announced a “Land Reform” in a decree later known as Decree No. 8. The program did not resemble at all the land reform implemented by communists (the “land reform” of the Khalq Democratic Party needs to be assessed separately). The members of the puppet Khalq party and government had very little knowledge of the status of peasants and landlords, the water share each section of cultivable land would get (Haqaba), the cultivable land, the means of production and farm implements, living conditions, the prevailing practices and the deep impact of religion on the lives of the masses. They “implemented the land reform” in less than eight months. It was right from the outset a mockery of land reform, which is one of the most challenging and sophisticated tasks that has to be carried out in a revolutionary process.

The land reform launched by the Khalq Party was guided by members of the party who did not know about the peasants or the land, and lacked basic knowledge of the essence of feudalism. These cadres of the party with poor knowledge gave utterly destitute peasants tracts of land without water, without seed and without farm implements. Regulating Haqaba was not addressed either.

When Moscow discarded the Khalqis, and brought the Parcham faction to power, the Parcham faction not only disregarded the mock land reform of the Khalqis, but struck deals with the landlords under its “National Reconciliation Policy”, offering each landlord privileges and recruiting them into the National Fatherland Front (Jabhaye Mili e Padar Watan). This explained the dilemma of the poor peasants who were “offered five jeribs of land tracts”.

The peasants extended apologies secretly to the landlords and handed over to the landlords the harvest for the year 1979, bowing to the bloodthirsty landlords. Those who did not follow suit, were labeled by the religious extremists involved in the war against the Soviets and their puppet government, as “the five-jerib sinful” and were severely punished or in some cases killed by the Mujahidden. Such peasants were “criminals” in their eyes. They were also forced to pay twice the quantity of the crop as compensation to the landlords.

In the meantime, peasants who rejected the land tract were labeled as “the cronies of imperialism” and were imprisoned or killed by the “cadres of the irreversible Saur Revolution”. Hence, the mock land reform, which forced the peasants to pay a high price with their blood, consolidated the landlords’ position and authority rather than eliminating feudal practices and supremacy.

All this led to an uprising under the leadership of the gentry and big landlords that handed over Afghanistan to US imperialism after the defeat of the Soviets and their puppet

government in Afghanistan. It proved that landlords are the sworn enemies of the Afghan masses and the main base of support for imperialists. This is why the Afghan society remains a colonial semi-feudal society despite the huge sacrifices made by the Afghan masses.

The thirty years of war also brought about some changes in the status of landlords. A number of landlords expanded their properties by taking part in the war against the Soviets or by becoming members of the *jihadi* parties. They grabbed private and state-owned land, or land possessed by other landlords from local ethnic minority groups, or land owned by defeated commanders. Some large landowners lost their political and social status as a result of the upheaval, while others became owner-peasants or semi-owner peasants after transferring their land to family members. As the status of landlords went through changes, the lives and class status of peasants were also transformed.

In countering the puppet “Khalq Democracti Government”, the criminal *jihadi* groups looted people’s properties and grabbed thousands of jeribs of state-owned land, in the process reinforcing the feudal order. Some of the notable individuals who were involved in large-scale land seizures included:

- Fahim, the current vice president (in Kabul and in the north of the country)
- Payenda Khan (Sare Pul province in the north)
- Dostum and his commanders (across the northern provinces)
- Aqa Mohammad Khan (Qala in Zabul province)
- Ewaz Mohammad Nazari (the Isakhan Plain in Bamyan)
- Hazrat Ali (the Gamberai Plain in Nangarhar and Laghman provinces)
- Zabet Jalil (Farah province in the west)
- Ahmad Khan (Ghor)
- Pir Bakhsh (Girdiwal in Ghazni)
- Haji Din Mohammad, Haji Qadir and Haji Zaher (in Nangarhar province in the east).

Urban land in Kabul and the state-owned land outside the city was also seized by individuals, including Sayaf, Mulla Ezat, Amanullah Gozar, General Besmellah and Haji Almas and Haji Nabi (the brother of Karim Khalili, the second vice-president).

Duringn this period, new groups of landlords emerged across the country owing their new status to the guns they possessed and the armed groups they controlled. This resulted in further strengthening of the feudal order. Then, under the Taliban regime, the feudal order was consolidated culturally, with any signs of capitalism suppressed by bullet and force.

Following the occupation of Afghanistan, the US and British imperialists introduced changes, such as the “exercise in democracy”, the “new market economy” and the so-called “free press”. These reforms prompted an increase in investment and some capitalist development. Commanders of the *jihadi* parties who hitherto had only stayed in rural areas moved into the urban centers and invested in various sectors, paving the way for the development of elements of capitalism. Of the total loans given to Afghanistan by the global banks up until 2007, a mere 0.7 per cent was invested in agriculture, illustrating their lack of interest in this sector.

Afghanistan has a 449 cities and towns, but all these urban developments emerged from fiefdoms and bear little resemblance to the cities of the western capitalist world. They lack drinking water ,electricity, standard roads, sewage systems, solid waste collections, parking lots, traffic lights and signals, airports or metro systems. Only one per cent of Afghanistan's landmass is urban, and in the cities even semi-capitalist relationships have failed to take root .

Only Kabul, Herat, Kandahar, Marzar-e-Sharif and Jalalabad may have some semblance of the outside world cities. Capitalism is more developed in Kabul than in these other cities: since 2007, 87 percent of banking transactions – one of the most distinctive manifestations of capitalism – have been conducted in the capital, compared with six per cent in Herat, three percent in Mazar-e-Sharif, and five per cent across the other cities.

Within some cities, social relations and culture have been affected by the large numbers of peasants pouring in from the countryside, some fleeing rural bankruptcy; others resettled in the cities following their repatriation. When they migrate to urban areas, many peasants retain their local village customs and the practices of feudal society, causing major cultural tensions among families living in the cities. Incomers prefer to live with the old culture and invariably disapprove of signs of bourgeois culture. These new city-dwellers are strongly concerned about protecting their sons, and in particular their daughters, against the “corrupting influence” of bourgeois culture. Elderly villagers are nostalgic for the past when everything was “good”. They describe the previous generations as brave, honest, and generous; they prefer the old musical instruments; they are sentimental about traditional pastimes such as horse-riding and swordsmanship. Resisting cultural progress, they regard village traditions and customs as “genuine Afghan culture” and dislike busy city life. Even when they realize that it is impossible to revive the past, they try to at least maintain the status quo.

A number of educated feudal ideologists promote and hail such ideas through the media. But in practice, most of their hopes are dashed by the relentless invasion of capitalist culture. Fewer people attend mosques, while youth are relentlessly exposed to advanced capitalist culture. The older culture is now under siege on all fronts: from the mass media, the internet and other advanced communications systems as well as from the upsurge in commercial exchange with the outside world. With many young people now travelling abroad and studying western languages this cultural clash has been intensified.

The defenders of the old culture have no alternative but to resist the new culture with Taliban bullets, by setting schools ablaze, by slitting the throats of teachers, and by forcing women to wear hijab. Thus the conflict between feudal culture and capitalist culture has become highly visible in this semi-feudal society. This is a period of transition: eventually bourgeois culture will prevail, but the process will be more complex than in other societies.

Recent statistics show that Afghanistan has a population of 25 million, of which 72 percent (18 million people) live in the countryside, while 28 percent (7 million people) live in cities. Afghanistan is a predominantly peasant society and is controlled through landlord-peasant relations. Even many of the city dwellers are still committed to rural beliefs and customs, and have not broken with their past beliefs, due to lack of development of the means of production and development of capitalist order.

With the occupation of Afghanistan at the hands of US imperialism, the introduction of a market economy and inward investment by imperialist companies, the process of capitalist development has not been driven by dynamic changes at the base, but by superficial adjustments from the top. Because of this, the public mindset never welcomed these changes, and the imposition of a market economy and culture has created a mafia economy in Afghanistan.

Only 12 percent of the 650,000 km² total area of Afghanistan is currently cultivable; three percent is covered with forests; 46 percent is grazing land; and 39 percent is mountainous. Statistics from the year 2007 show that the cultivable land in Afghanistan is 5,743,858 hectares, with no significant increase over the past two years. Fifty per cent of Afghanistan’s Gross Domestic Production comes from this source. The breakdown of land cultivation is as follows:

1. Land devoted to grain, potato, and etc. cultivation:

No.	Type of Cultivation	Land in Hectare
1	Wheat on irrigate land	2252000
2	Wheat on non-irrigate land	1395000
3	Rice	170000
4	Barley	236000
5	Millet	12000
6	Caraway	18158
7	Potato	20000
8	Sugar cane	3700
9	Beets	2500
10	Olive	2300
11	Other	294000
A total of 4331858 hectares		

2. Land devoted to orchards:

No.	Type of Orchard	Land in Hectare
1	Almond	12000
2	Walnut	2300
3	Citrus	1200
4	Apple	7000
5	Pear	350
6	Apricot	8000
7	Peach	1920
8	Prune	5500
9	Mulberry	5580
10	Grapes	57600
11	Watermelon	20000
12	Melon	25000
13	Fig	2700
14	Pomegranate	8000
15	Other	2862
A total of 160,000 hectares		

3. Land devoted to cultivation of seed plants:

No.	Type of Seed Plant	Land in Hectares
1	Flaxseed	40000
2	Sunflower	6600
3	Sesame	3000
4	Cotton	35000
5	Mustard	2000
6	Herbs	4500
A total of 891,000 hectares		
Land used for growing vegetable: 168,000 hectares		
Land used for poppy cultivation 193,000 hectares		
Grand total: 5,743,858 hectares		

Each hectare equals five *jeribs*. The total of this land is 28719290 *jeribs*.

Peasants are employed according to the land area and the land income. In some parts of the country, where a tract of land is cultivated two or three times a year, one farmer is employed for five *jeribs*. In other parts, where the land is cultivated once a year due to lack of sufficient water resources and climactic factors, one farmer is employed for 15 *jeribs*. A rough calculation of field farmers, orchard farmers and shepherds shows that 80 percent of the Afghan populations make a living through land cultivation. With the dominance of a peasant lifestyle, the main driving force for revolution will come from the rural areas. The liberation of Afghanistan and the triumph of the modern democratic revolution will be achieved by a people's war that involves encircling the cities from the countryside.

Afghanistan does not have any specific and unified land measurement unit such as the square meter or the hectare. Land is usually measured by the seed sowed; but this also varies. In fertile lands, more seed is scattered, while in less fertile lands, and on land without sufficient water, less seed is scattered, which subsequently yields less crop. For example, in Farah, up to three *Ser* (One *Ser* equals 7 kgs) of seed is scattered on one *jerib* of land, while in Herat, and northern provinces and Shomali plain, up to six *Ser* or even more seed is scattered on a *jerib* of land. The measurement differs from one province to the other or even from one village to another village. Some of the most common land measurements are *jerib*, *Beswa*, *Dang*, *Ser*, *Man*, *Shahi*, *Qulba*, *Pie Gaw*, *Changal*, *Qeran*, *Qadam*, *Patay*, *Pykal* and *Rasa*.

But the official and government measurement, based on which tax is collected, is *jerib*, or a tract of land 40 meters by 50 meters, or 2000 square meters.

Annually 80 billion cubic meters of water flow through Afghanistan rivers such as Amu, Kunar, Kabul, Helmand, Morghab, Harirod, Farahrod, Khashrod, Harutrod, and their tributaries and valleys and lakes which are alternately overflowing or dry. Some of these rivers dry up for half of the year, while the others are overflowing throughout the year. Only 30 billion cubic meters of the river flow is used in Afghanistan; the remaining 50 billion cubic meters outflows to Iran, Pakistan and Central Asian states. A cubic meter of water costs 1.5 USD by international standards, while the regional price for one cubic meter of water is 1 USD. This means that, every year, neighboring countries get water worth 50 billion USD for free. Dams like Darunta, Mahipar, Jabal Seraj, Pul-e Khumri, Khanabad, Sorubi, Naghlu, Chak Wardak, Daalah, Kajaki, Nahre Seraj and Salma, built on these rivers, have limited capacity to control the water flow. Some of the dam projects are abandoned midway. This has left desperate Afghan peasants with the superstitious option of offering rain prayer (*Estesqa*). Farmers cannot cultivate non-irrigated land during the years with insufficient rainfall. In addition to river flow, water reservoirs and water pumps are also used. But given the high price of fuel to run water pumps, the option of using water pumps is less viable.

River water flowing in Afghanistan can generate up to 30,000 megawatts electricity. In addition, Afghanistan can generate over 10,000 megawatts of wind power, and around 10,000 megawatts power from coal, fuel and gas. While Afghanistan has such a potential for generating electricity, the puppet regime and its imperialist backers import electricity from Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Iran in order to light up Kabul and other cities. This reduces Afghanistan to a consuming country, more and more dependent on other countries within the region. Yet Afghanistan has the capacity not only to meet its own electricity demands, but also to export it to the neighboring countries. Out of the current available 700 megawatts of electricity, 300 megawatts is imported from neighboring countries.

Grain production, particularly wheat is the staple food for Afghans (83 percent of Afghan meals are made of wheat; the Dari word *Nan* and the Pashto word *Dodai* for wheat bread also mean each of the three daily meals). Afghanistan can grow more wheat and can ostensibly meet the demand in the years with higher amount of rainfall; reactionary government officials call it self-sufficiency. Since over 60 percent of wheat production goes to 20 percent of gentry and owner-peasants, and less than 40 percent goes to peasants and other oppressed masses

which make up to 80 percent of the Afghan society, it reveals this self-sufficiency calculation is a big lie, aimed to show the destitute and hungry majority of Afghans as self-sufficient and well-to-do.

In reality, to provide their families with minimum living standards, these hungry masses are forced to sell their daughters, make their women undertake hard labor, flee to Iran or Pakistan to make a living or borrow money from big landlords. Statistics in the year 2009 show that 63.9 percent of Afghan families are in debt of up to 2000 dollars. The hand-picked reactionary government authorities, whose duty is to protect the gentry and big landlords, try to conceal the misery of masses and their exploitation at the hands of landlords. In 2008 agriculture produce was over five million tons; the client government and NGO officials described it as a year of “self-sufficiency” in grain production. Meanwhile, thousands of peasants in provinces like Badghis and Ghor ate leaves and grass or starved to death.

Agriculture in Afghanistan is mainly based on primitive methods and equipment. Irrigation canals are dug with shovels. Canals and streams dug tens or hundreds years ago are still intact and have seen no improvement. *Haqaba* and water distribution are conducted in extremely basic and primitive ways. Due to lack of sufficient water in some regions of the country, farmland is cultivated once every three or four years. Peasants have no access to advanced agricultural machinery; crop diseases are rarely treated; little fertilizer, or improved seeds are provided; and no agricultural research is ever carried out. There has been little improvement in farm implements over the past 30 years.

The agriculture sector in Afghanistan is divided into three intertwined fields: cultivation; raising livestock; and orchards. Improvement or lack of improvement of one field has knock-on effects on the other two fields. Cultivation comprises wheat, barley, corn, rice, cotton, beans, mung bean, alfalfa, clover, melon, watermelon, cucumber, sesame, flaxseed, chives, spinach, onion, garlic, poppy and potato. Orchards grow dry and fresh fruit such as grapes, pomegranates, apples, apricots, mulberries, walnuts, almonds, nuts, clementine, jujube and figs. Raising livestock includes ox, goat, sheep, camel, horse, donkey, mule, hen, turkey and duck. Afghan peasants, orchard farmers and shepherds have similar class status, and are exploited in similar ways.

Farm implements include plough, MALA, shovel, hack, PALKASH, hoe, KERAN or CHABCHOR, SHAKHI, CHAGHANA, CHAJ, CHAGHAL, SHALI PAK, JAWAZ or GINA, tractor, water pump and shredder. Landlords and owner-peasants own most of these implements. In some parts of Afghanistan, peasants own the basic implements. In this case a peasant’s share of the harvest increases and gets half of the harvest. But if the peasant does not possess his own farm implement, he can barely get employed as a farmer. For the past twenty years, particularly since the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, and the repatriation of many peasants, they brought along tractors, furrows, tools for digging canals, shredders and bulldozers. During the Soviet occupation, tractor was a major means of transportation used for transporting commodities from Iran and Pakistan, and in some cases moving refugees too. Currently there are 2700 tractor vehicles in use across Afghanistan to plough the land and shred the crops and carry loads. In the north of Afghanistan, 50 percent of plough is done by tractors while the remaining 50 percent is done by plow (*Gawahan*). But in central, southern and eastern Afghanistan only 30 percent of plough is done by tractors because of the mountainous terrain, and mostly the traditional means of plough are in use such as plough by oxen. Afghanistan imports fuel with a high price, which increases tractor plough cost (one hour for 500 Afghani/10 dollars). This is one of the factors for extensive use of plow (*Gawahan*).

Upon their repatriation, refugees had no option but to use underground water for irrigation through water pumps of two, three, four and six inches caliber because of the long spell of drought, and the destruction of waterways and canals. The Russians destroyed

irrigation networks in Kandahar and Helmand, which had been developed over decades, to stop anti-Soviet fighters from laying ambushes. Later on, the Taliban destroyed the water canals in Shomali plain. On the one hand, importing water-well drill machinery, and the need for using fuel, lubricant, and accessories for water pumps, cost the farmers a lot; on the other hand, their wheat harvest never could make up for the cost, therefore farmers started growing orchards cultivating poppy fields, which need little irrigation. Farmers cultivating poppy in Farah, Helmand, Kandahar, and Urozgan used water pumps in addition to canals branching off from rivers. In some other areas of the country too, farmers use Chinese, Czech, Indian and Russian water pumps to irrigate their farms particularly when the rainfall amount is low. Over 1 million water pumps are in use for irrigation purpose in Afghanistan. Small farmers still prefer to plough with traditional means of plow (Gawahan). In mountainous areas where the farmlands are on slopes rather than on level ground, few people use tractors for plough, and instead use oxen plough to hoe and shred the crops .

A peasant's share from production is limited because they have to pay land interest to the landlord. Moreover, in addition to paying landlords, middle and rich peasants, they also pay land tax to the government. For the past three decades that Afghanistan has gone through war and conflict, the government has not collected land and livestock taxes. The puppet Khalqi Democratic Government lost control over the countryside immediately, and *jihadis* ran the country through fiefdom systems, while the Taliban were engaged in fierce battles. Under the current occupation, many of the old landlords and the nouveau riche have risen to power and have tried to block land and livestock tax collection. In addition, technical problems have hindered the resumption of tax collection. However, the powerful local rulers have continued to extract money from the masses.

In more recent years, most of the old land maps have been rendered obsolete by a whole series of upheavals and changes, including foreign occupation; lack of security; land grabbing by warlords; lack of land-titling with clearly drawn boundaries; the division of land among sons, grandsons and great grandsons; and the use of some tracts for constructing buildings in rural and urban areas. There is now an urgent need for new maps to be drawn in order that land taxation can be levied fairly. Many false land-titles are recorded in the courts based on the false maps. Collecting land taxes in the traditional way has become less feasible, thus helping landlords to avoid paying taxes over the past eight years and it seems unlikely that any tax will be collected in the next few years either.

In the semi-feudal societies, where peasants and landlords are the two major social classes, peasants produce the material wealth more than any other class, and most of the society depends on the peasants' arduous labor. Under the proletarian leadership, peasants make the main force of the revolution.

Peasants

Afghan peasants can be divided into three categories: owner-peasants, semi-owner peasants and poor peasants. Where there are still farmlands near some urban areas and suburbs, peasants grow mainly vegetables and fruit and sell their produce in nearby cities. In remote areas, where it is not practical for peasants to take their produce to cities, they grow only for their own consumption.

Currently 25,114,290 jeribs of land is used for grain cultivation; 84,000 jeribs for vegetable cultivation, and 965,000 for cultivating poppies. Over a given year one peasant is employed for every five jeribs used for vegetables and poppy cultivation or twice that amount for grain cultivation. The total number of Afghan peasants stands at 2,870,000. Together with orchard farmers and shepherds, they are a major and unbeatable force. Peasant wives live with the same class status and condition, and, once awakened, could double the size of this force for a people's war and a modern democratic revolution.

Over the past three decades (1979-2009), this peasant class has gone through great change, both in terms of quantity and quality. A number of peasants fled to Iran and Pakistan. As they repatriated and resettled in cities they became workers. Others fled to cities following the rural bankruptcy and become either wage-laborers or part of the petty bourgeoisie. Others have become part of the lumpen proletariat, involved in robbery and murder. During the war years some became commanders or armed gang leaders; a few became part of the tyrannical gentry. Clearly those who became compradors on the basis of large-scale urban looting now act as enemies of the masses. Particularly in the face of the U.S. occupation and without the presence of a strong political party of the oppressed masses, a large number of dissidents joined the reactionary Taliban. A number of peasants are involved in poppy cultivation, unknowingly serving the interests of the capitalist mafia. The few who became landlords or members of the bourgeoisie do not exceed 10,000.

