

افغانستان آزاد – آزاد افغانستان

AA-AA

چو کشور نپاشد تن من مباد بدین بوم و بر زنده یک تن مباد
همه سر به سر تن به کشتن دهیم از آن به که کشور به دشمن دهیم

www.afgazad.com

afgazad@gmail.com

European Languages

زبانهای اروپایی

By Bernhard Horstmann

10.12.2023

For the Washington Post, the war in Ukraine is over



Sources: Crisis Observatory

The Washington Post has published a lengthy two-part article on the failed "counteroffensive" in Ukraine. He blames U.S. and British planning alike for the whole disaster and the Ukrainian execution of it.

The points of the first part:

Miscalculations and divisions marked U.S.-Ukrainian offensive planning

The key elements that shaped the counteroffensive and the initial outcome include:

Ukrainian, U.S. and British military officers conducted eight major tabletop warfare exercises to draw up a campaign plan.

But Washington miscalculated that Ukrainian forces could be transformed into a Western-style fighting force in a short period, especially without giving Kyiv the comprehensive air power that modern militaries must have.

U.S. and Ukrainian officials at times sharply disagreed over strategy, tactics and timing. The Pentagon wanted the assault to begin in mid-April to prevent Russia from further reinforcing its lines. The Ukrainians hesitated, insisting they were unprepared without additional weapons and training.

U.S. military officials were confident that a mechanized frontal attack on Russian lines was feasible with the troops and weapons Ukraine had. The simulations concluded that Kyiv's forces could, at best, reach the Sea of Azov and isolate Russian troops in 60 to 90 days.

The U.S. advocated a concentrated attack along that southern axis, but Ukraine's leaders believed their forces had to strike at three distinct points along the 600-mile front south through Melitopol and Berdyansk to reach the Sea of Azov, and east, toward the besieged city of Bakhmut.

The U.S. intelligence community took a more pessimistic view than the U.S. military, assessing that the offensive had only a 50 percent chance of success given the solid, multi-layered defenses Russia had built over the winter and spring.

Many in Ukraine and the West underestimated Russia's ability to recover from disasters on the battlefield and exploit its longtime strengths: manpower, mines, and willingness to sacrifice lives on a scale few countries can tolerate.

As the expected launch of the offensive approached, Ukrainian military officials feared catastrophic losses, while U.S. officials believed the death toll would ultimately be higher without a decisive assault.

And from the second part:

[Russia's incremental gains as the Ukrainian counteroffensive stalls.](#)

Key findings from the reports on the campaign include:

Seventy percent of the troops of one of the brigades that spearheaded the counteroffensive were equipped with the most modern Western weapons, they entered battle with no combat experience.

Ukraine's setbacks on the battlefield sparked rifts with the United States over how best to break through Russia's deep defenses.

The commander of U.S. forces in Europe was unable to reach Ukraine's top commander for weeks in the early part of the campaign amid Americans' tension over decisions on the battlefield.

Each side blamed the other for errors or miscalculations. U.S. military officials concluded that Ukraine had fallen short on basic military tactics, including using ground reconnaissance to understand the density of minefields.

Ukrainian officials said Americans didn't seem to understand how attack drones and other technologies had transformed the battlefield.

In total, Ukraine has regained only about 200 square kilometers of territory, at a cost of thousands of dead and wounded and billions in Western military aid in 2023 alone.

All of those points played a role, according to the Washington Post

Other background to consider:

Both Ukraine and its supporters systematically underestimated Russian capabilities. (And they still do.)

A satellite reconnaissance showed Russian defense preparations at the level of the historic [Battle of Kursk](#). There, the German Wehrmacht, after lengthy preparations, failed to break through the Russian lines. The lesson of 1943 not learned by the West: When you see lines of defense like these, try something else.

Battle simulations and tabletop war games have only one "moral" contribution for each side. Setting your side's factor to 10 and the enemy's factor to 0, as the US and the UK obviously did, will allow you to win every time, but it bears no relation to reality.

Air support wouldn't have helped. Russian air defenses are too strong to counter it.

The decision to use poorly trained brigades with no combat experience was a serious mistake.

Not using smoke grenades and, in general, means of deception, was not at all reasonable.

That half of the new troops, the most experienced part, fought in Zelensky's already lost battle for Bakhmut, was a huge political mistake.

Together, they ensured that the so-called "counteroffensive" never had a chance to get off the ground. The current disputes are just an attempt to shift the blame for failure to the other side of the table.

Ukrainian General Zaluzny learned from the battle. Now he presents somewhat realistic figures for the U.S. to understand how small its chances of winning really are:

U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin was told during a visit to Kyiv that Ukraine needed 17 million rounds of ammunition and \$350 billion to \$400 billion to liberate the country.

According to a senior Ukrainian official: "When Austin was told that 17 million rounds of ammunition were needed, he was stunned, to put it mildly, because it is not possible to gather so much ammunition around the world."

The Ukrainian army does not have the necessary weapons to fire 17 million bullets. Nor do men have the power to feed these imaginary weapons.

Obviously, Zaluzny thinks that the war is lost and over. And that it is time to make policies that contribute to peace:

In addition, according to the same source, Austin recounted that