The peasants' work begins in September and continues until the following September. Most of the land is devoted to wheat cultivation. The landowner pays for the seed, plough, fertilizer and threshing with the peasants' share typically equaling one-third or one-fourth of the harvest. Recently, due to the scarcity of farmland, all of the landowner's costs are deducted and then peasants receive half of the harvest. The same arrangement exists in barley and corn cultivation while on orchard farms, the peasants' share is greater.

Peasants are responsible for a variety of collective work, including digging and repairing canals. The amount of work and the number of collective workdays depends on the damage caused by rain and other natural factors, as well as the distance from the headspring. In some cases, canals are so long that peasants have to take along several days' supply of food. They are also forced to spend their nights sleeping next to the canal in the open air. In some parts of Afghanistan this repair is done once a year but in other cases, peasants have to repair the canals several times.

Peasants level and prepare the land for planting whether ploughing is done by tractor or oxen. The land is divided into equal segments in order to irrigate. Until the crop is thriving, the land needs to be irrigated several times. In some parts of Afghanistan peasants plant and harvest the crop while another group is responsible for reaping. Reapers are paid in cash or in grain before the harvest is divided. In some parts of the country, where feudal practices are more entrenched, the share of Mulla, barber, ironsmith and *Miraab* (one who regulates the distribution of irrigated water) are also paid before the harvest is divided.

While the harvesting is occurring, village poor gather around, to receive *baksheesh* known as *Kepsang* in the north, *Bekhsang* in the central hinterland and *Dahyak* in the western provinces). This practice reveals how poverty-stricken Afghan society is. Hence, the interests of Mullah and landlord are interdependent. In some parts of the country, the landowner leases

a tract of desolate land to the peasant who can take the first year's harvest for himself and his family. This practice, called *Bogri* or *Bokrik*, continues because it provides the landowner with an efficient method of clearing more land. With this ruse, the landowner binds the peasant to him in gratitude, while using the peasant's toil in order to prepare his land for future cultivation.

Many peasants need wheat or cash advances from the landowner so they can pay for their daily expenses until the next harvest. In some cases the peasant's entire harvest share belongs to the landowner. He must then make a new deal with the landowner, borrowing money again. This debt can reach the point where the peasant is in debt to landowner for his whole life. In some cases indebted peasants repay part of their debt through selling their daughters.

The peasants' staple breakfast is mostly tea and bread, but particularly in the eastern provinces where they raise livestock, peasants have milk and cheese or cornbread. Peasants on Shomali plain mostly take *Talkhan*, made of dried mulberry, for their winter breakfast. For lunch 80% of the peasantry eat bread with onion and corn. In the summer they generally have bread and yogurt. Their dinner consists of beans, vegetables and potatoes; these are cheap. In the summer, they eat the vegetables they grow. In Bamyan, peasants grow potatoes for their daily meals while in the north they cultivate rice. Thus neither use wheat for baking bread. In Kunar and Nuristan, peasants mostly eat cheese; in areas where orchards are common they eat fruit. Except at weddings or other social gatherings peasants rarely eat meat. Most peasants only buy new clothes for family members on the occasion of *Eid*. Most peasants (except in the areas where orchards are common) cannot take fruit.

Peasants' wives also take part in hard labor. They make carpets and weave rugs, collect wheat or corn, weed vegetable gardens, raise poultry and livestock, bake bread, collect opium, and perform chores in the landlords' homes. In the mountainous areas they collect wood for stoves. The daughters and wives living near urban areas work in the homes of rich city dwellers. Through their work and social status, peasant wives are part of the peasant economy.

Due to arduous labor and poor diet, peasants suffer from various health problems in their middle age and soon grow old. Through being forced to pay interest on the land peasants are exploited in exactly the same way as laborers, who generate surplus value, are exploited.

While workers get no share from production which would lead to petty ownership, peasants get a small portion from their production. Peasants consider themselves to be like the land, water, and the share they get from production; they have a petty ownership life. By participating in uprising and armed struggle, peasants will lose their yeomen status. There are various strata within the peasantry and peasants transition from one stratum to another. Frequently the poorest of peasants lose their relationship to the land and are forced to become proletarian.

During the Soviet invasion, the war was concentrated in rural areas. The peasants were the main force fighting against the Soviet invasion; they suffered heavy casualties. Even more, revolutionary forces had extremely limited opportunities. Additionally those forces made a number of mistakes in assessing the anti-Soviet resistance. As a result, revolutionaries failed to lead the resistance. And after the peasants paid with their blood to defeat the Soviet occupation we find there is a new occupation, this time by U.S. imperialism.

Afghan peasants have carried the heavy burden of the three-decade war on their shoulders. Some serve the interests of armed bandits and warlords in the area ruled by warlords and jihadi parties. In the Taliban-held areas, peasants are either forced to serve, or voluntarily serve, the Taliban's interests. In poppy-cultivating areas, they are the backbone of the drug mafia.

Peasants are potentially the main force of the modern democratic revolution in Afghanistan. Yet extremely limited revolutionary work has been carried out among the

peasants. Most Afghan peasants are still in the grip of religious and superstitious beliefs as well as rotten tribal and feudal traditions and medieval practices. Yet under the leadership of the proletariat, the task of encircling cities by the countryside falls upon the shoulders of the peasants.

What is clear is that the objective and subjective conditions for revolution will grow in proportion to the peasantry's progress. Without this growth the working class will be deprived of its chief ally, and any movement from the working class alone will be a left deviation doomed to failure.

Afghan peasants have played a major role in the battles over power both in the capital and in feudal fiefdoms across the country. They have suffered heavy losses, paying with their lives and their property. In three Anglo-Afghan wars and once again during the Soviet invasion the peasantry was the massive oppositional force. But since the leadership of the wars remained with the feudal rulers, once the enemy was defeated the interests of the peasants have never been considered. In fact the peasants' miseries have increased. In the late 1970s, due to the drought and famine many peasant families sold their daughters. In fact the peasants did launch a limited uprising, attacking warehouses of both the government and the landlords. But without a powerful revolutionary party to channel the anger, only exploiters benefitted from the peasants' uprising.

However due to the three decades of refugee life, clashes, losses, betrayals and imperialist occupation, peasants have developed a higher level of consciousness. They are also familiar with using weapons and are more prepared for armed struggle. If revolutionaries can build their power bases among the peasants, and if that party can take root among the peasants and develop links with the leadership of the working class, they will definitely participate in the victory of the oppressed masses.

Right now peasants carry the heavy load of the Taliban war against the foreign occupation and the government in Kabul. The Taliban further entrenches the imperialist occupation in our country by committing appalling crimes. In addition to the Taliban, warlords also take advantage of the peasants' strength by using tribal, regional, religious and linguistic affiliations to strengthen their own armed groups. It will remain impossible to stop the misuse of the peasants' strength at the hands of Taliban and the warlords, unless the massive peasantry acquires consciousness.

Depending on their land possession and the share they get from the harvest, there are three strata within the peasantry. This stratification is applicable to the entire country; however, the peasants at each stratum and their level of possession vary in different parts of the country. To clarify this, a number of villages from different parts of Afghanistan are presented here as examples. It is worth mentioning that depending on the fertility of a given tract of land in different parts, the peasants' stratification also differs. For instance, in Shad Khan village in Khewa district of the eastern Nangarhar province, because of plentiful waterways, proximity to the provincial capital Jalalabad and two harvests per year, peasants get much higher harvest from the given size of land compared to the same size in Bedo Mushkin village in central Bamyān province or Roken village in the western Farah province. Hence, middle peasants in Farah own more than five *jeribs* of land on average, but a peasant owning the same size of land will be considered a rich peasant in Khewa district of Nangarhar province. Therefore, the stratification in terms of land possession is not similar in all villages. Here four villages are chosen from the north, center, east and west of the country as models to analyze the peasantry stratification at the country level.

1. Bedo Mushkin village:

Located in Yakawlang district of central Bamyān province, Bedo Mushkin has 90 families, of which, 18 families are currently refugees in Iran. The village is 90 kilometers away from

the provincial capital of Bamyan, therefore peasants do not have a market to sell their agriculture produce. Thus the vegetable cultivation which brings a good income for middle peasants does not bring a significant amount to the village families income. The size of land is measured through the seed scattered on it in *Ser* (7 kgs). 91 villagers make a living through farming, of which three villagers cultivate 100 Sers of seeds each, one villager cultivates 80 Sers of seed, one villager 70 SERS, three villagers 60 SERS each, one villager 50 SERS, two villager 35 SERS each, four villager 30 SERS each, three villagers 25 SERS each, one villager 20 SERS, nine villager 25 SERS each, two villagers 12 SERS each, nine people 10 SERS each, two villagers seven and a half SERS each, two villagers five SERS, four villagers 4.5 SERS each, four villagers 3.5 SERS each, two villagers three SERS each, 11 villagers 2.5 SERS each, eight villagers two SERS each, eight villagers 1.5 SERS each, 10 villagers one SER each, and one villager does not possess land at all. Among the residents of the village, nine are landowners (in this village landowners have a land of between 50 and 100 SERS each). 35 are semi-owner peasants (owning between 7.5 and 35 SERS of land each), and 49 people who have land of less than five SERS each, make the poor peasants who have to work on the land owned by others. There are 29 teachers, five shopkeepers and 10 artisans in the village, making the petty bourgeoisie of the village.

2. Shad Khan village:

Shad Khan Village is located in Khewa district of eastern Nangarhar province. Here, land is measured in *jerib*, but those who possess less than one *jerib* of land, measure their land by *Tokhmrez* or the amount of seed cultivated. On average, four SERS of wheat is cultivated on each *jerib*. Each SER of seed, yield 15 SERS of harvest, meaning each *jerib*, yields 60 SERS of wheat. Four villagers have land of 20 SERS of *Tokhmrez* each, four villagers 18 SERS each, six villagers 10 SERS each, one villager 12 SERS each, six villagers eight SERS each, 12 villagers six SERS each, 11 villagers five SERS each, 39 villagers four SERS each, 32 villagers two SERS each, and 17 villagers one SER each. 134 villagers are agrarians of which 21 are middle peasants, and 113 are poor peasants who survive on less than five SERS each. There are 82 teachers, civil servants, drivers, shopkeepers and brick layers in the village. Besides men, women also do arduous tasks such as raising cows, poultry, working in the fields, and tailoring and embroidery in addition to the daily chores around house, and make part of the family annual income. Peasants possessing less than five SERS *tokhmrez* (the quantity of seed scattered), can rely on their income for only five months, and have to cover for the remaining seven months by doing wage labor in the village, or in Jalalabad and Kabul cities, and particularly in Peshawar city in Pakistan. Some families even send their sons younger than fifteen years of age to Peshawar to support their families by working as wage laborers. Unlike Bedo Mushkin village, Shad Khan Qala is in proximity of Jalalabad city; therefore the peasants can sell their vegetable produce in the city, and make more money from smaller land tracts. While in Bedo Mushkin where peasants only grow potatoes, and in Roken village where peasants only grow cucumber. Each peasant family has at least on cow for milk and yogurt in Shad Khan village, and annually makes lots of curd.

3. Chichka village:

Chichka village is located in Khoja Ghar district of northern Takhar province, and has residents of 40 families. People mainly rely on agriculture. The land is cultivated twice a year. The first harvest is wheat or flaxseed; the second harvest is mung bean, rice, corn and sesame. The village is 20 kilometers from the center of the district, so there is not market for the village vegetable produce. Women of the village do yarn spinning, cotton spinning,

and help their husbands with farm work. Besides irrigated land, the village has 500 *jeribs* non-irrigated land. In Chichka, six people have land between 30 and 80 *jeribs* each. They also have the same size of irrigated land. One peasant is employed for every 20 *jeribs*, thus each of the six landlords in the village exploit between three and six peasants. Eight people have between 10 and 20 *jeribs*, who exploit one or two peasants in addition to toiling their lands themselves. Henceforth, the village has eight owner-peasants. Another 15 people who own between four and eight *jeribs* are semi-owner peasants, who do wage labor in addition to toiling their own land. They make part of their annual expenses through cultivating their lands. Other villagers who don't own land are either poor peasants, or belong to the artisans and civil servants who are considered as petty bourgeoisie.

Peasants in Chichka cultivate their lands twice a year, and their produce consists of wheat, corn, melon, watermelon, mung bean, flaxseed, sesame and rice. They also cultivate vegetables such as onion, okra, eggplant, tomatoes, spinach, zucchini, turnip and carrots.

4. Roken village:

Roken village is situated 16 kilometers from the provincial capital of Farah province. There are 277 families in the village with a total workforce of 347 people. Out of this number, 107 people either live and work in Iran, or go back and forth. The land is cultivated once every three years meaning the landowner with 150 *jeribs* has 50 *jeribs* in reality, because each *jerib* is cultivated once every three years due to irrigation water shortage mainly. The village has a separate canal branching off Farahrod river. Since Farahrod has water only for five or six months a year, people have to use water pumps quite often. Currently there are three hundred water pumps in use in Roken village. Besides wheat, barley, alfalfa, clover, poppy, watermelon and cucumber, other types of vegetables are also cultivated for the villagers own consumption. Orchards are also common. The villagers also sell the grapes and jujube.

Tractors are used for plough. There are five tractors in Roken village. The traditional plow (Gawahan) has ceased to exist. Wheat harvest is 1:15 or 1:25 of the seeds scattered. With the recent changes taken place in the village, currently there are only 13 landlords that exploit between one and three peasants annually. But most of the peasants are semi-owner, toiling their own land without employing other peasants. Landowners cultivate over ten *jeribs* for every harvest season. There are 25 poor peasants in Roken. The number of semi-owner peasants who own up to eight *jeribs* of land stand at 57. The petty bourgeoisie of the village is consisted of lower civil servants, teachers, carpenters, barbers, shopkeepers, broom-weavers, and peddlers, making a total of 65 villagers. There are 14 laborers and 12 skilled laborers such as tractor drivers, and masons in Roken. There are 15 vineyards with 1200 up to 12000 grapevines planted in each. A total of 18 farmers are employed by the owners of the vineyards. The village also has 11 big orchards of jujube yielding between four tons and five tons of jujube. The market price of every kilogram of jujube is 120 Afghanis (2.30 dollars).

Women in Roken raise poultry, cows, goats and sheep for eggs, meat, lassi, curd, butter, milk, wool, dung (for burning), and manure (for fertilizer). Women's share in collecting jujube and grapes and processing them into raisins is significant. Carpet weaving and broom weaving are also common in the village. Women also do tailoring and embroidery which make a good source of income for the families.

Now the overall stratification of peasants is presented after four samples of peasants strata from four villages in four parts of Afghanistan were given.

Poor Peasants:

This stratum made the largest of the peasantry before the Soviet-backed coup in April 1978. Though these peasants have lost their land for various reasons, they work on landlord and owner-peasants' land, and get one-fourth of the harvest annually. On average, these peasants get between one to one and half *Kharwar* (a *Kharwar* equals 560 kgs) of wheat annually which barely suffices for eight month bread of a family of six members of poor peasants. The remaining expenses are covered through borrowing money, women working on the farm, the wage labor done in free time, raising poultry and so on.

In the mock "land reform" of Taraki's Khalq Party, most of these peasants were given five *jeribs* of land each, but they soon gave up ownership of the land they were given. Some of the poor peasants fled to Iran and Pakistan. Less than 60 percent of the peasants returned to the peasant life upon repatriation, and 40 percent resettled in cities and stopped working as peasants for good. With the repatriation of refugees, the city population increased manifold in a short period of time. Some of the peasants bought land in their villages and started tilling their own land, thus becoming semi-owner peasants. Most of big landlords who fled to Pakistan or Iran could not maintain their position anymore, because they could not work for they had become elderly, neither could they fill their purses from the cash given to the *jihadi* parties, nor could they extort money at gunpoint to become richer or to preserve the land they had inherited from fathers; such big landlords started selling their lands. Therefore those peasants, who had become rich because of the new dynamics, purchased the land.

The lands earlier owned by Pashtoons were grabbed by Tajik and Uzbek warlords. Thus, some of the previously poor peasants became owner-peasants or big landlords, or by grabbing large tracts of state-owned land. So far, warlords have grabbed 4.5 million *jeribs* of land. Hence, the poor peasants went through significant changes. Two decades of refugee life in Pakistan and Iran hit hard the big landlords' families, and the owner-peasants and semi-owner peasants. Their land tracts did not expand. On the other hand, their land tracts had to be divided between the members of the expanded family. This land division had to be conducted to the point that some big landlords' sons inherited only a courtyard; the little tract next to it was turned into a small orchard where the once son of a big landlord became a farmer there. The income from this small size of property did not meet the requirements of the family. Therefore, they did not have to employ more peasants to work on their land, and many of the employment opportunities for poor peasants ceased to exist. This time around, some of poor peasants had to become wage laborers who now work in construction sites, brick factories and road construction, or they sell their workforce in Iran and Pakistan or in the Gulf countries. Some have become laborers working in cutting marbles, carpet-weaving, and other industrial products. Others work as painters, mechanics, confectionaries, welding, tailoring, carpentry, or work as peddlers. The remaining has become addicts and don't take active part in production. Some of the unemployed peasants form lumpens and have joined the gangs of robbers, murderers, warlords or the Taliban. Thus, part of the poor peasants has broken up into other peasant strata, laborers, petty bourgeoisie and lumpen proletariat inside Afghanistan or abroad in Iran and Pakistan.

Currently making 30 percent of Afghan peasants, the poor peasant stratum is the most revolutionary of the peasants, and is very receptive to the cause of the working class. Mao has described them as rural proletariat. But this stratum of peasants is no longer as large as it used to be before the coup in 1978 and has been replaced by the semi-owner peasants as the largest peasants' stratum. Poor peasants still struggle for their survival as a social stratum in the north, west, and to a certain extent in the east of the country where larger size of cultivable land is available. But in the south and central provinces of Afghanistan where peasant petty ownership is dominant due to lack of enough cultivable land, the number of poor peasants is low.

Semi-owner Peasants (Middle Peasants):

Semi-owner peasants make the largest stratum among the Afghan peasants, and the size of the land they possess differs in different parts of Afghanistan. They get two to three KHARWAR wheat harvest, and also a quantity of vegetables, corn, vetch and other grains; they also have a certain amount of income from raising livestock. In the areas with poppy cultivation, the semi-owner peasants also make money from poppy cultivation equivalent to six KHARWAR of wheat. In the west and north of the country, semi-owner peasants own between 5 and 20 *jeribs* of irrigated and non-irrigated land, while their main land next to their residential area is up to three *jeribs*. But in the central and southern parts of Afghanistan and in the mountainous areas like Nuristan, Bamyan, Paktia, Paktika and Badakhshan, their total land size is between two and five *jeribs*. These peasants only work on their own land, and don't employ any other peasants. Around 60 percent of Afghan peasants are consisted of semi-owner peasants, and are spread across the country. Bankruptcy of owner-peasants, divide of the land of small landlords among their family members, during the refugee life, sale of the land owned by the big landlords in the past, grabbing state-owned land at gunpoint over the past 30 years, have resulted in the ever-expansion of semi-owner peasants. In the mountainous areas with limited cultivable land, and where the land is divided based on the patriarchal and tribal system, each villager got two to three *jeribs* from the land inherited from father, upon repatriation from Iran or Pakistan. Also, some of the villagers received only a skimpy tract of land, which is not enough for none of the family's male members. In this case, the land is given to one or two brothers in return for cash to other brothers, who would go back to Iran or Pakistan and get involved in non-peasant jobs, thus switching their social class. Though the upper layer of the semi-owner peasants, but it constantly try to reach the position of owner-peasant. The upper layer makes only 20 percent of the semi-owner peasants, the remaining 80 percent are consisted of the lower layer, which can only make a living to survive.

Semi-owner peasants live in old mud houses, and only have shovel and hack as farm implements. Some of them have plough, MALA and CHAPRI and lend them to other peasants too (this practice is called *Algaw* or *Polgho* in the north of Afghanistan). Sometimes a peasant has to borrow oxen from another peasant to plow the land as one ox is not enough to get it done. The peasant pays the owner of the oxen from the harvest. This pay differs according to the size of the land and also the arrangement in different parts of Afghanistan. In winters, peasants in center hinterlands look after the landowner's oxen in return for straw and grass as well as a small portion from the harvest; this practice is called *Osra*.

Majority of semi-owner peasants are not sure what future holds for them, particularly its lower sub-divide, not much different from the poor peasants. A small untoward circumstance can present huge challenges to them, such as a family member getting sick, paying tributes to the bullying landlords, or arranging a wedding party for a son can break the cohesion of their lives, and force semi-owner peasants to the status of the poor peasants. These middle peasants cannot afford to buy improved seeds and fertilizers; usually their harvest is not good or the crop is damaged because they cannot pay for irrigation water when reaping time nears, therefore their harvest is much less than the harvest of landlords or rich peasants. Semi-owner peasants are always worried about their status; therefore they work extremely hard to maintain their position. Their sons and wives also work on the field, in addition to raising poultry, looking after the livestock, doing carpet-weaving, rug-weaving, embroidery, laundry, baking and doing the chores in the house of landlord and wealthy families. Women in Nuristan province have to work even harder because they have to do the farm work mainly as men look after the livestock and take them to the grazing land. Women also have to collect wood from the mountains to stoke every day and also stock for winter. Their children have to work at

young age to build houses in the village, collecting fodder for livestock such as alfalfa, clover and barley; collecting wood for winter, refurbishing the roofs for winter snowfall; shoveling orchards; taking cows, goats and sheep to the grazing land; thus every member of the family has to work hard the whole day.

Like the poor peasants, this stratum, in particular its lower sub-divide wants a new situation to emerge so that they get rid of all their miseries and destitution; they can join the revolution even with the very little consciousness provided to them. In addition to the poor peasants, revolutionaries should pay greater attention to enabling semi-owner peasants to join the revolution. Revolutionary work among Afghan peasants is in fact revolutionary work among the middle peasants; because their status in the village and their frustration about their living condition can bring them to the revolution lines.

Rich Peasants (Owner-Peasants):

Rich peasants constitute around 10 percent of Afghan peasantry. Each of them contends to reach the landlord status through exploiting a few peasants; hence they don't miss any opportunity to buy the land of any bankrupt middle peasant, in order to expand the size of the land they own. Rich peasants get a harvest of over ten KHARWAR each year. They also cultivate a tract for vegetable and fruit, rice, corn, potatoes, vetch, beans, cotton etc. Called *Kulaks* in communist literature, they broker land renting, making money through providing transportation between the village and the city, and possessing mills, while some of them are money-lenders. Though money-lending is disapproved of because of religious conviction, and money-lenders are detested, but with the modern private banking, it faces less objection; however, it is still an unacceptable practice if conducted in the old manner. Rich peasants have close ties with the wealthy city dwellers, so they commute between the village and the city frequently. They possess tractors, shredders, and in some areas, oxen for plough. In some parts of the country, they drill several water wells, and use water pumps to irrigate their own land, and also sell irrigation water to other villagers. Rich peasants mobilize the rural capital and wealth more than anyone else. MIRABI (regulating irrigation water distribution) and running the village affairs also belong to them; since the year 2002, the village affairs are through village councils rather than the old manners; these *Kulaks* still play dominant role in the village councils.

Rich peasants have prospered either from the middle peasants getting rich or from the bankruptcy of landlords, or upon the repatriation of peasants from Iran and Pakistan and particularly the Arab countries while bringing along sizable amount of money, or by grabbing lands at gunpoint, as well as making fake land titling, or grabbing the state-owned lands. Some rich peasants have gone bankrupt due to the social changes over the past 30 years, while some other rich peasants have expanded the land size they previously owned. Though the change has taken place in the case of all rich peasants across Afghanistan, but its scale varies. Rich peasants are part of the peasantry, but they have two characteristics: on the one hand they are peasants themselves, on the other hand, they employ and exploit a few other peasants and hire laborers. Thus they are less receptive to the revolutionary cause. They are not called village bourgeoisie in Afghanistan, but they virtually play the village bourgeoisie role. The rich peasants join the revolution once the revolution gains momentum, and they are left with no other option but to join the revolution. In addition to joining their own party lines, they can join the modern democratic revolution and can participate in the united front as an organization or a party with the communist party. Rich peasants resemble national bourgeoisie in their class status.

Peasantry constitutes the largest class in the Afghan society. Grain and seeds are cultivated on a total area of 5222858 hectares or 25114290 *jeribs*; while one peasant works on every 10 *jeribs*, the total number of peasants growing grain stands at 2511429. Each peasant family has

5 members on average; therefore 12557145 Afghans depend on the income made through this type of agrarian production. 168000 hectares (849000 *jeribs*) land is devoted to cultivating vegetables yearly; one peasant works on every five *jeribs* of land devoted to vegetable cultivation, thus 168,000 peasants work in vegetable cultivation; with an average of five members for each family, 840,000 villagers make a living from vegetable cultivation. In the year 2007 (this year is also used for the fore-mentioned statistics), 193,000 hectares (965,000 *jeribs*) was given to poppy cultivation. One peasant works on every five *jeribs* of poppy land, thus 193,000 peasants work in poppy fields, and with an average of five members for their families, 965,000 villagers are dependent on the income from poppy cultivation. The total number of people dependent on income from grain, vegetable and poppy cultivation stands at 14362145.

Orchard Peasants:

Cultivating orchards has been common for centuries in Afghanistan. Afghanistan is the world's second fruit supplier following Lebanon. Before 1979 and the beginning of the 30 years of war, Afghanistan supplied 60 percent of fresh and dry fruit to the global market. This also constituted the bulk of Afghan exports. Thirty years of war dealt a severe blow to the orchards in Afghanistan, but refugee repatriation from Pakistan and Iran, and the hard work of the toiling and sweating masses, once again helped orchard cultivation prosper. Currently there are 160,000 hectares (800,000 *jeribs*) devoted to orchards. One peasant works on every five *jeribs* on average, thus the total number of orchard peasants stand at 160,000. With an average of five family members for each orchard peasant, a total of 800,000 Afghans are dependent on orchard income. The figure for growing fruit in Afghanistan for the year 2007 is as following:

No.	Fruit	Total Production by Ton	Province	Production by Ton
1	Pomegranates	Over 178747	Kandahar	35000
2	Grapes	726322	Parwan	148000
3	Almond	31481	Samangan	13800
4	Peach	13622	Kabul	4060
5	Apples	54869	Wardak	21250

Furthermore, apricots, watermelon and melon from Afghanistan have got high demand on foreign market. But due to the occupation, war, corruption in the puppet regime, high taxes that neighboring countries levy on Afghan fruit export (India levies 100 percent tax on Afghan fruit import, while Afghanistan has placed only 11 percent tax on India's luxury and low quality commodities imported to Afghanistan), low quality of processing and packing, Afghan fruit production is not capable of competing against Indian and Pakistani fruit products.

Over 90 percent of orchard peasants work on their own orchards. They resemble poor peasants and owner-peasants in their social status depending on the size of the orchard and its productivity. Those orchard owners, who have more than one orchard, hire a number of peasants in return for daily wages, to shovel the orchards, cut branches, and irrigate. The peasants hired are wandering laborers who sell their workforce in the village and in the surrounding villages. In some parts of the country, orchards are also considered as farm work; the way a peasant gets one-third or one-fourth of the crop harvest, he can get one-fifth or one-

sixth of the fruit harvest despite doing all the arduous tasks of the orchard. An orchard owner hires wage peasants on a daily basis, but he does the main part of the orchard work himself. The income from orchard is higher than the farm work, and orchard peasants are usually better-off compared to farm peasants.

Apple and apricot orchards in Wardak and Logar, vineyards, mulberry and walnuts in Shamali, vineyards and pomegranate orchards in Kandahar and Farah, vineyards of Parwan and Heart, almond in Samangan and Zabul, melon in the north, jujube in Farah, prune in Ghazni, watermelon in Farah and Helmand, and orange, lemon and clementine in Nargarhar generate higher income than the land with the same size devoted to wheat, alfalfa, corn or paddy fields. Some of the big orchard owners, who exploit several orchard peasants every year, lease their orchards to the poor orchard peasants. Leasers are usually those who have close ties with fruit business in the cities. Orchard leasing is a common practice among Afghan orchard owners, sometimes ending up in pressing times because the orchard peasants get much lower than expected fruit harvest. Orchard owners, who work on their orchards and also hire one or more orchard peasants in return for daily wage, are considered rich and act as village bourgeoisie, waiting for their time to beat small orchard owners, with the hope to become big orchard owners.

Shepherds:

Statistics from the year 2007 show that there are 4.4 million cows, 8.1 million sheep, 5.4 million goats, and 9.3 million chickens in Afghanistan livestock and poultry. This figures has seen no significant change except for the chicken. The total number of cows, goats and sheep in Afghanistan is 17900,000. Generally, two shepherds are employed for taking 200 goats and sheep to the grazing land, and one *Padawan* (cow shepherd) is employed for taking 100 cows to the grazing land. There are a total of 180,000 shepherds and *Padawan* in Afghanistan, each with an average of five-member family; thus 900,000 Afghans live on the income of shepherd and *Padawan*. Like peasants, shepherds and *Padawan* too, live in rural areas. Shepherds consist of *Kuchis* (nomads) and settled shepherds. *Kuchis*, with a population of 1.5 million, live in tents and are led by *Sarkhel* (tribal leader). While big livestock owners own herds of between 1000 and 5000 goats, sheep and camels, middle livestock owners own herds of between 100 and 500 goats or sheep, but small livestock owners have herds of fewer than 100 goats and sheep. Shepherds take the livestock owned by big livestock owners and their own livestock to pasture and stay there for many days and nights. Fifty percent of the livestock is owned by the big livestock owners, while the remaining fifty percent is owned by the middle and small livestock owners. Shepherds get one yearling out of ten, each year, while the rest goes to the gentry who own them. In some places, one out of twenty yearlings is given to shepherd. Thus while working so hard throughout the year without getting anything significant from their labor, shepherds suffer the most acute form of exploitation at the hands of gentry. The *Sarbans* (camel shepherds) take camels to the grazing land, and are in no way better-off than shepherds. Since the number of camels is way too small, so is the number of *Sarbans*, compared to the shepherds.

Settled shepherds who take the village livestock to the grazing land, get paid on a monthly basis. Most of villagers possess a few goats and sheep. The shepherd takes them out to the grazing land during the day, and returns them to the village for the night. Their monthly income is less than the salary of a junior government employee. *Padawan* who takes villagers' cows to the grazing land have similar living condition to that of the shepherds. Upon returning the cows from the grazing land in the evening, *Padawan* gets a quantity of food called *Ash Halal* or *Khoja Khezri*, from each owner's house. In the east and central provinces of Afghanistan, many families cultivate land in addition to raising livestock, but there is no set proportion between agriculture and livestock as the two main pillars of

production. Some villagers mainly raise livestock; others are agrarians, while they all have peasant lives.

Peasants, orchard peasants and shepherds have similar living conditions in general (poppy peasants have higher income than other peasants, while shepherds are the poorest); their share from the production is similar and they all are exploited by paying interests to the land owners. The three sub-divides live in rural areas and are connected by the similar miserable living conditions. The three are parts of the revolutionary force, and join the revolution cause under the leadership of proletariat, after getting the required revolutionary consciousness. Since peasants, orchard peasants and shepherd together make a total number of 3212426, and make a living for 16 million out of the 25 million population of Afghanistan, thus they make the main force of the revolution; once mobilized, they make a force so powerful that they can smash any power. Hence, the Afghan society is a peasant society and the stage of the revolution is modern democratic revolution. In addition to peasants, gentry and part of the petty bourgeoisie (junior civil servants, teachers, artisans and peddlers) also live in rural areas. Therefore, the total number of those living in rural areas goes beyond 16 million individuals.

Landlord Class

Landlords are those that own both land and part of the farm implements, thus exploiting the peasants through land interest. Big landlords own lands between 1000 and 75000 *jeribs*, while middle landlords own land between 500 and 1000 *jeribs*; small landlords own land between 100 and 500 *jeribs*. They employ peasants according to their land size. The main power base for feudalism is the rural areas, but their intelligentsia representatives in the state system are based in the cities. They do not forgo any efforts to stand up to the revolution and deny communists, determined to topple their tottering power, a victory. The dominant class characteristic of the present government is a combination of puppet landlords and compradors.

Big landlords, too, have gone through a number of changes in recent years. A number of top big landlords of the years before the 1978 coup no longer enjoy their unchallenged power and lost their social status, because of the emergence and pressure from the armed groups in the rural areas, or they had to divide their land between the male members of their expanded families. But a number of landlords who also had a family member affiliated with armed groups managed to protect their lands during the war years. But the nouveau riche landlords, who emerged across the country in recent years, rule with cruelty and also are in the leading positions of some of the *jihadi* parties, make the chunk of the landlord. By using religion, traditions and customs entrenched in feudalism they fight any manifestations of capitalism, while also frightened by the revolutionaries. Most of those at the top most echelons of the current puppet regime consist of this class. Most of the parliament members are representatives of this class, thus establishing the relations between the rural areas and the city. In some places, the power of the landlords is huge. For instance, Haji Payenda, a big landlord in Sar-e Pul forced a village teacher and his family to pay him and his brother 200,000 Afghanis and quit the village, after a friend of Payenda raped the wife of the teacher. Despite being the victim, the teacher was ordered in public to pay the amount as a fine and quit the village.

Sayed Mansour Naderi, a big landlord, rules over everyone in Dara-e Kayan in Baghlan province. He not only enjoys absolute landlord power, but has also created the party *Paiwande Meli*, and has brought a number of *Parchami* puppets into his party; he rules over the people through the power he inherited from his father. His brother is minister without portfolio at the Presidential Palace; this way the entire family is connected with the government, set up by the occupying forces, and safeguard their interests both in the city and in the village. Zabit Jalil, grandson of Haji Sultan Mohammad Khan, the biggest landlord in Afghanistan before the 1978 coup, is a *jihadi* commander, has not only managed to maintain the land he inherited from his father and grandfather, but has also expanded it. He was also promoted from a non-commissioned officer to the rank of major general by the government. Aref Noorzai, another big landlord involved in the armed resistance against the Soviet invasion, used his tribal links to preserve his land in Kandahar and Helmand provinces. He is now a parliament member, and also served as the deputy speaker of the parliament for a while. Haji Din Mohammad, who was governor of Kabul before the son of Sabghatullah Mojadedi, Senate Speaker, is from a powerful gentry's family in the east of Afghanistan. He has grabbed large tracts of land at gunpoint. Hazrat Ali grabbed part of the lands in Gamberi Dag (steppe) in Nangarhar province. He is now a parliament member. Kabir Farahi, the political deputy minister of foreign affairs also comes from a powerful feudal background. A big number of this class holds powerful positions in the current government.

Landlords that exploit peasants through extracting the highest amount of land interest

across Afghanistan are as following:

In Baghlan province: Haji Sultan Mohammad Khan (in Baghlan Jadid), 4000 *jeribs*; Khaja Lal Aqa (Dahana-e Ghor) 2400 *jeribs*; Rais Atiq, 2000 *jeribs*; Wakil Abdul Rashid, 1700 *jeribs*; Wakil Nasim, 1400 *jeribs*; Ali Ahmad formerly a royal court minister, 900 *jeribs*; Haji Hashem, 900 *jeribs*; Haji Akhtar (Bande Ghor) 800 *jeribs*; Haji Pacha Mir (Baghe Shamal) 570 *jeribs*; Arbab Saidal (Chashma Shir) 500 *jeribs*.

In Kunduz province: Mohebullah Khan (Khanabad) 10,000 *jeribs*; Hakim Khan (Khanabad) 5000 *jeribs*; Sarwar Nasher, 4000 *jeribs*; Sardar Mohsen (Qalamcha) 3000 *jeribs*; Haji Qudus Aqtash (Aqtash) 1500 *jeribs*; Haji Nazekmir (Archi) 1200 *jeribs*; Haji Baba Mir, 1000 *jeribs*; Haji Akhtar Kakar (Qalaye Zal) 1000 *jeribs*; Haji Fazel Rahim Shenwari, 500 *jeribs*; Nang Yousufzai, 500 *jeribs*; Haji Aman, 400 *jeribs*.

In Ghazni: Barakat Abdul Ahmad Khan 20,000 *jeribs*, Khan Mohammad Khan, 10,000 *jeribs*; Haji Sher (Qalaye Pasar), 1000 *jeribs*; Wakil Abdul Rashid, 400 *jeribs*.

In Badakhshan province: Wakil Hussain (Keshm) 2000 *jeribs*; Haji Burhanuddin (Shahre Bozorg) 2000 *jeribs*; Sayed Mohayuddin (Keshm) 1500 *jeribs*; Makhdum Esmatullah (Faiz Abad) 1500 *jeribs*; Sayed Ahmad Khan Dehqan (Keshm) 1000 *jeribs*; Hakim Bai Badakhshi (Faizabad) 800 *jeribs*.

In Balkh province: Sardar Saryawar Ghafur, 5000 *jeribs*; Qayum Bai, 500 *jeribs*.

In Takhar province: Haji Haikal (Kalafgan) 4000 *jeribs*; Haji Qader (Rustaq) 400 *jeribs*; Karnail Qaraqul (Baharak) 3000 *jeribs*; Mir Wali (Yangi Qala) 3000 *jeribs*; Ishan Nabi (Farkhar) 2500 *jeribs*; Mullah Qurban Arab (Taloqan) 2000 *jeribs*; Haji Kolab (Baharak) 2000 *jeribs*; Nayeb Nabi (Khaja Bahauddin and Darqad) 2500 *jeribs*; Jamshed Khan (Chayab) 2000 *jeribs*; Hafiz Bai (Taloqan) 1000 *jeribs*; Mirhaye Andarkoh (Baharak) 1000 *jeribs*; Qachqar Khan (Khotayan) 1000 *jeribs*; Haji Abdul Rasoul (Chichka) 1000 *jeribs*.

In Farah province: Family of Haji Sultan Mohammad Khan (Bala Buluk) 75000 *jeribs*; Haji Noor Mohammad Khan and brothers (Poshte Rod) 5000 *jeribs*; Haji Hakim Jan, 5000 *jeribs*; Haji Rahim Jan and brothers (Qalaye Kah) 5000 *jeribs*; Yaqub Jan (Bakwa) 2000 *jeribs*; Haji Malek Sher (Khake Safed) 600 *jeribs*.

In Nangarhar province: Hasan Khan Momand (Kama) around 1000 *jeribs*; Haji Mir Afzal Khan (Gushta) 500 *jeribs*; Haji Matiullah Khan (Nangarhar) 400 *jeribs*; Hazrat Mojadedi (Nangarhar) 700 *jeribs*; Sayed Ahmad Gilani and brother (Sorkhrod) 700 *jeribs*; Lal Aqa, 400 *jeribs*.

In Sar-e Pul province: Payenda Mohammad Khan, 1000 *jeribs*; Khair Mohammad Eshaqzai (Baghawi) 2000 *jeribs*; Kamaluddin Khan Eshaqzai, 3500 *jeribs*; Bahauddin Khan Eshaqzai, 4000 *jeribs*; Timur Shah Khan (Kohestanat) 2300 *jeribs*; Mir Hamza Khan (Kohestanat) 2300 *jeribs*.

In Jawzjan province: Wakil Abdul Rashid Khan (Sheberghan) 1500 *jeribs*; Tora Baz Khan, 3700 *jeribs*; Jalad Khan, 2000 *jeribs*; Khudai Nazar Khan (Qamsai) 1200 *jeribs*; Haji Mohammad Qul Bai, 4800 *jeribs*.

Kapisa and Panjsher provinces: Wazir Abdul Rahim Khan (Mahmud Raqi) 300 *jeribs*; Khans of Dashtake Panjsher, 100 *jeribs*.

In Kandahar province: Mohammad Afghan Khan, Abdul Khaliq Khan, Haji Mohammad Shafiq Khan, Gul Sardar Khan, Haji Nazar Khan, Haji Abdullah Khan, Mohammad Tawfiq Khan, Mohammad Ayub Khan, Haji Qaher Khan, Haji Abdul Hai Khan, Mohammad Tariq Khan, Mohammad Harun Khan, Abdul Rahman Khan Babi, Majid Khan Babi, Atta Mohammad Khan Babi, Haji Abdullah Khan Babi, Mullah Naqibullah, Haji Abdullah Khan Saraf, Haji Mohammad Khan Saraf and Haji Bashar Khan, each has over 500 *jeribs* of land, and each employs up to ten peasants.

In Helmand province: Shah Wali Khan, Habibullah Khan, Mohammad Umar Khan, Haji Sarwar Khan, Haji Abdul Qader Khan, Khalifa Haji Shirin Khan, Jamal Khan, Dost

Mohammad Khan, Awrang Khan, Sher Mohammad Khan, Amanullah Khan, Zaher Khan, Mohammad Wali Khan, Taj Mohammad Khan, Haji Nafis Khan and Mehrab Khan, each has over 500 *jeribs* of land, and each employs up to ten peasants yearly.

In Nimrooz province: Family of the former provincial ruler Sultan Mohammad Khan of Kang, Haji Ibrahim Khan, Sakhiullah Dad Khan, Sardar Dastgir Khan, each has over 2000 *jeribs* of land.

In addition to the aforementioned landlords who have inherited land, a number of powerful individuals grabbed private or state-owned lands during the thirty years of war. They are now part of the *nouveau riche*. They not only grabbed private lands, but also bully to irrigate their land by taking other villagers' share of irrigation water. They force some peasants to work for them without pay, while they themselves don't work in repairing or digging irrigation canals. They have also grabbed land in cities, and in addition to being village landlords, they also own land, marketplace, and townships in cities. Here are the names of a few: Ahmad Shah Ahmadzai, who was minister of interior during the years of infighting between *jihadi* parties, has prepared fake titles for 122 houses in Kabul alone. Malawi Abdul Rahman, Wakil Awrang, Moawen Safar, Qumandan Paiman, Dawud Farkhari, Makhdom Abdullah, Qumandan Mir Alam, Qari Rahmatullah, Amer Latif, Sufi Manan, Amer Abdul, Qumandan Ghulam Andarabi, Abdullah Rostaqi, Mirza Naseri, Haji Laqa Andarabi, Rasul Andarabi, Mustafa Andarabi, Agha Sherin, Amir Gul Baghlani, Piraqul, Bashir Chayabi, Qazi Kabir, Mamur Hasan, Haji Agha Gul, Mutaleb Baig, Pir Mohammad Ahandara, Inginar Mohammad Omar, Subhan Qul, Arbab Abdul Wali, Qari Amir, Mullah Mohammad Omar Hazaragi, Qayum Bai, Qumandan Ahmadi, Doktor Qadam Shah, General Nazir Mohammad, Zalmai Khan, Atta Mohammad Noor, General Besmellah, Shamsi, Lal Qumandan, Qelej Qumandan, Wakil Payenda and his brother, Amir Chogha, Majid Pacha Khan Tashqorghani, Gul Mohammad Qumandan, Karim Barahawi, Qumandan Khaja Isa, Yahya Khan Siawoshani, Zabit Jalil, Komisar, Fahim Qasim, Haji Din Mohammad, Haji Zaher, Pacha, Hazrat Ali, Qarar, Zaman, Inginar Ghafar, Munji, Mawlawi Tarakhel, Haji Nabi (brother of Karim Khalili), Arif Dawari, Alam Gul Kuchai, Amin Yakawlangi, Akhund Mohammadi, etc

While 72 percent of Afghan population live in rural areas and are agrarians; big, middle and small landlords make five percent of the rural population or 180,000 individuals, each with an average of five family members. Thus the overall number of those living with gentry relations, is 900,000, owning 50 percent of the cultivable land in Afghanistan. 20 percent of the land is owned by owner-peasants, while the remaining 30 percent land is owned by semi-owner peasants. Of the landlords, less than half consists of the previous landlords, while more than half are those who have recently ascended to the position of landlords during the thirty years of war. Some of the old landlords have managed to maintain their land by the "*jihad*" gun against the grabbing by the warlords. They also have grabbed the land owned by peasants or those from other ethnic groups. Thus it becomes clear that of 18 million villagers, 16 million live with peasant living conditions, 900,000 live with gentry living condition, 200,000 petty bourgeois with an average of five-member family make one million villagers living under rural petty bourgeois conditions (low ranking civil servants, teachers, artisans, shopkeepers, etc), and another 100,000 live with the living condition of working class.

The landlord class, consisted of bureaucratic and non-bureaucratic wings, is the sworn enemy of the people, and its evil elements commit all sorts of heinous crimes against peasants. Landlords are involved in most of the robberies, lootings, kidnappings, raping peasants' wives and daughters, spying for the occupation forces, collaborating with the oppressive government forces, grabbing private and state-owned lands, and cooperation with the Taliban and brokering deals between the Taliban and the foreign forces in the areas under the Taliban control. Elements of the landlord class are closely linked with the government, and enjoy the support of government officials in the capital city and in provinces. Landlords

will be toppled in the modern democratic revolution, as a class supporting the foreign invasion and occupation. Their lands will be redistributed among the poor peasants. This is one of the major tasks of the revolutionaries in this stage of the revolution.

Capitalist Relations (Laborers and Capitalists)

With the urban settlement in Afghanistan, trade began between various production sectors and later trade contacts were established with the neighboring countries. Afghanistan used barter exchange for business inside the country for years. The country experienced a significant progress in trade after banknotes were introduced when the rule of King Amanullah was approaching its end, and the barter tax was replaced with cash taxation; banks were opened and business enterprises started to function. Western countries, particularly the two powerful neighbors India and Russia wanted to expand their trade with Afghanistan and turn the country into a consuming nation by exporting wasteful luxurious commodities to Afghan markets, given the landlocked location of Afghanistan. Thus with the import from Russia and India, the pace of industrial development slowed down; its slow development, however, made some artisans bankrupt, while the demand for their products helped some artisans survive despite the industrial development.

Manufacture has been common in Afghanistan for years, and both men and women worked in it. As a result of machine industry over the past 50 years, some of the manufacture industries have been weakened or completely removed. Some of the professions that were once common in Afghanistan and some that continue to be common are as following: carpet-weaving, leather industry, carpentry, making iron articles, soap making, rug-weaving, fabrics, rope-weaving, sewing, broom-weaving,, pottery, shoe-making, shoe cobblers, barbers, making horseshoes, binding books, miniature, calligraphy, saddle-making, shopkeepers, extracting cooking oil from certain herbs and plants, confectionary, sewing hats, embroidery, weaving beads, stone works, producing painting colors, spinning yarn, making slippers, making veils (burqa), making fringes for burqa, making Chamus (traditional cheap shoes), sewing traditional garb (Chapan), butchery, laying bricks, building mud walls, digging irrigation canals, digging graveyards, making knives, tattooing, making shields and swords, weaving turbans, spinning cotton, making traditional medicines, raising cocoon, weaving tents, peddler, making perfume, and many other professions.

Up until 50 years ago, feudal accommodated some artisans such as carpenters, ironsmiths, barbers, weaver, butchers, and woodworker in their fortress villages. It was said that if a village lacked one of these artisans, it was not considered a complete social unit and could not offer Friday prayer, so they villagers had to go for Friday prayers to the villages that had all these artisans. This was a symbolic representation of a typical feudal society, which was disturbed by the merchant development first.

Artisans usually paid taxes to the government, and had to bear the economic burden of wars through paying money, providing horses, and fighters. Thus they were as dissatisfied with their living condition as the peasants were. Machine industries were first imported during the reign of Amir Sher Ali Khan. It was called "*Maachin Khana*" which produced and repaired weapons. Maachin Khana was destroyed during second Anglo-Afghan war (1878-1880) and later during the strengthening of feudal states of Abdul Rahman Khan and Habibullah Khan.

With the murder of Habibullah Khan, his son King Amanullah ascended to the throne in 1919. Amanullah Khan represented the liberal nobility and wanted Afghanistan to become a modern capitalist country immediately. He introduced a series of reforms in all economic and social spheres, and imported advanced industrial machinery to Afghanistan. In order to boost trade, he merchants. Some of the roads connecting Kabul to provinces were repaired; telephone and telegraph were set up to communicate within the country and with the outside world. Annual budget was approved for the first time; first, he imported weapon factory and its repairing equipment; cotton genopress and a small electricity generator were installed in

Herat province with the Soviet assistance; small factories like button, painting material, matches and wooden furniture began to operate in Kabul with the German assistance. After King Amanullah succeeded to get loans from Germany, he ordered numerous factories to Britain and Germany, including woolen and yarn textile factory, dry cleaning factories, power generating factories, cement factories, sugar and matches factories; he also planned for later phase to produce cigarette, paper, glass, car repair, spare parts, cooking oil, air plane repair, gunpowder, canned fruit, and many more in Kabul city and Paghman, by using electricity. By the time the factory machineries arrived at the port city of Karachi in the then British India, Amanullah Khan's government was already overthrown. King Amanullah intended to launch capitalist development in Afghanistan with the help of the royal court nobility and a group of constitutionalist intellectuals. Operation of all these industrial machineries and the approval of certain laws to ease development of capitalism in Afghanistan paved the way for the emergence of the Afghan working class. The ensuing developments though hindered significantly the development of this process, but the emergence of Majid Zabuli and the prevailing trend among the nobility surrounding Hashim Khan towards capitalist production and interest, once again expedited the process of the emergence of the working class. Thus in the 1940s, the Afghan working class and the bourgeois class emerged.

During this period, Afghan trade was freed from Soviet and Indian monopoly. Afghan traders began trade with Britain and Germany on a limited scale. King Amanullah's economic policy was based on more export, less import, and building up concentrated industries. These three factors could pave the ground for the capitalist development, and weakening of feudalism. In reality, this period demonstrated the peak of contradiction between the rotten feudal system, and the emerging capitalism in Afghanistan. Eventually, feudalism succeeded to weaken the nascent capitalism in Afghanistan, by resorting to religion, customs and landlords power (with the direct support of British colonialism). The British old colonialism at that time, relied heavily on religious and feudal custom factors, and saw bourgeoisie and its revolutionary thoughts of that time a threat to the British interests in Afghanistan.

In this period, Afghan exports to India were worth 8 million pounds, while imports from India were worth 9 million pounds; exports to the Soviet Union were worth 27 million rubles, while imports from the Soviet Union were worth 20 million rubles. During the rule of King Amanullah, the state decided the main economic policies and orientation, but there were also corporations from private sector like Tanwirat (electricity), Motar (vehicles), Adwiya (medicine), Afghani, Afghan, Qamar, Zia, Rafiq and Jarman, and Tejaratkhanaye Shorawi (Soviet Chamber of Commerce) were active, which underlined the fact that the king and his circle were interested in supporting the private sector, the distinctive element of the liberal bourgeoisie. In the state sector, Amania and Samar enterprises were established. Rafiq Corporation worked as a joint venture of private and state sectors. These corporations and enterprises quickly weakened some of the manufactures. While considerable activities were carried out to promote commerce and industry, and a relatively significant number of industrial workers emerged, but the Afghan bourgeoisie was still in the bud, and the royal court nobility but the king were determined to create such sort of industry and class. The nobility paid attention to the development of industry and created its enemy – the working class- when it realized that the tax it got from industrial production was much higher than the taxation from agrarian produce. The agriculture sector paid taxes only once a year, while industry paid taxes every second it produced. The industry and King Amanullah's commercial and industrial programs were destroyed by the mutiny by Habibullah Bachaye Saqao in 1929.

Following the overthrow of King Amanullah, during which the factory machineries he had ordered never got the chance to be used, the machineries were installed during the rule of Nader Khan and Hashem Khan. Since the industrial machinery required electricity, thus the hydroelectric power plant in Jabal Seraj, the hydroelectric power plant of Chak Wardak with a

total capacity of 4000 kilowatts, the hydroelectric power plant of Pul-e Khumri textile factory with a capacity of 480 kilowatts, fuel electricity plant in Kabul Maachin Khana with a capacity of 2000 kilowatts, hydroelectric power plant in Baba Wali of Kandahar with a capacity of 300 kilowatts, fuel power plant in Pashtoon Corporation in Kandahar with a capacity of 14 kilowatts, hydroelectric power plant in Jelaw Archa in Herat with 150 kilowatts capacity, followed one after the other and began operation in the years 1938, 1940, and 1946. In this period, work began on Daraye Shekari and connecting the capital city with the north. Greater attention was paid to growing cotton and beets in the north. In 1932, Majid Khan Zabuli, who had lived abroad for a long time, and had learned the ways through which comprador bourgeoisie works, established a major corporation.

Zabuli and Hashim Khan (the then prime minister and King Zahir Shah's uncle) held the same opinion of starting the industrial production in Afghanistan. They both worked together and got their shares. This clearly highlighted the coordination between the nobility and the nascent capitalism in Afghanistan. Through their cooperation, Zabuli and Hashim Khan could pave the way for the invasion of imperialist capitals in Afghanistan. After the end of the second imperialist World War II, leading to the redrawing of the imperialists' status on the global stage, process of western capitals entering Afghanistan gained a much faster pace. The Americans invested in private sector, and also gave the Afghan government a long-term loan with a 6.5 percent interest rate. Later on, Afghan government awarded American Morison-Knudson Company the contract to build the Nahre Boghra, Nahre Seraj canals, and Kajaki hydroelectric dam in Helmand valley. The Soviets invested in Hadda and Ghaziabad citrus farms in Nangarhar province. Thus, the US and the Soviets began rivalry in Afghanistan. After a while, the US was attracted by Pakistan, and refrained from investing and working in Afghanistan. The Soviets invested in developing gas fields in northern Afghanistan. They developed 36 gas fields in northern Afghanistan and began to transfer gas to the Soviet Union, with each cubic meter for 16 Afghans, which the Soviet later sold to Czechoslovakia for 40 Afghans. This underlines the fact that the Soviets treated Afghanistan to preserve its colonial interest long before invading Afghanistan.

Zabuli and his comprador group also obtained from the government the monopoly over sugar and fabrics production, import of fuel, vehicles, and government's requirements, the export of wool, cotton, Qarqul lamb skin, and excavation of mines. He also proposed that government buy some of the shares from his company on behalf of a number of traders to promote the private sector. Finally Zabuli's company became "National Bank" in 1934, which started controlling monetary-related matters, in addition to doing the company's regular business. The shareholders of the company, with Zabuli at the head, controlled the Afghan economy, and also monitored monetary policy, and money circulation; thus the bourgeoisie for the first time started to grow up. Until then, workers worked only in the sectors where the government had invested. The bourgeoisie class was a combination of nouveau riche small investors and the palace nobility, who also joined the capitalist camp in addition to owning large tracts of land and exploiting peasants. As witnessed, comprador bourgeoisie and feudal nobility are the sworn enemies of the people; they unite quickly; build friendship, and coordination, and serve the interests of imperialism through plundering people. This unity between comprador bourgeoisie and nobility could be clearly seen in the unity between Zabuli and Hashim Khan. Today too, Khalili and Fahim (the two vice presidents of the US-installed government) who represent the rotten feudal ideology, and their brothers who represent the comprador bourgeoisie serving the interests of imperialism, is a clear example of unity between feudalism and comprador bourgeoisie.

National Bank started with a joint investment capital of 3.5 million dollars from government sector and private sector. Eight years later, the government opened "Da Afghanistan Bank" as the central bank with the initial reserve fund of 35 million dollars; thus

the National Bank became a completely private bank. In 14 years of operation, the National Bank increased its capital to 40 million dollars, without any sizable change in the number of its investors. Zabuli, Sardar Rafiq, Aziz Khan Sindhi, Musa Khan Kandahari, Dost Mohammad Khan Aimaq and Ghulam Haider Khan Mokhtarzada were its main shareholders, representing the bourgeois class of that time.

Since its inception under the leadership of Zabuli, the National Bank invested in 50 commercial and production enterprises till 1935, and virtually took control of the commercial and industrial economy of the country for many years. Greater attention in textile industry was paid to Qataghan. In 1949, processed cotton output reached 10,000 tons, and the fabrics made of it reached 15 million meters. Textile machinery was imported from Germany and Britain. Beets cultivation began in Baghlan, and sugar factory equipment was imported from Czechoslovakia. Following are the factories and their investment in that period:

1. Kandahar woolen textile factory was built in 1941 in Kandahar city, with an initial investment of five million Afghanistan. It employed 106 workers.
2. Cotton textile factory of Jabal Seraj, its machinery was purchased during the rule of King Amanullah Khan. It began operation in 1956, and employed 600 workers. In 1953 its production reached 1.1 million meters of fabrics a year.
3. Pul-e Khumri textile factory began operation in 1952. By 1956, the factory had 550 weaving machines. Its average annual production was 14 million meters of cotton fabrics, and 20,000 yarn bundles. 2634 local workers and five foreign technicians were employed in the factory.
4. Baghlan sugar factory was established in Baghlan in 1938, with an initial investment of 28.7 million Afghanis. The enterprise expanded its activities by building two sugar factories: Baghlan sugar factory, and Nangarhar sugar factory. Its daily operational capacity was processing 600 tons of beets, and the annual production was 6000 tons of sugar. 50 workers and two engineers were employed in the factory.
5. Matches factory was built in 1928 towards the end of Amaniah Era (the period King Amanullah Khan ruled Afghanistan). It was functional by state investment till 1942, and was sold to the private sector, Pashtoon Co. Its initial investment was 1.2 million Afghanis. It produced 1194067 match boxes in 1953.
6. Pashtoon Fruit Co. was established in 1934 in Kandahar. For the first three years, fruit was processed and packed manually. In 1938, all its operation was done through machinery. There factory also produced chocolate, butter, fruit conservation, and ice. In 1938 its capital reached 2.7 million Afghanis.
7. Kabul carpentry and marble factory was established in 1937. It was given to the private sector in 1941.

Other corporations active around that time are as following:

1. Pashtoon Kandahar Corporation began to operate in 1934, with an initial investment of 2.8 million Afghanis. The corporation exported dry fruit.
2. National Bank SAHAMI Corporation that began to operate with the initial investment of 60 million Afghanis, to perform financial transactions.
3. Wattan Kandahar Corporation, that began to operate with an initial investment of 49.7 Afghanis, to export cotton.
4. Pul-e Khumri Textile Corporation, established in 1936, with the initial investment of 40 million Afghanis to import textile machinery.
5. Petroleum and Sugar Corporation, was established in 1938, with an initial investment of 30 million Afghanis. It had the monopoly over sugar and petroleum.
6. Vehicle Monopoly Corporation was established in 1938 with an initial investment of 9.2 million Afghanis. It had the monopoly over vehicle import.

7. Qaraqul Corporation was established in 1940, with an initial investment of 44 million Afghanis to export Qaraqul skin.
8. Electricity Corporation was established in 1940 with an initial investment of 1.7 million Afghanis, owned power plant factories.
9. Textile Corporation was established in 1940 with an initial investment of 6.7 million Afghanis, to install the textile factories.
10. Matches Factory was established in 1940 with an initial investment of 1.2 million Afghanis was running matches factories.
11. Carpentry and Marble Corporation was established in 1940 with an initial investment of 3 million Afghanis to produce wooden and marble furniture.
12. Eqtesad Sahami Corporation was established in 1940 with an initial investment of 4.8 million Afghanis to produce woolens.
13. Shoe making Corporation was established in 1940 with an initial investment of 163.5 million Afghanis.
14. Kabul Service (Bus) was established in 1940 with the initial investment of 8.6 million Afghanis to provide transportation services.
15. Weesa Corporation was established in 1940 with an initial investment of 5.5 million Afghanis, had monopoly over a number of exported items.
16. Wool Export Corporation was established in 1941, with the initial investment of 21.4 million Afghanis to export wool.
17. Zabul Corporation was established in 1941 with the initial investment of one million Afghanis, to export wool.
18. Eqbal Corporation was established in Kabul in 1942 with an initial investment of 20 million Afghanis, to export wool
19. Storai Corporation was established in 1942 with an initial investment of two million Afghanis, to export wool.
20. Nangarhar Corporation was established in 1942 with an initial investment of 1.8 million Afghanis, to export wool.
21. Sho'a Corporation was established in 1941 with the initial investment of one million Afghanis, was an export and import corporation.
22. Sabah Corporation was established in 1952 with an initial investment of 700,000 Afghanis, was an export and import corporation.

Some of the factories during this period produced rugs, resulted in stopping the traditional rug-weaving. Thus rug-weavers became poor peasants. Fabric was also imported legally from abroad, and was also smuggled from Iran and Pakistan.

When Shah Mahmood Khan became prime minister, foreign capital invasion to Afghanistan got a faster pace; its upshot was the growth of comprador bourgeoisie. The fake democracy introduced for the first time, only strengthened this process. During the election campaigns for the seventh term of the parliament, one of the two main goals of Khalq Party led by Abdul Rahman Mahmoodi, and Wattan Party, led by Mir Ghulam Mohammad Ghoobar was to oppose the foreign capital invasion, on the ground that foreign capital was the reason for the defeat of the national bourgeoisie. During this period, and also during the ten years of Daud Khan as prime minister, and then during the "*decade of democracy*" and the five years of Daud Khan's republic, Regulated MUKHTALAT economy was the main economic orientation for production and trade. During the prime minister period of Hashim Khan, private sector was supported because it preserved the interests of both the nobility and the comprador bourgeoisie, but in the later years, bureaucratic production, and the support from the US and the Soviet Union were given priority for economic projects. During the prime ministership of Shah Mahmood Khan, trade contracts were signed with European nations like

Britain, Germany, Poland and Czech, and machinery was purchased from them. During the imperialist World War II, the main market for Afghan Qaraqul skin moved from London to Washington. This brought 20 million dollars to the Afghan bank accounts in US banks. Since the US emerged as the victorious nation of the war, it signed the first Helmand Valley contract in 1946 of to build irrigation canals, improve irrigation systems, and build roads. The contract was given to the US company Morrison and Knudson Co. at a total cost of 17 million dollars to be paid from the 20 million dollars Afghanistan had in Washington-based banks. With the three-year contract duration, 300,000 hectares of land was supposed to be ready for the resettlement of 15,000 peasant families. But after six years into the contract, and 20 million dollars spent on it, only 30,000 hectares of land was ready for the resettlement of 1500 peasant families. Some of the amount was loan from US banks. Thus, the newly emerged US imperialism could not conceal that it had the same exploitation policies, and those who were diehard supporters of the US imperialist presence in Afghanistan, had to face humiliation.

Afterwards, contracts were signed with the Soviet Union to survey the gas and oil fields in the north; build petroleum reservoirs in Kabul and Mazar-e Sharif, build oil pipeline between Mazar-e Sharif in Afghanistan and Termez in Uzbekistan; build three silos in Kabul, Pul-e Khumri and Mazar-e Sharif,; and build a hospital in Jalalabad. The Soviet Union offered 8 million dollars of loan to Afghanistan for the projects. This marked the beginning of Soviet influence in Afghanistan. Afghanistan officially became recipient of the US and the Soviet investment upon Shah Mahhmood Khan becoming prime minister. Following the non-capitalist way of development theory, the Soviets invested in the Afghan state sector; The US announced its military assistance to Pakistan in 1953, and rejected Prime Minister Daud's call for equal and similar US assistance to Afghanistan. Daud failed to get the US assistance as the US preferred Pakistan. Thereby, Daud Khan tilted towards the Soviets, and Afghanistan became even more dependent on the Soviets' assistance, the bulk of which went to the state sector. This and Daud's economic policies struck a blow to the private sector.

During Prime Minister Hashim Khan, the National Bank and its main owner Majid Zabul got unqualified support. The bank took significant steps in trade and to a certain extent in industry such as the establishment of Pul-e Khumri textile factory with an annual output of 12 million meters of fabric, Baghlan sugar factory with annual output of 5000 tons of sugar, Chack Wardak hydroelectric power plant of 4000 kilowatts, and Pul-e Khumri hydroelectric power plant producing 9000 kilowatts electricity. Cotton cultivation also became common across the country. Following the WWII, National Bank resumed its functions, but it was on the down grade because the Afghan economic scene had changed due to the emergence of new super powers, and the bank lost its lucrative contracts of petroleum, sugar and vehicles. Though Gulbahar Textile continued to produce an annual output of 35 million meters of fabrics, and the Surubi hydroelectric power plant with a capacity of 22 kilowatts was built, but sugar production, despite the much conducive environment for it, did not receive the required attention, more so because the government was short on budget due to the Helmand Valley project.

Daud Khan pretended to support the Combined Economy and private sector, but in reality he strengthened the bureaucratic economy to the extent that it did not allow the private sector to breathe. In his first five-year development plan of 8.5 billion Afghanis, Daud Khan allocated 50 percent of the development budget to agriculture, 14 percent to communication, 7 percent to public services (education and health), and only two percent to industry and mining. In practice, he focused on road-building and power plants. To this end, roads were built between Kabul-Kandahar, Kandahar-Spin Boldak, Kabul-Torkham, Kabul-Qezel Qala, Salang Tunnel, Kabul-Herat, and Herat-Torghundi. In the second five-year development plan of 33.3 billion Afghanis, 33.5 percent of the development budget was allocated to industry and mining, 23.5 percent to agriculture and irrigation, 25.5 percent to transportation, 11.2

percent to public services, while 6.3 percent was allocated to other sectors. This plan gave greater attention to industry, because the ruling family (Daud Khan was the King's cousin) noticed that the government revenues should be based mainly on the taxes coming from industry and mining as this sector begot more money than agriculture. In this period, barter taxation stopped even in the remotest villages of the country, while market expanded to the remotest areas. To provide new credit, commercial banks, agricultural banks and mortgage banks were created with the government investment. All this paved the way for the growth of medium and small industries. With the increasing tension in Afghanistan and Pakistan relations, trade faced pressing challenges, thus giving a chance to industries and domestic production to flourish. The tension between the two countries, pushed the US to increase its support for Pakistan, while Daud Khan was further inclined towards the Soviets. The first contract between Afghanistan and the Soviets on arm purchase was signed in 1956. In his ten year tenure as prime minister, Daud Khan kept national bourgeoisie and comprador bourgeoisie under immense pressure through strengthening the government sector. Despite all this, the working class gained strength, and all its revolutionary actions were directed against the government.

In the "decade of democracy", the planned (Regulated) and MUKHTALAT economy adopted during the first years of Daud Khan, was applied. Virtually, the role of private sector was next to nothing. The National Bank, which controlled the bulk of private production and trade, had to cease operation because of the contradiction with government economic policies and lack of financial guarantees. Following the completion of Gulbahar Textile factory, no other factory was established by the private sector. Big and middle capitalists redirected their investments in small and quick-profit activities such as house building and transportation. Government investment was focused on road-building, irrigation, and power stations, thus little money was left for setting up big industries. In this period, the Soviets loan reached 572 million dollars and the grant was 100 million dollars, while the US loan for Afghanistan was 99 million dollars, and the grant amount was 313.5 million dollars. The number of Soviet experts (agents) in Afghanistan was 1050, while the number of US experts (agents) was 210. Since the Soviets policy in Afghanistan was to strengthen the government sector not the private sector, the latter faced numerous challenges and could not make a significant comeback.

Comprador bourgeoisie began its activities in trade first. During the reign of the People's Democratic Party, state sector economic policy was applied, but later when Najib took power, due to the change in the government policy and the deteriorating security along the highways, government allowed the private sector to get involved in trade; therefore the import of consuming commodities from India and Central Asian republics began. During the years when *jihadis* ruled the country, the entire economic infrastructure was demolished and factories were sold out to Pakistan as iron scraps; Afghan markets were dominated by Pakistani and Iranian commodities; there was only chaos, and nothing as economic development. During the Taliban, trade with Iran, Pakistan and China increased. With the occupation of Afghanistan at the hands of US-British forces, free market economy was introduced in order to turn Afghanistan into a consuming country; thus imports and exports flourished in many sectors, which will be touched on later.

Capitalist Relations in post-9/11 Afghanistan

With the occupation of Afghanistan and setting up the puppet government by US, British, German, French, Italian and other imperialist powers, market economy was adopted in the Bonn Conference and was later included in the constitution in 2004. Market economy paved the way for the investment and capital invasion of the imperialist corporations into Afghanistan. Apparently there has been an investment of 8.3 billion dollars in all sectors, but the fact that 4 billion dollars have been invested in construction works alone, the figure given for the investment shows only a small portion of what is really invested. Foreign investors conceal the actual amount of their investment for tax evasion, while the puppet government cannot dare to bring them to the book. The foreign exploiters have 201 registered companies in trade alone, and volume of their transactions is several times more than that of the Afghan companies or the incorporated companies. Moreover, the main “export” item of Afghanistan is poppy, worth several times more than all other export items put together. Smuggling of historical artifacts, precious stones and timbers clearly show that billions of dollars have been invested in different sectors of production and commerce, mainly outside of the government control, with the profit going to the foreign companies. Official figures (which cannot independently confirmed) show that 66 percent of the investment in Afghanistan between 2003 and 2009 were from local companies, and 31 percent of the investment has come from foreign companies. Ideologues of free market economy like Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai, Hamidullah Farooqi, Umar Zakhelwal, Anwarul Haq Ahadi, Khan Jan Alakozai, Mina Sherzai, Amin Farhang, Delawari, Mahmood Karzai and others promote the good of market economy through their lectures and writings in publications like Serwat, Pangawali, Eqtesad, Bank, Free Market, etc.

Afghan Investment Support Agency (AISA) was created by the German occupiers; United States Agency for International Development (USAID) with the direct guidance from the CIA also works hard to strengthen the market economy concept in Afghanistan. US Engineering Corps was also established in Kabul by the US to build military bases for the US and also coordinate the activities of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). The bulk of the 37 billion dollars of the so-called US assistance is spent through the Engineering Corps. Now the US imperialism and its corrupt agencies admit that Engineering Corps was involved in massive corruption. The US security company BlackWater with around 30,000 armed men in many countries, is mainly comprised of American and non-American murderers and lumpens; Camp Eggers has been awarded the contract of armored vehicles and construction projects; it also outsources some of its contracts; The Louis Berger Inc. is awarded most of the construction and road-building contracts. It is one of the most corrupt companies in the US, and is linked with the top decision-makers of the US government. FedEx runs the postal services; Bearing Point organizes contracts for US companies in Afghanistan; National Democratic Institute of America (NDI) strengthens the so-called civil society institutions and promotes the bourgeois ideology; US agency “SUMONE” manages US projects in Afghanistan, and the US company Super carries out construction works. It was recently accused of issuing fake passports. All these companies have plundered the bulk of the money in the name of assistance to Afghanistan. Omar Zakhelwal, finance minister of the puppet regime confirmed that Afghanistan has so far received only 7 billion dollars of the “assistance pledged”. World Bank and Asian Development Bank try their utmost to strengthen the free market economy and comprador bourgeoisie in Afghanistan. By January 2009, World Bank has given Afghanistan an amount of 1890 million dollars; of this 1450 million dollars is grant loan, while 440 million dollars is loan. Besides, the UK Department for International Development, German GTZ, Danish DCA, Swiss SDC, Norwegian NCR, Asia Foundation,

Chinese copper mining company MCC, French Cultural Center, German FES, German Mediothek, Japan's JAICA are the agencies that are in Afghanistan to preserve their interests, and strengthen the capitalist system that would only favor their interests. In addition to these agencies and companies, there are a number of companies that operate in Afghanistan in the name of humanitarian assistance, but just to enhance their inauspicious colonial interests. These agencies launch some reconstruction projects just to make smoke screen for their activities. There are also 700 foreign and Afghan contractors working in Afghanistan. Karzais, Fahims, Khalili Brothers, Rahim Wardak, and General Baba Jan are the most corrupt among the local contractors. They make lofty amounts of money by getting contracts. Hamed, son of Rahim Wardak, minister of defense, has made mythical fortunes by providing concrete blocks for sensitive installations and foreign bases. He gets the contracts through his father's ministry. Thus, the concrete blocks are not meant for security, but just to win contracts for those who have invested in it.

Between 2003 and 2009, around 16056 companies got registered with AISA; 78 percent of these companies are local, while 22 percent are foreign companies. 55 percent of the registered companies are construction companies, 25 percent are companies that have invested in the service sector, 16 percent in industry, and 4 percent are in agriculture sector. These companies have so far created 654475 jobs, 55 percent by the local companies, while 45 percent by foreign companies. 53 percent of the jobs are in the construction sector, 28 percent in the service sector, 14 percent in industry sector, and five percent in agriculture sector.

Two types of industrial parks have been established in order to boost private sector: the first type by ministry of commerce in Kabul, Herat and Kandahar, while the other type is created by AISA in Kabul, Herat, Mazar-e Sharif, and Kandahar cities. Most of the industrial parks created by AISA are financed by USAID.

Over the past eight years, 17 private, government banks and branches of foreign banks have begun operation in Afghanistan. Capitalist relations, mainly manifested in banking activities are mostly concentrated in Kabul. Most of the loans provided so far are given to the clients based in Kabul. This highlights that capitalist relations have mainly emerged in Kabul, while the rest of the country where people live under gentry-subject relations is wholly out of step with it.

Despite the imperialism efforts to strengthen capitalism in its own favor in Afghanistan, Afghan cities are still the least developed; Nine out of ten Afghan families live in one-room or two-room houses. Though there are some signs of capitalist relations in Kabul, 70 percent of Kabul residents live in houses that were not built based on the city mapping and planning; there is no running water, sewage, regular electricity, parking lots, or public toilets in the city. Shortage of accommodation units in Afghanistan was 1 million units in 2006; this shortage will be 1.25 million units in 2010, and 1.5 million in 2014. Less than 10 percent of Afghans have access to electricity power; 85 percent of Afghans use wood for heating and kitchen, showing the worst record in the world. Each day, 10 people die in Kabul alone of diseases related to pollution.

People have witnessed countless incidents of looting, poverty, unemployment, bullying of the powerful, corruption, class gap, hard labor for underage children, begging, prostitution, high rate of infant mortality, people dying of curable diseases, insecurity, during the eight years of miserable living condition under the occupation of the country by the imperialist military forces. People realize the intention and evil essence of imperialism. They have demonstrated their anger by holding over 2000 protest rallies and strikes mainly against the presence of US-led foreign troops.

Breakdown and motives of the investment in Afghanistan:

1. Trade, and Transportation Sector:

This sector consists of consultancy, marketing and advertisement (annual spending on advertisement is 20 million dollars), public relations, transport companies, loading and unloading in border crossing points, and custom services. Given the geopolitical location of Afghanistan, imperialists have always tried to turn Afghanistan into a consuming and begging country; since this imperialist perception further deepened after 9/11 heavy investment in trade is taking place for that reason.

Companies and individuals who have received license for import and export between 2003 and 2008, make a total of 56946 companies, comprising 34123 local companies, 358 foreign companies, 160 transit transportation companies, and 20641 individual investors. Currently 25000 of these companies are active, with an investment of between 50,000 dollars and 10 million dollars each. Individual investors have invested in this sector between 30,000 and 150,000 dollars each. But Alakozai, Spin Ghar, and Cement Production have invested more than 40 million dollars each. The total number of big and middle businesses stands at 300,000 across the country, while some of them are also involved in industrial production activities too.

Most of these companies are involved in export and import business; this underlines the fact that Afghan markets are open to the imperialist companies. These companies mainly operate in the two comprador and national sections; in fact, the main part of the Afghan society capitalist aspect is marked by investment in trade. Afghanistan is a landlocked country; 30 percent of its imports and exports go via Iran in two border crossing points of Milak in Nimroz and Islamqala in Herat; 60 percent of the export and import takes place via Pakistan in two border crossing points of Torkham in Jalalabad and Spin Boldak in Kandahar; 10 percent of the Afghan export and import takes place in the border crossing points of Torghundi in Herat with Turkmenistan, Hairatan in Marzar-e Sharif with Uzbekistan, and Sher Khan Bandar in Kunduz with Tajikistan. With the recent opening of Chah Bahar port in Iran, and the interest of Afghan companies in this port offering shorter distance, Afghan export and import through Iran will increase.

The trade has taken shape in two ways: first through the direct investment of capitalist companies served by Afghanistan comprador bourgeoisie; the second section is through the import and export of regional countries like Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, China, India, South Korea and Russia, as part of the Afghan markets came under the control of the branches of other foreign companies based in these countries. These branches are known as “agency”. Pakistan makes 1500 million dollars annually, while Iran makes 1000 million dollars annually through running the business on behalf of other countries.

Imported items to Afghanistan in the year 2008, either through monopoly “agency” or individual and free trade, are as following:

No.	Imports	Million Dollar
1	Transport vehicles Vehicle accessories	575.7
2	Fuel and lubricant	547
3	Metallic products	432.2
4	Cooking oil	163.2
5	Wheat and flour	162.4
6	Tire and tubes	115.3
7	Textile products	70
8	Tea	40
9	Cigarette	33.6
10	Clothes	10

11	Sugar	23.4
12	Soap	21.3
13	Other items	822

Thus, import items to Afghanistan in the year 2008 were worth 3.2 billion dollars. In the same year, Afghan export items were as following:

No.	Export Items	Million USD
1	Dry fruit	244.5
2	Carpet	150.5
3	Fresh fruit	41.5
4	Herbs	2.1
5	Skin	20.4
6	Qaraqul skin	13.7
7	Wool and animal hair	5
8	Seeds for cooking oil	3.4

Other items including SHIRIN BOYA, white HING, red HING, black and white caraway, olive, BARBU, discarded plastic, skin, rumen, beans, glue (traditional glue made of straw), mushroom, and rice, totally worth 43.8 million dollars. All this included, Afghan export in the year 2008 reached 544 million dollars. Up to 40 percent of Afghan export items are wasted due to lack of proper packing. In the year 2008, poppy harvest reached 7700 metric tons. 700 tons of the harvest were either consumed domestically or were confiscated; the remaining 7000 tons were sold, 70 dollars for a kilogram. The total worth of the opium trafficking was 500 million dollars, thus making the total amount of money coming from export 1 billion dollars. Also, precious stones, historic artifacts and timber were smuggled abroad, not known how much they were worth.

Afghan exports to 37 countries in the year 2008:

No.	Country	Million USD
1	Pakistan	74
2	India	43
3	Iraq	15
4	Iran	10
5	Russia	10
6	UAE	9
7	Canada	8
8	Turkey	4
9	Syria	4
10	Belgium	4
11	Germany	2
12	US	2
13	Turkmenistan	2
14	China	1
15	Saudi Arabia	1
16	Others	Less than 1

Furthermore, Afghanistan works as a crossroads for the transition of goods from Pakistan and Iran. Part of the goods produced as a result of imperialist companies' investment in regional countries, particularly in Iran, Pakistan and UAE turn Afghanistan into their selling market. Import of such items is monopolized; the compradors involved in importing such commodities sell them to small traders.

Most of the transportation is carried out through cargo planes and trucks, because Afghanistan has no access to the sea transport, nor does it have any railway networks. Currently there are 400 air transportation companies in service in Afghanistan, mostly based in Kabul. Most of these companies are foreign-owned, getting the most out of this business. 11000 are employed in this business.

Four airlines, Ariana, Safi, Kam Air, and Pamir operate in Afghanistan. In addition to passenger aircraft, they also transport goods to India, Dubai, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Russia and Germany. The state-run Ariana Airlines has the monopoly over all handlings at Afghan airports. As the security deteriorates by the day due to the occupation, the cargo airline business is booming, given the increasing insecurity along the highways. In addition to the currently active airline companies, a number of airline companies have also applied for license. 300 to 350 flights are carried out from Kabul airport every day. The US has planned to build 14 additional airports across Afghanistan. Airbus, Boeing and N-32 carry passengers and goods between Kabul and Dubai. Since air cargo costs a lot, some of the goods are also imported to Afghanistan through Karachi, Bandar Abbas and Chah Bahar ports in Pakistan and Iran. 95 percent of Afghan imports and exports are carried through Benz, Hino, Kamaz, Isuzu and Volvo trucks. There are 160 transit companies, with Afghanistan having 1350 trucks in these companies. In addition, individuals and individual goods companies have the same number of trucks. Also, Iranian and Pakistani trucks carry Afghan goods. The laborers employed in this sector are comprised of truck drivers, labors loading the trucks, stock guards, and crane drivers, adding a total of 5000 laborers to the number of the Afghan working class. They carry out the arduous task of loading and unloading heavy loads. Thousands of metric tons of load are transported every day; over 250,000 metric tons of vegetables go through the Torkham border crossing point alone into Pakistan each year. Kamaz No 4 used to be one of the leading goods company prior to the US invasion. It had four sections; three of them were destroyed in the US aerial bombings following its invasion of Afghanistan. The surviving section now has 240 trucks, with a total of 340 truck drivers and administrative personnel; most of them are professionals and skilled laborers considered as civil servants.

2. Construction Sector:

Construction sector is consisted of producing construction materials, overseeing construction of buildings, boring water wells (this section has attracted the biggest amount of investment), constructing buildings, architecture and designing, and producing doors and PVC window. 800 local and foreign companies are involved in construction sector; its wage laborers are the peasants, who come to the cities to work occasionally. Figures suggest that 31 percent of investment (mainly foreign investment) has taken place in this sector, showing over 4 billion dollars of investment, with most of it in Kabul. In 2007, this sector constructed 508 buildings, out of which, 189 were government offices, while the remaining 319 buildings were for the private sector. Currently there are 11 government-owned construction enterprises, and 800 private construction companies. 6000 laborers work in the private construction sector to run machineries such as compressors, excavators, mixer, bulldozers etc.

Some Western construction companies have invested in the construction sector, while a number of Turkish, Iranian, and Pakistani companies are also involved in construction sector.

American construction company (VICC) is the leading US construction company in Afghanistan, employing 120 staff and over 300 skilled laborers. Onex Construction Company has shared capital with Aziz Bank. Ghulghula group, owned by Karim Khalili's family, has constructed Omid-e Sabz Township in Kabul and Pul-e Khumri also has a few more construction projects; it also owns one of the factories producing PVC windows. There are also a number of government-owned construction enterprises, which only exist on paper, such as House Building Department, Banayee department, Afghani department, and Municipality Construction Department. These enterprises once employed over 6000 workers and skilled workers, are now totally bankrupt. They now have only 600 staff considered as civil servants.

Private sector and foreign investment own over 80 percent of the investment in construction sector. They get construction contracts and also build their own townships. Some of the towns built in Kabul are Salim Karwan, Omid-e Sabz, Gulkhana, Esteqlal, Shirpoor, Kolola Poshta, Nawroz Abad, Semetkhana, Shadabzafar and Aria. Aria is built by an American company, without any direct investment. It first gets the money from the applicants and the apartments are built with the applicants' money. 16 percent of the money is given to Kabul Municipality for the plot. Two Afghans are hired as agents for running the business, who get two percent of the profit. Two big mosques of Khatamul Nabiyyin and Haji Abdul Rahman are also built in Kabul. A number of small malls such as Kabul City Center, Gulbahar Center, Maryam Shopping Center, Abasin Zadran Center, Faisal Shopping Center, Faryab Center, Roshan Plaza, Azizi Bank building, Etesalat Tower, Kabul Bank building, MTN building are built in Kabul, while Ashraf Ramazan Hotel and Kefayat Market are built in Mazar-e Sharif. Herat Five Star Hotel, Safi twin towers, Nazari Hotel, a five star hotel are built in Herat. A massive King Amanullah Khan Township project is underway in Nangarhar. A number of Pakistani laborers, much more skilled than Afghan laborers are also employed in construction projects. With a total number of over 170,000, the construction laborers, both skilled and unskilled laborers, make majority of the Afghan working class. They are paid between (4 and 12 dollars a day), barely enough for their basic living needs. Most of the construction laborers are unemployed during the cold winter when construction works come to a halt. They either go to Iran and Pakistan, or move to the cities with warm winters so that they can sell their labor force. Or else, they have to borrow money during the winter, and repay it in mid-spring when the construction works resume. Also, over 20,000 Pakistani laborers work in the Afghan construction sector.

3. Financial Sector:

Currently there are 17 banks in Afghanistan of which, 10 are privately-run, two are state-run, and five are branches of foreign banks in Afghanistan. The total branches of these banks reach 153 branches with unlimited services, 135 branches with limited services, and 46 automatic telling machines. Kabul Bank and Aziz Bank are leading in terms of branches across the country. At present, the banks operate in the provincial capitals of the 34 Afghan provinces and a number of districts and border crossing points. Bank assets in Afghanistan, excluding the central bank or Da Afghanistan Bank were 133.1 billion Afghanis (2.66 billion dollars) in November 2009, showing a 41 percent increase from the previous year, when the total bank reserve assets were 94.3 billion Afghanis. Private banks have had the highest increase in their assets, with 47 percent increase from the year before. State-owned banks had 24 percent increase, while the branches of foreign banks had 38 percent increase in their assets. In June 2009, the assets of banks were as following:

No.	Bank	Reserves in Million Afghanis
1	Kabul Bank	42872
2	Azizi Bank	1342 8
3	Pashtany Bank	10105
4	AIB	14219
5	Afghan National Bank	10260
6	Standard Charter Bank	9655
7	First Microfinance Bank	5945
8	Alfalah Bank	7966
9	Afghan United Bank	5555
10	Maiwand Bank	1125
11	Ghazanfar Bank	1120
12	Arian Bank	1026
13	Bakhtar Bank	651
14	Habib Bank	4600
15	National Bank of Pakistan	2275
16	Punjab National Bank (India)	1017
17	BRAC Bank (Bangladesh)	718

Banks in Afghanistan have offered loans to the following sectors in 2009, showing 19 percent increase from the year before:

No.	Sector	Percentage
1	House building and Construction	20
2	Production	1
3	Commercial	49
4	Services	9
5	Small Commercial Activities	12
6	Consumption	2
7	Individual leasing loans	4
8	Miscellaneous	4

Loans by province:

No.	Province	Percentage
1	Kabul	84.6
2	Balkh	6.6
3	Herat	3.8
4	Nargarhar	1.4
5	Kunduz	1
6	Others	3.2

The money people deposited in the saving accounts for the interest rate makes the bulk of the banks' assets, the amount of which stood at 2.2 billion dollars in November 2009, showing 47 percent increase. The total number of loan receivers was 43236, while 1103164 account holders deposited their money. These banks work closely with Western Union and Swift to transfer money in return for paying interest. Azizi Bank and Kabul Bank have close financial ties with Commerz Bank, the second largest German bank. The two local banks compete neck in neck. Recently Azizi Bank bought Afghanistan Development Bank after the latter went bankrupt, and renamed it to Bakhtar Bank. Azizi Bank pays 6.5 percent annual

interest for the saving accounts, while Kabul Bank pays 6 percent. None of these banks has so far faced challenges from Mullahs who strongly reject the interest rate on religious grounds. Mullahs showed opposition to only one provincial branch of a bank once. But once received gifts from the bank, the Mullahs reversed their objection.

There are 6435 local staff of private banks, and 189 foreign staff. 95 percent of the staff makes the white-collar workers, and five percent are foreign staff and managers who preserve the interests of the bourgeois class. The number of staff for state-owned banks is 2805 with 1180 of them are service personnel or workers of this sector, coming under the civil servant category.

4. Industrial Sector:

This sector is comprised of furniture factories, electronic appliances, medicine, bottled water, juice factories, packing, printing houses, factories producing films for movies and photography, plastics, hygiene materials, iron products, leather products, milk processing factories, raisin packing and wrapping, cartons, poultry, producing pipes, foodstuffs, marble, precious stones, cement, cooking oil factories, doors and PVC windows, washing and stretching carpets, and other light industries meeting the basic needs.

This sector, making the most significant economy sector and paving the ground for the strengthening of Afghan bourgeoisie, has been ignored by the imperialists and foreign companies following the occupation of Afghanistan. 24 percent of investments taking place between 20003 and 2009 were in this sector. Following the Bonn Conference the industrial sector has not developed significantly due to the fact that foreign companies can make decisions at will and that Afghan industries are dependent on them and are part of them; the import of foreign commodities and incompetence of Afghan industries to compete; insecurity along the major highways; lack of support from the protégé government for the industrial sector particularly in the case of providing land to factories; rampant corruption; lack of access to cheap power and fuel; around 40 percent of the industries in industrial parks in Kabul, Herat and Mazar have gone bankrupt since 2002. While in some other sections of industrial sector, factories are up and running because of the support they get from the foreign countries and companies. Most of the products of these factories are in the form of monopoly, with the direct and indirect investment of imperialist companies. Some of the compradors linked to Iran, Pakistan, Gulf nations, India and Turkey closely tied to the bigger capitalist companies have opened branches of their businesses in Afghanistan, particularly in cooking oil, plastics, fuel and soft drinks industries. The overall number of skilled laborers in the industry sector reaches 35270. The number is much more when joined by semi-skilled, unskilled and white-collar laborers.

With the market economy approved in the new Constitution, most of the state-owned factories and enterprises were privatized, while the ones not sold out yet such as Kamaz, Jabalseraj textile, Mazar power and fertilizer factory, Sheberghan Gas, government-owned printing press, Jangalak, Khana Sazi, Banayi, Khana Sazi Afghan, Kabul Breshna (electricity), Spinzar Kunduz, Helmand Ghori, Kabul Silo, Pul-e Khomri electricity, Mazar Silo, Kabul Textile, Pul-e Khomri Textil, and Pul-e Khmori Silo) are semi-operational. A total number of 7200 laborers work in these factories, and are considered as government laborers.

Laborers are exploited in the worst possible way in these factories. Some of them are skilled laborers who have picked up their skills in Iran and Pakistan, with only a few in Afghanistan. The rest are unskilled laborers. The laborers get a low wage, with no insurance, transportation service, workers' unions or other political and social support or good living conditions. Over four million Afghans are unemployed, while the laborers endure all their sufferings and prefer it to being unemployed.

The Commerce Ministry reconstructed Industrial Park in Herat and has received some sort

of support from the government, currently accommodates 200 factories, with an investment of 1 billion dollars, and 20,000 laborers. Most of these laborers are professional who have learned their vocations in Iran.

Kabul Industrial Park hosts 250 factories with 5750 laborers, working in 13 fields such as producing cooking oil, aluminum, water pipes, plastics, tiles, polishing precious stones, processing raisin, cartons, foodstuffs, medicine, bottled water, and juice.

Mazar Industrial Park hosts 35 factories involved in producing foodstuffs, processing dairies, and plastics. A total number of 3885 laborers work in Mazar industrial park.

Kandahar Industrial Park has a total of 75 factories with only 49 of them operational, producing plastic materials (20 factories), cooking oil (10 factories), medicine (one factory), oxygen producing (3 factories), producing ice (3 factories), aluminum material (four factories), steel (one factory), construction materials (4 factories), cigarette (one factory), painting color factory (two), sweets (four), metal and carpentry (one), assembling motorcycle (one), marble (two), and soft drinks (17). Power outage, insecurity, seasonal operation, and import of cheap commodities from Iran and Pakistan, some of the factories in the industrial park are rendered non-operational. If fully operational, the factories have the capacity to employ over 10,000 workers. Currently only 3450 workers are employed.

There are 65 small-scale production factories in Jalalabad city, Nangarhar, producing ice (26 factories), marble cutting and polish (four), juice (six), plastic items (three), cooking oil, fodder for livestock, soap (six), pressure cookers (five), producing and processing foodstuffs (10), bottle water (three), and chips for construction (three). All these factories are operational and have employed 2540 workers.

Around 25 factories are operational in Kunduz with varying range of productive capacity, employing a total of 3100 workers. Flour mill, Spinzar factory producing cooking oil and soap, three poultry farms, factory producing fertilizer, processing rice factory, Kunduz dairy, juice, and factory producing slippers are operational in the province.

In addition to the factories in Kabul Industrial Park, there are also 17 pressure cooker producing factories in Kabul, each employing up to 25 workers, with a total reaching 649 workers. These small factories work for seven months each year, and are closed for the five months in the winter. The pressure cookers produced in these factories are better quality than the ones produced in Iran and Pakistan. The aluminum used in producing pressure cookers is taken from the used engines and parts of the vehicles which are abundant in Kabul. Recently the aluminum is smuggled to Iran, resulting in higher price for the price of pressure cookers in Kabul. There are also five factories in Jalalabad, producing pressure cookers. These factories could beat the same industry in Pakistan and Iran, if the raw material for the pressure cookers was not smuggled to Iran.

There are factories producing medicine in Kabul such as Terajmir, Kimyagar, Höchst Pharma, and Arya, with each producing 10 different types of medicines. A total of 255 laborers are employed in these factories.

Cement and coal industries:

One of the factories that launched its operation during the occupation of the country is Afghan Investment Company (AIC), involved in cement production and coal mining in Ghorisani cement factory of Baghlan province. With all its machinery made in Czech Republic (former Czechoslovakia), the factory was recently privatized. 43 investors have invested 40 million dollars capital in the factory with a total of 400 shares, each share worth 10,000 dollars. The company also monopolized the two nearby Karkar and Dudkash coal mines. The initial daily production of the factory was 180 tons of cement; the production has now reached 400 tons a day after two other furnaces were renovated and reactivated. In order to make greater amount of surplus value through exploiting even more workers, the company had to play the

comprador role for a major foreign company. Asian Development Bank gives the company a loan with ten percent interest. A total of 150 admin staff, 250 skilled laborers and 200 unskilled laborers are employed in the factory. Moreover, the company exploits additional 300 skilled and unskilled laborers in the two coal mines it has monopolized, thus making the total number of employees 1000. If the company gets additional funding from imperialist banks, the factory can employ up to 2000 workers.

Poultry:

Poultry is carried out in two ways in Afghanistan: first the basic way that each family in the rural areas has up to 20 hens and chickens, raised mainly by the peasant women. The other is poultry farms. There were many poultry farms that went bankrupt due to the bird flu “breakout”, the import of cheap chicken from Pakistan; spike in the grain price used in poultry forms the vaccines. Farah province is one of the provinces where farm poultry is a major business; however the 400 poultry farms across the province has fallen to 200 farms. On average, 7500 chickens are raised per farm. Around 150 investors have invested 5 million dollars in this business in Farah. The eggs and chicken from these farms are sold in Herat, Kandahar, Helmand and Nimroz provinces, and also exported to Iran. A total of 3100 workers are involved in Farah poultry industry. There are three poultry farms in Kunduz city.

Printing industry:

Printing industry flourished after the US invasion of Afghanistan, particularly due to the press boom as a result of the “freedom of expression”. Over 400 publications, dailies and weeklies are published across Afghanistan. Moreover, printing ID cards and business cards also became common. During the three general elections held so far, the printing press business became lucrative for publishing the election banners, programs and posters of the candidates. Currently, there are 171 printing presses in Afghanistan currently, each employing 20 skilled and unskilled laborers on average. Out of these printing presses, 125 are based in Kabul, with the remaining 46 in other major cities. A total of 3429 laborers are employed in the printing presses. Beside the laborers, a number of mechanics are also involved in the business to fix the printing machines, thus increasing to 5000 the total number of those making a living through printing presses. The laborers working in the printing press, not only handle the printing machines, but also have access to the publications; they can quickly become receptive to the revolutionary cause and can play a major role in it.

Other sectors:

In addition to the aforementioned sectors, over 12000 workers are employed in carpet-weaving, confectionary, fixing vehicles, assembling motorcycles and bicycles. Among them, 3000 are skilled laborers while the remaining 9000 are unskilled.

5. Service Sector:

This sector consists of state and private services.

State services: the total number of government employees, excluding personnel of the armed forces and the intelligence, stands at 329911. 88135 of the mentioned number are staff providing services, while 5864 are workers with extremely low wages. 6700 of the state staff are ministers, deputy ministers, directors, members of the parliament, army and police generals, governors, deputy governors, zone commanders and provincial police chiefs, ambassadors and other bureaucrats or ministers without portfolios working in the presidential palace, making the backbone of the support for the US occupation of Afghanistan. The rest of the civil servants with miserable living conditions are considered as part of petty bourgeoisie class.

Private sector:

Private sector provides services in education, postal services, electricity transfer and cable repair, logistics and transport, car rentals and fixing, gas, security services, tourism, research institutes, restaurants and hotels, providing information technology and press. Over the past eight years, 37 percent of the overall domestic and foreign investment was invested in this sector.

Private schools and universities:

At present, there are 237 private schools across Afghanistan, with most of the investment in them coming from the local investors. On average, each school has hired 60 staff (admin, teachers, guards, drivers and cleaners), making a total number of 16100 employees, or white-collared laborers. There are also 22 private higher education institutes with majors in 72 fields. Each private higher education institute has employed 100 staff on average, making the total of 2200 staff.

Private clinics and hospitals:

There are 152 private clinics and hospitals in Afghanistan, of which 84 are based in Kabul. These clinics and hospitals are run with the money from the local and Iranian, Indian, French, Pakistani and Turkish investors. Some of the hospitals are the local branch of the main hospital abroad, which also introduce their rich patients to the main hospitals abroad. Thus, in addition to making lots of money in Afghanistan, the private hospitals also do the marketing for the main hospitals. In addition to the operating hospitals, 20 more hospitals have applied for licenses. Charging higher than the state-run hospitals, the private hospitals provide relatively better health services. The total number of staff working for the private hospitals (physicians, nurses, admin, drivers, guards and cleaners) is 14000. Except for the 5 percent or 600 doctors working in the hospitals or hold shares in the business, the remaining staff has to work hard to make a living. They make the white-collared laborers, but get paid higher than the civil servants.

Media:

In the media, there are 21 TV channels, 100 radio stations, and 300 dailies, weeklies, monthlies, periodicals and magazines and five news agencies; of which, two TV channels, a radio station and 50 publications are state-run, while the remaining are privately-owned. The privately-run media gets 90 percent of the ads, in addition to the “financial assistance” they get from the occupiers and the neighboring countries particularly Iran, which tries hard to dominate this sector by its lackeys and spies. The owners of the privately-run outlets spend only two percent of the income from the ads and the money they get from “donor countries” to run the business and pay the salaries of the staff such as reporters, cameramen, photographers, anchors, trainers, producers, technicians, designers, drivers, cleaners and security guards. They treat the staff as their private servants. The staff gets paid low wages and the reporters particularly face threats. They are in a way connected to the trade and industry and are white-collared laborers.

Around 8000 employees work in the mass media sector. In addition to the media outlets, companies such as Setara (foreign-owned), Altai (foreign-owned), Mediacom (foreign-owned), Lips (local), Cetena Group (local), Capul (local), Internews (foreign), Insight Media (foreign), Reach (local), Honare Haftom (local), Vision (local) and Star Group (local) also operate in media productions and selling advertisements to other media organizations in Afghanistan. Nay (local) and OSI (foreign) are the two companies that provide support to the media outlets. FKH (foreign) is a company producing TV ads, and TriVision (foreign) designs websites and sell ads. IMPACS (foreign), is a company that supports the local outlets. All these companies are linked with foreign embassies and work to safeguard their interests.

Power sector:

The main power supplier in Afghanistan is Da Afghanistan Breshna which was a completely state-owned enterprise until recently. There are private companies too in the provinces to provide power by installing small power generators. Such companies employ between two to ten laborers. In some parts of the country, these small private companies charge residents 50 Afghanis/1 dollar for a kilowatt of electricity while the electricity provided in the capital by the government is only 1.5 Afghanis for a kilowatt. A number of big imperialist companies have also invested in the power sector with the major one being the one in Deh Sabz power project, employing 700 laborers.

Figures from 2007 show that there are 12 hydroelectric power plants in Afghanistan, employing 3220 people; But the total number of employees working in state-owned and privately-run power plants and stations, is over 7000.

Security companies:

Security companies are the other means of safeguarding the interests of the foreign occupiers. The companies were originally formed after the UN conventions passed laws that prevented the army from violating “human rights”, so that companies could fill the gap to commit heinous crimes instead. Now, security companies act as an arm of the army and serve it wholeheartedly. There are 10,000 armed personnel from private security companies in Iraq, and the US occupiers carry out some of the crimes through such companies. In Afghanistan, there are 26 local security companies hiring 6325 locals and 377 foreigners; there are also 26 foreign security companies hiring 11353 locals and 4418 foreign nationals in Afghanistan. Thus a total of 17680 Afghans and 4795 foreign nationals are hired by the private security companies. Most of the foreign nationals working for these companies are soldiers from the Sri Lankan, Bangladeshi, Nepali and other armies. Moreover, a number of foreign security companies have not been registered yet, and operate “illegally”. The companies pay their Afghan employees (guards) 10,000 Afghanis (200 dollars) a month, but charge the recipient companies 500 dollars for the security services of each guard. This section has employed over 20,000 Afghans. Companies in Afghanistan spend 20 percent of their income for their security, while security spending is between one and two percents in other parts of the world.

Demining:

A big amount has been spent on demining under the UN supervision in Afghanistan over the recent years. It is reported that over 10 million landmines were planted in the 30 years of chaos in Afghanistan. Currently, 30 Afghans fall victim to the landmine explosions each month. Both local and foreign corrupt officials involved in demining make heaps, though, the laborers working in the demining always face threats. Over a hundred Afghan laborers have lost their lives to date, while carrying out demining, and a number of deminers have also been abducted by the Taliban. The demining is managed by the UN and the contracts are given to companies and NGOs. A total of 15 NGOs and 10 companies are involved in demining, which is a lucrative business for them. A total number of 9000 Afghans work in the demining of which 8000 live in miserable living condition of working class. Though they make more money than the laborers in other fields, but the harsh climate and terrain that they work in, make their jobs insufferable. They constantly move from one site to another site, and face the Taliban threats.

NGOs:

NGOs make the highest amount of money in Afghanistan, and each NGO is linked closely to foreign intelligence circles. About 1950 NGOs are registered and all are corrupt and involved in embezzlement without exception. Those in charge of NGOs serve the interests of the occupiers. Around 14000 Afghans work for NGOs. Foreign NGOs are smaller in number, but rob most of the money coming to Afghanistan as “assistance from donor countries”. They

are awarded special contracts, as they share the crumb and steal the loaf. The NGOs are partners with the foreign occupiers and are grateful to them because of the opportunity they have been offered. The owners of the NGOs make huge amounts and are part of the comprador bourgeoisie.

6. Telecommunication sector:

A total of 10.6 million Afghans have access to cell phone and landline telephones. The total amount of investment in this sector is 1236 million dollars, which shows a major investment compared to other sectors.

Afghan Wireless Communication Company (AWCC) was the first cell phone company which launched its operation with an initial investment of 60 million dollars. Currently its investment has reached 300 million dollars. Owned by Dick Cheney, the company has hired Ehsanullah Bayat and Amin Ramin as two compradors, with each holding a small share in the business. The Afghan government also holds a 20 percent share in the company's business for the first 15 years.

Roshan is the second cell phone company, launching its operation in Afghanistan with the investment of a British company. Its current investment stands at 390.4 million dollars. It has 1114 employees and 25000 part time employees. The company provides 6 percent of the government incomes through the taxes it pays.

MTN and Etisalat are the two other cell phone companies operating in Afghanistan. MTN is a US-Arab company, and has developed its business in Afghanistan significantly in a short period of time, while Etisalat has not been successful yet to leave its imprint in the Afghan telecommunication market. Afghan Telecom is a state-owned company employing 80,000 (including staff, guards, technicians, cleaners, and part time sellers).

In addition to these companies that plunder the Afghan masses, the US company UTRA is also involved in this business and sets the frequencies for telecommunication companies and radios, and controls the whole telecommunication system in a way. Also, ASIA consultancy also works in telecommunication and has around 180 employees. This company installs the telecommunication towers and rent them to the telecommunication companies.

7. Agriculture sector:

While the companies representing imperialism have invested in different sectors over the past few years, they have done only scanty investment in agriculture sector. On the one hand, they want to turn Afghanistan into a consuming society, in addition to the fact that investment in agriculture sector cannot yield quick profit, and most of the rural areas are insecure. For this reason, only 4 percent of the investment between 2003 and 2009 has been allocated to agriculture sector, and the banks have given a loan of only 1.7 percent.

The primitive ways of agriculture was discussed earlier; in this chapter, the mechanized agriculture will be discussed.

Use of agricultural machinery such as tractors, shredders, double-bladed, triple-bladed, bulldozers, water pumps and drills has increased over the past thirty years, thus turning some of the peasants into agriculture laborers. 27200 tractors and 27200 agriculture laborers work in this sub-section; put together with the mechanics that fix tractors and other equipment, the number reaches 30,000. Peasants themselves run water pumps.

8. Road-building sector:

Based on the development plan drawn at the Bonn Conference, the priority was given to road construction, power and water respectively; the companies involved in road-building, have made far more profit. Since the local companies were not capable to build highways and roads connecting long distances, both in terms of expertise and equipment, most of the

road-building contracts to be implemented through the financial assistance of the foreign countries were awarded to foreign companies. KATTLE road building company, affiliated with Bush and Cheney, made huge sum of money in Iraq and Afghanistan, and won numerous road project contracts in Afghanistan. The company outsourced the projects to smaller companies for much cheaper price. A few other US companies are also involved in road-building “business” in Afghanistan. Turkish companies of UKSIL and LAMAK, along with three other smaller Turkish companies made heaps from the road-building contracts in Afghanistan. A Chinese, a Pakistani, an Iranian and an Indian companies have also won a number of lucrative contracts in road-building. Companies from India, Iran and Pakistan built roads with the money their own governments had pledged for the reconstruction of Afghanistan; for instance, an Iranian company built the roads between Islam Qala-Herat, Milak-Zaranj and Mil 75-Farah city, while a Pakistani company built Torkham-Jalalabad Highway, and an Indian company built and asphalted Zaranj-Delaram road. US companies reconstructed each kilometer of the Kabul-Kandahar-Herat Highway for US\$ 400,000. A Chinese company rebuilt Kabul-Jalalabad Highway; Turkish company rebuilt Kabul-Kandahar Highway, Indian company rebuilt Kandahar-Herat Highway and another Turkish reconstructed the Salang Tunnel. The work on the ring road and the road between Takhar-Badakhshan is underway. All these companies used technicians, professionals and skilled labors from their own countries, thus leaving the laborious tasks to the Afghan laborers in exchange for extremely low wage. There are also 70 Afghan road-building companies that implement small portions of the contracts, incapable of the leveling and asphaltting roads longer than 30 kilometers. Road-building companies work within the framework of construction companies and are part of the 800 construction companies.

9. Mining sector:

According to a NASA aerial survey, the total untapped reserves of Afghan mines are worth 500,000 billion dollars; this does not include the mines in Badakhshan and Helmand provinces. Many people believe that the figure can be far higher, and the US space agency may have shown the figure lower than the actual one. There are 1400 mine reserves in Afghanistan; some of them are excavated by powerful warlords or foreigners. Ainak copper mine located in Logar province is the second largest copper mine in the world. Its contract was awarded to the Chinese company MCC in exchange for 3 billion dollars. Its excavation is yet to be launched, and for the full excavation, over 10,000 miners will be employed. The contract was awarded seven months ago, and so far only 320 miners work there.

The British excavates uranium in Khanshin district of Helmand province without paying a single penny. The office for Afghan gas and oil is in Oslo, Norway, and the reason given for this is the claim that Afghans are incapable to manage their gas and oil marketing. The coal excavated from Karkar and Dudkash coal mines is exported to Pakistan. Both these mines are bought by AIC Company which also owns the Ghuri cement factory. The company claims that the coal is used to run the furnaces in the cement factory; but in reality, the coal is exported to Pakistan. Currently 500 miners work in the two coal mines. The lazuli, lapis, and emerald mines are excavated in a damaging unprofessional way in Nuristan, Panjsher and Badakhshan. In Kunar and Nuristan alone, around 2000 teams, each consisted of at least 15 people, are involved in digging BIRUJ and other precious stone mines such as rubi, emerald, and lazuli. The Kotal Sabzak coal mine in Herat was sold to the private Khoshak Company. Over 500 laborers work in this mine. Extracting marble in Hamuri area of Helmand province has increased recently. 500 laborers work there. The iron mine of Hajigak in Bamyán will soon be sold to private companies. A total of 30,000 laborers and staff work in the mining

sector, but their employing is only seasonal, therefore the number of laborers working full year is 11000. Five percent of the total staff is comprised of investors and managers. In the year 2007, calcium carbonate, marble, salt and coal production was 13 million tons, 31 million tons, 123 million tons and 242,000 tons respectively. 1100 laborers work in calcium carbonate, salt and marble mines.

The breakdown of owners, managers, skilled laborers, unskilled laborers, white-collared laborers and other admin staff is as following:

No.	Field of Work	Owners & Managers	Staff	Cleaners	Skilled Laborers	Unskilled Laborers
1	Cargo Transport	350	4950	700	1000	4000
2	Land Transport	800	600	500	1350	1750
3	Construction	2400	2400	800	8000	156000
4	Banks	221	5000	750		
5	Industrial Park Herat	600	1000	800	5000	130007
6	Industrial Park Kabul	750	500	500	2000	2000
7	Industrial Park Mazar	105	140	640	1300	1700
8	Industrial Park Kandahar	200	200	250	1000	1800
9	Industrial Park Jalalabad	200	250	290	1000	800
10	Industrial Park Kunduz	100	100	300	600	200
11	Pressure Cooker	35	70	49	495	
12	Pharmaceuticals	15	20	20	200	

13	Cement and coal	70	250	30	500	150
14	Poultry	150		30	800	1900
15	Printing Press	500	71	71	350	2500
16	Miscellaneous industries	1000			3000	8000
17	Private Schools	1000	13500	1600		
18	Private Higher Education	880	1100	220		
19	Private Clinics	600	12400	1000		
20	Media	850	6450	700		
21	Power	500		500	4000	
22	Demining	900	1800	900	5400	
23	Telecommunication	2000	3500	8000	1500	65000
24	Coal from Koshk	20	30		200	220
25	gemstones	1000			6000	4000
26	Calcium Carbonate, Salt, etc.	200	40	120	80	660
27	Security Companies	260	1700	15820		
28	NGOs	6000	4000	2400		
Total		21706	60071	36890	42775	265180

29. Within the government, 6700 run the government affairs, 235914 are teachers and junior civil servants, 88235 are service personnel, and 7200 are skilled laborers.

Thus in Afghanistan:

1. The number of factory and private company owners, and statesmen with majority of them representing the comprador bourgeoisie reaches 28406;
2. The number of teachers and junior civil servants reaches 295985; most of them are exploited just like white-collared laborers in the private sector, and get a monthly salary of between 3000 and 20,000 Afghanis.
3. Cleaners and guards, are like unskilled laborers. They perform hard labor and get a monthly salary of 3000 to 6000 Afghanis.
4. Skilled laborers working in the state sector and private sector, and get a monthly wage of 5000 to 15000 Afghanis. Their number reaches 49975.
5. Unskilled laborers working in the factories and transportation sector (unloading lorry); they are not directly involved with machinery. Their number reaches 265190.
6. The number of agriculture laborers reaches 30,000.
7. The total number of traders across Afghanistan is 300,000.

Hence, the total number of traders, industrialists, skilled laborers, unskilled laborers, junior civil servants and white-collared laborers stands at 1042875. Since each family has five members on average, the total of those dependent on their income stands at 5214375. As it

was calculated in the rural population, 18 million Afghans live in the rural areas. Skilled and unskilled laborers, traders, investors in industry, civil servants and teachers (as part of the petty bourgeoisie) make 5.2 million, live mainly in urban areas. The remaining 2 millions of the 25 million Afghanistan population are artisans who make another sub-divide of the petty bourgeoisie).

Working Class

The Afghan working class first emerged during the rule of Sher Ali Khan (from 1863 to 1866 and from 1868 until his death in 1879), but could not it further develop due to the second Anglo-Afghan war (1878-1880), and later due to the despotic rule of Abdul Rahman Khan and Habibullah Khan. The working class reemerged in the state-run industry and commerce during the rule of King Amanullah Khan (1919-1929), and developed as a class in industry, agriculture and commerce by the year 1331.

Most of the Afghan workers have worked in state-owned factories, because since the formation of the working class until the US invasion of Afghanistan and the Bonn Conference, the dominant industry sector was the state sector. For this reason, most of the working class movements, strikes and demos were directed against the government, not against the investors in the private sector, which exploited and employed smaller number of workers compared to the state sector.

With the installing of textile factory in Jabal Seraj, most of the handicraft artisans lost their profession. The factory employed only the young, active and physically strong local artisans with the lowest possible wage. The work hours for workers were set as nine hours for the first six months of the year, and eight hours for the second half of the year. The factory machinery was least advanced, and the working condition was extremely hard. Workers had to walk to work three to four kilometers in the chilling cold of the winter and in the burning sun of the summer. In the year 1959, the difficult work and living condition, the intense exploitation, famine, price hike and grinding poverty and hunger forced the factory workers to go on strike for the first time as part of the Afghan working class. Workers demanded wage increase, cooperative, transportation, and the fabric they needed for their families (in exchange for cash). The strike lasted four days. The government sacked only Hesamuddin, the manager of the factory, but did not meet other righteous demands of the workers. Thus, the first strike of the Afghan workers did not yield the desired result.

The April 1978 coup carried out by the revisionists with the false claims of defending the rights of workers and peasants, not only did nothing to improve the living condition of the workers, but also the ensuing suppressing policies forced a big number of workers to escape from the cities and join the anti-Social Imperialist resistance war. Some of the workers were arrested with the “counter-revolutionary” label and were killed by the shooting squads. Some of the workers were forcibly conscripted and had to die beside the occupiers of their country. Others sought refuge in Pakistan and Iran. Therefore, workers were the main victims of the Russian invasion and the installed authoritarian government. A number of workers joined the lines of the masses uprising against the Soviet invasion, an uprising that was soon seized by the religious fundamentalist commanders and parties servile to Pakistan and Iran. They leaned towards religion in reaction to the “Khalqi communists”. The last batch of workers just stayed outside the country. Once the religious fundamentalist parties seized power and the ensuing infighting over the power, all the state-run and privately-owned factories were looted and the country was left with no factory machinery; workers fled the provinces, as well as the capital. This all depicted the miseries the working class and other toiling masses had to go through.

Following the occupation of Afghanistan by the US-led imperialists and the inception of the Bonn Conference, efforts of the imperialists were focused on turning Afghanistan into a consuming society, so that the Afghanistan remains a begging nation for as long as possible. Based on this policy, little effort was made to revive the Afghan industry and the factories that were looted and sold as scraps in Pakistan. In the meantime, the comprador bourgeoisie took control of all economic activities in both industry and trade sectors. The blue-collared and the white-collared workers started selling their workforce in industrial sector and industrial

agriculture.

Industrial workers:

Industrial workers are comprised of blue-collared and white-collared workers. Since they produce collectively, and handle advanced equipment, they make the most progressive section of the toiling masses, and are the main leaders of the revolution,

Blue-collared workers in Afghanistan work in the factories producing bottled water, cooking oil, pharmaceuticals, car and tractor fixing, producing pressure cookers, gas appliances, cement, coal mining, electronic appliances, juice, packing fresh and dry fruit, power plants, construction, road-building, loading, marble polishing, copper mining, furniture, dairy products, poultry, carpets, motorcycle assembling, confectionary, carpet, and plastics. There are both skilled and unskilled workers in this sub-divide, with unskilled workers outnumber skilled workers by far. Some of the skilled workers have learned their skills abroad in Iran or Pakistan. Others have learned during the Soviet-backed governments in Afghanistan. Majority of workers don't have accommodation, transport facility and particularly insurance. They work eight hours a day, and have only one day weekend. Some of the blue-collared workers get paid on a daily basis, while others are paid once a month. Their daily wage ranges between 4 and 8 dollars.

Latest figures show that the number of skilled industrial workers in the private sector is 35270, while this number is 5864 in the state sector, totaling 41134 skilled industrial workers. Most of them are city dwellers, and with each having five family members on average, their total dependents are 205670 people.

Besides them, there are a significant number of semi-skilled and unskilled workers who are exploited just like industrial workers, despite not being involved in the industrial production. They sell their labor force, and their share from the production is not more than industrial workers. These workers numbering 186499 work in construction, road building, mining, poultry and other fields. With an average of five family members of each worker, 932440 people are dependent on the wages made in this sub-divide. Also the government and private sector cleaners and service staff who number 125025 live in conditions similar to that of workers; 625125 people are dependent on their wages. Thus the total number of those living in the cities with working class living condition reaches 1763235.

White-collared workers work for security companies, banks, demining companies, private schools and universities, hospitals, media and NGOs, are better-off than the blue-collared workers in terms of living condition and work nature. These the workers work both full time and part time. Since employment in the industrial sector is not stable for a number of reasons and the factories are open or closed alternately, even the skilled laborers also lose their jobs routinely. Construction and road building workers are unemployed between two projects.

Agriculture workers:

These workers mostly work with tractors, water pumps, reaping machines and other machines used in the field. The number of Afghan agricultural workers equals the number of tractors and also the 3000 mechanics that fix tractors and other agricultural machineries. There are 27200 tractors in Afghanistan. Therefore the total number of agricultural workers stands at 30,000. Peasants themselves handle the water pumps. Agricultural workers mostly live in the villages and commute between village and town. Since they work individually, they are not as revolutionary as the industrial workers, and cannot organize their ranks; however, they are connecting link between town and village as they are intermediate between peasants and industrial workers. Agricultural workers work under feudal order and are influenced by that order, thus they are committed to respecting the feudal traditions. They need to be educated to get rid of feudal cultural influence and relations. For this reason, any

communist organization should pay greater attention to this section of the workers in villages. In total, the number of Afghan working class is 79995, comprised of 42775 in private sector, 7200 in state-owned industries, and 30,000 agricultural workers. In addition to them, there are 265190 unskilled workers and 125025 cleaners and service staff that are exploited under the same conditions as other workers.

Afghan workers abroad:

Between 2 and 3 million Afghan workers are employed in different fields in Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Qatar, India, European countries and the US.

Most of the 1 million Afghan workers in Iran work in cutting construction stones, brick factories, poultry farms, road building, orchards, building construction, digging water wells, painting buildings, raising cattle, small-scale factories, loading at ports, etc. These Afghan workers have no job security, and work for a much lower wage than Iranian workers. In some cases, the industry owners strike a deal with the cruel security personnel of Iran. At the end of a long duration of work, Afghan workers are deported for entering Iran “illegally”, without the workers getting paid for the time they have worked. Afghan workers cannot take part in Iranian working class rallies, because they will be treated brutally if arrested in such activities.

In Pakistan too, there are around 1 million Afghan workers. They work in factories producing plastics, manufacturing illegal weapons and ammunition, brick factories, cutting stones for construction, carpet factories, raising cattle, milk processing, building construction, road building, orchard, textile factories, sweets factories, pharmaceuticals, transport, and other fields. Afghan workers in Pakistan get paid less than their fellow Afghan workers in Iran and live under even worse conditions, but they are most often treated as equals to the Pakistani workers in wages and treatment by the industry owners.

The number of Afghan workers in the Gulf countries reaches 300,000. They work as house servants, loading at ports, working in construction, road building, mechanics, bakers, truck drivers, or are employed in poultry farms, fields and orchards. Afghan laborers in the Gulf countries have a much better living condition. Unlike their fellow Afghans in Iran, they don't face insult in the Gulf countries, and their jobs are relatively secure. But their wage is much lower than the Arab workers, and they most often do the tasks that Arab workers would not do.

Most of the Afghan workers working in Iran and Pakistan have taken their families along too. But those who have not done so move back and forth. They cross the border, particularly crossing the border into Iran risking their lives. Very few of the workers working in the Gulf nations, have taken their families along, therefore they come to Afghanistan frequently. These laborers don't make part of the Afghan working class, but they get the working class characteristics by working in the Gulf States; they acquire relative knowledge, and can play a significant role in the Afghan revolution upon their return to Afghanistan, once the revolutionary process gets strengthened. When the proletarian party is relatively grown, it has to expand its organizational networks among these workers, so that they join the revolution cause inside Afghanistan in order to fulfill their historic missions.

Comprador Bourgeoisie

In addition to the collaboration of landlords, imperialists need the comprador bourgeoisie class in order to strengthen its pillars in our country. Comprador bourgeoisie makes the main pillars in the cities, and the occupiers make great efforts to form and strengthen this class so that it can lead the handpicked government, by making strong political parties and educating managers and professionals to run the government affairs. This class runs and controls the government system by paying taxes from the imperialist investments and its own investment, thus outmaneuvering the national bourgeoisie.

The comprador bourgeoisie class has emerged through the investment of imperialist investments in production and trade, and also by the creation of Afghan Chamber of Commerce and Industries mainly under the auspices of USAID and GTZ of Germany. Over USD 5 billion that imperialist companies have invested in Afghanistan in the past eight years, have been mainly channeled through this class. Members of this class are the heavily counted on by the imperialist companies because they can circulate their investment in order to exploit the Afghan toiling masses in favor of the imperialist companies. Following are few of the major comprador bourgeois and their field of operation who are on payroll of imperialist companies in order to serve the interests of the imperialist companies: Bayat (Afghan wireless communication company), Rahim Gardizi (steel), Ziaullah Arab (MTN), Sayaf (Etesalat cell phone company), Roshan (cell phone company), Kamgar (Kam Air airlines), Diyanat (Samsung), Ishan (Ishan electronic appliances), Tanwir (paper), Dawi (fuel, Ferguson tractors, VARTA batteries, and trucks), Bashiri (Chinese generators, Total lubricant), Shadab Zafar (construction), Habib Gulzar (bottled water, soft drinks), Mahmud Karzai (cement, Toyota cars, construction, coal mining, Nissan vehicles), Alakozay (tea, Pine cigarettes, cooking oil), Mina Sherzoy (carpets, women's handicraft), Safi (Shaista cooking oil, Safi airlines, steel), Azizi Hotak (fuel, banking, Sun Gas, Nissan cars), Qari Sami (construction, fuel and dress), Ramin Brothers (Afghan wireless company, fuel), Haji Hasin (brother of Qasim Fahim) (Gaz Group company and construction), Tawab (tea), Arya (Arya township), Noor (construction, dry fruit, fuel), Barakat (vehicles, fuel, furniture), A Zaid company (bottled water; the company operates inside Bagram Airbase, and makes the highest income from soft drinks in Afghanistan reaching 1 million dollars a day. It is owned by Asad and a member of the Ramin family as compradors), Rashed Elham company (Japanese and Chinese vehicles), Satar Bayi companies, Shafi Safi, Zarmal and Haji Abdullah Safi has the monopoly of Turkish rugs; Qari Azizullah, Wahid Sohrabi and Haji Razaq companies have monopoly of Iranian rugs; Mir Group (marble), Afghan ITT (electronic appliances), Ghulghula Group (PVC windows and construction), Kabul Folad (steel), Najib Zarab (Korean tires, Nirala milk, Spin Ghar cooking oil), Kifayat company (glasses), Jalfar (an Arab company and three other companies which have monopoly over part of the pharmaceuticals, with a daily profit of USD 420,000), Gates Group (monopoly over of pharmaceuticals, with a daily profit of 420,000), Omar Bangash Group (incorporated company of five Pakistani and Afghan companies, has monopoly over part of pharmaceutical imports, with a daily profit of up to 200,000 US dollars), Pamir and Al Akhtar (two companies that have monopoly over import and assembling of motorcycles), Super Asia company imports Kuwait dairy products; Zaranj (importing and assembling motorcycles); Bahar-e Omid company (producing juice), Kunduz milk (producing different dairy products, is supported by a Turkmenistan company); Autoline company has monopoly over Landcruiser and other vehicles); and Pamir Cola (Pamir bottled water, Pamir Cola drinks and Shifa juice). Moreover, 700 individuals work as contractors to supply logistics to the occupation forces and the Afghan government offices. They plunder

millions of dollars each year, and make efforts to entrench the US occupation of Afghanistan. Hamid, son of Rahim Wardak (defense minister), and Ajmal son of General Baba Jan (former police chief), Haji Almas and a few more are part of the comprador bourgeoisie class.

Foreign companies take the most out of the widespread corruption. Foreign companies such as Straight Group, Global, Black Water, UTRA, Shah Group, Uxel, Louis Berger, and other companies provide armored vehicles, road building, and construction. Security companies have won the highest number of contracts. They later on outsource the contracts to Afghan companies for much lower price, who implement contracts with poor quality. The prime contractors later on blame their Afghan subcontractors for the poor quality, while it is clear that capitalism means corruption, backchannel deals, and theft to accumulate capital. The US imperialists and their cronies now make fuss about fighting corruption, eight years after the invasion which gave free hand to the warlord and non-warlord criminals to plunder at will in order to form the comprador bourgeoisie.

Comprador bourgeois in Afghanistan each has a capital of between one million and 50 million dollars. Some of them are closely linked with the comprador bourgeoisie in the neighboring countries and in reality make the second-hand comprador bourgeoisie in Afghanistan. The class exploits the toiling masses for its own benefit and the benefit of the imperialists by channeling the capital in Afghanistan to the imperialist companies. The comprador bourgeoisie in Afghanistan consider the end of occupation as its own demise.

National Bourgeoisie

National bourgeoisie is the class running production or trade without reliance on imperialist companies. The upper stratum of national bourgeoisie cannot challenge and resist the invasion of imperialist capital and investment. Thus it turns into comprador bourgeoisie. But the lower stratum continues to run the less profitable production and trade activities for a longer time, despite the foreign capital invasion.

National bourgeoisie emerged a long time ago in Afghanistan, with its main involvement in trade. This class of bourgeoisie is under constant overwhelming pressure from comprador bourgeoisie and always goes bankrupt. Currently the comprador bourgeoisie either directly invests the capital of imperialist companies in construction, services, and industrial sectors, or it runs the branch offices or “agencies” of foreign imperialist production companies in Afghanistan. Comprador bourgeoisie imports commodities produced by different imperialist companies and hand them over to small bourgeoisie or national bourgeoisie to sell the commodities as wholesalers to the retailers.

National bourgeoisie is not active in all commodity sectors since the comprador bourgeoisie also works as a wholesaler in some sections. National bourgeoisie has invested mainly in, and controls for the most part the export sector particularly in dry fruit, carpets, herbs, alfalfa and clover seed, poultry farms, and gas stations. National bourgeoisie in Afghanistan is involvement in small-scale production and owns many small factories, operating in producing gas appliances, pressure cooker, electronic appliances, printing press, poultry farms and other. Each of the national bourgeois has invested between 1 million and 1.5 million dollars, and employs maximum of 10 laborers. They smart under the blow of the comprador capital and the government which defends the imperialist investments. For this reason, the national bourgeoisie is disgruntled. They distribute commodities such as pharmaceuticals, cooking oil, textile, tires, paper sheets, vehicle and computer accessories, soap, shampoo, foodstuffs, and construction materials imported by the “agencies” or compradores. Haji Osman Khan Ghazniwal and Haji Aka Jan Farahi (in textile), Haji Dawood Darayi (in cooking oil and construction materials), Haji Fazl Ahmad (in tires), Nasrullah Sediqzai (in manufacturing gas appliances), 17 manufacturing factories in Kabul, three pharmaceutical companies in Kabul, and a number of poultry farms in Kunduz and Farah are a few examples of the national bourgeoisie investment and production.

National bourgeoisie has not formed its own political party yet, and does not expect better prospect for its business, as it does not have sufficient monetary back up, and can go bankrupt any moment. Once a relatively strong proletarian party is formed, it can get the national bourgeoisie on board to form the united front; but if not so, the revolutionaries don't wait for them, and launches their armed struggle.

Petty Bourgeoisie

Petty bourgeoisie is one of the largest classes in the Afghan society. This class is based in both cities and villages, but plays little role in production. Intelligentsia, artisans, shopkeepers, and junior civil servants belong to this class, which is divided into yet more sub-divides. Petty bourgeoisie lacks thorough democratism, particularly the intelligentsia that always thinks of luxurious, urban lives, and of acquiring higher education, can easily change its position. For this reason and many other reasons, petty bourgeoisie cannot lead the revolution. The artisans are employed by the bourgeoisie classes and toil to produce. Their yeoman lives are not satisfactory, and more and more resemble the working class living condition. Industrial production has had a dramatic fall in the past couple of years, thus most of the village bankrupts have become petty bourgeoisie, resulting in huge increase in urban population with a big number of petty bourgeois individuals. The semi-owner peasants in the south of the country do not have sizable area of land, so they leave for Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE and Oman to do labor work. Upon their return, they reside in cities for comfortable life and start petty bourgeois lives.

There are three strata within the petty bourgeoisie: the rich, middle, and the poor; this also determines revolutionary characteristics respectively. Currently the poor stratum of petty bourgeoisie comprises the largest part of it. Middle stratum is smaller in number than the rich, and is less faced with the bankruptcy and change in its position. The rich stratum is consisted of owners of super markets, a number of money exchangers, car dealers, some goldsmiths, middle contractors, brokers for senior government officials, artists with high income, some managers of the trade and industrial production companies, a number of hoteliers, some of the owners of transportation companies, owners of media organizations, heads of NGOs and others. They try their utmost to make more savings and become bourgeois themselves. The difference between this strata and the national bourgeoisie is that its capital is less than the capital of national bourgeoisie; secondly this stratum of petty bourgeoisie itself works in addition to employing a few laborers.

Petty bourgeoisie is a revolutionary class in general. Its poor stratum lives under miserable condition, and quits its position of petty bourgeoisie and becomes proletariat as soon as it is employed in industrial production or trade. The middle stratum also breaks up, most of whom join the poor stratum, while the small portion of them join the rich. The two poor and middle petty bourgeoisie strata join quickly the revolutionary process, while the rich stratum would join the revolutionary cause reluctantly and only once it is sure of the revolution's triumph.

Social Forces

In addition to the above-mentioned six classes, there are also social forces that have similar position and fate in social structures in many ways. These forces act similarly under certain conditions. Lumpens, Mullahs, women, and refugees are among such social forces.

Lumpen Proletariat:

Lumpen proletariat is a group of unemployed individuals, affiliated to none of the social classes. They are the bankrupt laborers or peasants, whose lives have been destroyed in the villages, but cannot get employed in cities either. Usually economic crisis or wars create this type of people in capitalist nations. While in our country, lumpens have laborer, peasant or petty bourgeoisie origin. Lumpens are not committed to any ideology, but most of them seek refuge in religion. Thieves, beggars, prostitutes, robbers, gamblers, hired murderers, addicts and traffickers are lumpens, who are ready to do whatever interests them, as they don't rely on their workforce but to live as predators. They are prone to be hired by other criminals and those who entrench the foreign occupation of Afghanistan. They believe in no principles and can easily align with the occupiers.

During the anti-Social Imperialism resistance war, this group grew on a massive scale. Some of them more committed to destruction and crimes were killed, while others took side with the Soviet occupation. Dostum, Esmat Muslim, Khano, Allah Noor and tens of other lumpens were honored by the Soviet occupiers, and committed crimes against the Afghan people to the end. On the other hand, there were also hundreds of lumpens in the ranks of *jihadis*, serving the criminal "*jihadi leaders*" and commanders who were based in Pakistan and Iran.

Some of the lumpens either escaped, or were arrested and even in a few cases were executed when the Taliban came to power, but there were also a large number of lumpens among the Taliban. They stole, robbed, raped, extracted money forcibly and murdered. These lumpens fled to the mountains or to Pakistan and Iran upon the ouster of Taliban.

Some of the lumpens are as following: Rasul Pahlavan (in Sheberghan, was killed), Timur (in Kabul was hanged), Bashir Qenaat (was arrested in Herat), Shin Sher was killed, Sebghat was killed, Abullah Shah was hanged, Zardad was arrested in London, Rais Khudaidad is alive, Mansur was hanged, Shafi Dewana '*mad*' was killed, Telagai was arrested, Qumandan Khalak was killed, Basir (Tughchi Parwan) is still alive, Azim Jan (Takhar province) is still alive, Qumandan Qayum (Qara Bagh of Ghazni province) was killed, Bachaye Baz was killed in Ghazni province, Aref Dawari is alive, Kal-e Qudoos was killed, Gul Mohammad Pahlavan, Naser was killed, Malang Qumandan (in Badakhshan province) is alive. The lumpens who were killed are succeeded by other lumpens and right now there are a big number of lumpens across the country, committing crimes.

The easiest thing for lumpens is to get and use weapons as Afghanistan has been going through armed conflict for the past three decades; On the other hand, grinding poverty and hunger threaten over 70 percent of the population and the latest findings suggest that 6 million of the Afghan population are in urgent need of humanitarian assistance; all this proves that the process under which lumpens grow, is not similar to the capitalist nations where laborers become lumpens as a result of economic crisis. In Afghanistan most of lumpens have peasant and petty bourgeois origin.

Prostitution, drugs, theft and robbery, begging, and criminal gangs are the legacy of the criminal rulers of the past generations, and further expanded in poverty, unemployment, and *Khadi*, *jihadi*, and Taliban environment; with the dollars provided by the occupiers, such lumpens are widely used by the police and intelligence in Kabul. For this reason, crimes are

on the rise in Kabul by the day.

Lumpens are widely involved in criminal activities. They prefer anarchy and are against the order. For this reason they should not be attracted to the revolutionary cause. Educating and correcting them is difficult more than any other class or stratum. The party lines should be so strengthened by the attracting more and more toiling masses to avoid any disrupt and disorder within the party by the joining of lumpens, who need a patient education and reeducation process. Lumpens are brave, so that can be used for the revolutionary cause once they are reeducated. But till then, they have to be handled with extreme care.

Mullahs:

Majority of the Mullahs are hailing from the petty bourgeoisie, while only less than 2 percent are consisted of feudal gentry. There are 164,000 mosques registered with the ministry of Hajj and Endowment in Afghanistan, and their Mullahs get their salaries from the government. This stratum has no role in production of material wealth, and batters on the masses labor. In addition to their salary, the Mullahs get their share from the people through *Zakat*, *Sarsaya* and *Ushr*. They also try to take side with the powerful, and not to stand up to them. Mullahs are appointed by the landlords in Afghan villages. Since those with the bigger tract of land and more crop and harvest give the Mullahs bigger quantity of wheat, therefore the Mullah takes sides with the landlord in village disputes in order to return the favor. Most of the Mullahs go from village to village to continue their profession of leading the prayers congregations, teaching the village children the basics of religion, performing wedlock, writing *Tawiz* (amulet), which all bring him good income.

In addition to the registered Mullahs and mosques, an even bigger number of mosques and Mullahs are not registered. The Mullahs are divided as Sunni and Shiite, conservative and less conservative, traditionalists, *Ekhwani*, Deubandi, Barelvi, Wahabi, and Jafari. Most of the Afghan conservative Mullahs oppose all bourgeois manifestations. Mullahs are extremely prone to become spies for the imperialist occupiers and seal deals with them, but they pretend to be against the occupation and try hard to protect the feudal order. Mullahs are burden on the masses' shoulders, and try to further entrench the superstitious beliefs. Even within their stratum, they reject anyone who thinks otherwise, let alone the dissenters. Taliban have even stricter stand against the Mullahs disagreeing with them. Tens of Mullahs have been killed at the hands of Taliban for disagreeing with the Taliban or for collaborating with the Americans. Between 2002 and 2009, 28 known Mullahs and Maulawis were killed in Kandahar alone.

Women:

Women make half of the Afghan population; they suffer under national oppression, class oppression and also male oppression.

98 percent of Afghan women are financially dependent on the male members of the family. Despite their relative role in producing material wealth, women are dependent because of the dominant feudal relations. Women are considered as second degree citizens despite their involvement in production such as carpet-weaving, embroidery, sewing, poultry farming, collecting wood, baking bread, cooking, raising cattle, beauty salons, teaching, civil servants, NGO jobs, reporting, trade, farming, raising children and midwifery, but the men say the final word and are the decision makers.

With the recent trend in Afghan capitalists to exploit greater number of people, more and more women have joined the industrial activities. Out of 20,000 laborers in Herat industrial park, 6000 are women, with women leading the management of 13 factories. 280 laborers out 5000 in Kabul industrial park are women. Over 270 women in Parwan are active in projects such as saffron farms, making pickles, and sewing. Association of Trader Women claim to have hired 20,000 women in trade and its relevant activities. In Balkh province, 3300 women

are involved in four associations and three unions of embroidery, sewing, carpet-weaving, running literacy classes, soap-making, sewing beads and polishing gemstones. In Samangan province, 2500 women are involved in soap-making and handicraft. 5000 women in Faryab are active in carpet-weaving, yarn-spinning, sewing and embroidery. 600 cows raised for the dairy factory in Balkh province are raised and looked after by women. 4000 women weave carpets in Ghor province. Women in Nuristan do two major tasks of agriculture and collecting wood, but due to the increase of fundamentalist and Wahabi activities over the past few years, women are increasingly confined to house limits, and consequent decrease in their productive role. Kuchi (Nomad) women raise cattle and take part in moving the tents and the livestock each time they move on a season basis. They don't suffer less than the nomad men because of the insufferable conditions of their unsettled life style. Nonetheless, men arrange their marriages, receive the money from the women's marriage, marrying them to the victim family to settle old blood feud, and can rough the women up at will. Such practices are justified by the religion and traditions in Afghanistan.

Islam applies the cruelest and most reactionary treatment of women. For this reason, Mullahs, Islamic parties and Taliban hold similar convictions. Islam allows for four wives for a man at a time, and gives a woman half of a brother from inheritance from the family wealth, and two women equal one man in giving eyewitness account in the courts. As one woman gets raped in every two minutes in the United States as the so-called model of liberal democracy, warlords and fundamentalists in our country oppress women, and enjoy gang-rape of women and children. To settle their feudal feuds and murders, they marry daughters to the 'victim family' and also murder women; all such practices only underline the depth of anti-woman feudal belief.

The toiling women cannot get rid of the three national, class and male oppressions in Afghan society and to resolve this contradiction until the triumph of modern democratic revolution and socialism. Following occupation of Afghanistan at the hands of western imperialists, a number of women were handpicked to embody democracy. Imperialists on the one hand hire the most notorious warlords and fundamentalists and Taliban to serve their imperialist interests, on the other hand, they confer medals and grant awards and money to groups of women, who in turn pave the ground for entrenching the imperialist occupation of Afghanistan. Thus, the imperialists portray these spying and deal-broker women as the symbols of women liberation in Afghanistan. Definitely, once the Afghan toiling and oppressed women awareness elevates, they will hold these handpicked women accountable for their treason, and will turn the imperialist awards and medals to the noose around their necks.

Refugees:

The first batch of unemployed Afghan youth moved to Iran when the tottering rule of the former King Zahir Shah was coming to an end, and a long draught spell hit Afghanistan. At the same time, Afghans living in the south could move freely across the Durand Line into Pakistan for trade without being required to have passports or visa. As a result of the long spell of draught in 1970, the Afghan workforce exodus for Iran and the Arab nations of the Gulf increased. The Iranian regime did not block their entry into Iran as it needed greatly this cheap and obedient workforce because of the oil and construction boom. Towards the end of Daud Khan's republic (1973-1978) when relations with Shah of Iran improved, many more Afghan laborers and peasants migrated to Iran. At that time, Afghan laborers migrated to Iran individually, and returned to Afghanistan with some cash once in a while. These migrant laborers and peasants made a daily wage of up to 50 *toman*, or 500 Afghanis while in Afghanistan a daily wage was only 40 Afghanis, at a time that a *Ser* (7kgs) of flour prices was 35 Afghanis. A daily wage of 500 Afghanis in Iran could attract Afghan peasants in their

thousands.

Following the April coup in 1978 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that ignited a bloody war, millions of Afghans from all classes, strata, age group and gender fled their homes in the villages and cities for Pakistan, Iran, Arab nations of the Gulf, Europe and the U.S. The number of Afghan refugees in Pakistan reached 3 millions, and the number of Afghan refugees reached 2 millions in Iran, with the difference that refugees in Pakistan stayed mainly in refugee camps and were supported by the anti-Soviet states like the US, European countries, wealthy Arab countries, China and Japan. This support mounted to hundreds of millions of dollars to provide for ration, or foodstuffs and basic necessities of Afghan refugees. Afghan refugees in Pakistan also worked in schools, hotels, trade, arm trade, as staff of the fundamentalist parties, commanders, bodyguards, media and other fields; Pakistan did not deny Afghan refugees job opportunities. Gradually, some Afghan refugees started working in Pakistani factories in Peshawar, Lahore, Faisalabad and Karachi. Also, some Afghans who were part of the toiling masses and have stayed in Pakistan since then, work in construction, laying bricks, working farmlands, transportation, mining, road-building, and carpet-weaving. Even now, despite a big number of refugees repatriating from Pakistan, over two million Afghan refugees live in Pakistan. Pakistan has given citizenship to a number of skilled workers particularly carpet-weavers, and makes millions of dollars annually by employing these skilled workers.

The rulers of the Islamic regime in Iran accommodated Afghan refugees in addition to their puppets of the Afghan fundamentalist parties, but the regime applied a strict policy on refugees, depriving them of all sorts of refugee rights. The cheap and submissive Afghan workforce was at the disposal of Iranian capitalists, who exploited them to the possible limit. The ruins left by the Iran-Iraq war were rebuilt by the toil of Afghan laborers. Currently 90 percent of Afghans living in Iran are workers, while 10 percent work as shopkeepers, traders, drivers and peddlers. Afghan workers in Iran are discriminated against, a practice that is supported by the rulers of the theocratic regime. Afghan workers contribute to the Iranian economy so much that following the Afghan refugees expulsion drive in 1984, the Iranian officials themselves admitted that the policy of expulsion of Afghan refugees brought half of the Iranian industrial production to a standstill. Nonetheless, Afghan workers have no protection or job security in Iran, and are always insulted and harassed.

A total of 300,000 Afghans live in Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait and Oman. Most of them are from the southern provinces of Afghanistan. They live there without their families, with either Afghan or Pakistani passports. Their wage is higher than workers in Iran and Pakistan. Some of them have become rich petty bourgeoisie upon their return from the Gulf countries, and have bought vehicles and property to open store or hotel. Their living level is much higher than their fellow Afghans. They have relative job security, and unlike the workers in Iran, they don't face insult.

About 200,000 Afghan refugees live in the US and Europe, who fled Afghanistan during the years of war. Most of them work in factories or in service sector. They have better job security. Following the attacks on September 11, some of them have found jobs as staff, investors, interpreters and work for foreign forces in Afghanistan. They have a much higher living level than Afghans.

Over 80 percent of Afghan refugees work as workers, and they are part of the Afghan toiling masses, who will stand by the working class in the modern democratic revolution. Afghan workers abroad work side by side the workers of their host countries, thus increasing their awareness. Upon return to Afghanistan, they can play a significant role in the revolution.

Concluding remarks

This work is in no way infallible; but it is the collective work of the members and sympathizers of the Afghanistan Revolutionary Organization, as the first effort to analyze the classes in Afghan society. The facts and figures used in calculating the class forces are not hundred percent accurate, however they are reliable enough. This analysis is just the opening of a great window for proletarian revolutionaries to realize the actual structure of the Afghan society and on the other hand, to recognize their friends and enemies even more clearly, to lead the proletarian revolution to the victory. With this, ARO looks forward to your constructive comradely criticism.

**Down with Imperialism!
March on to Socialism!**

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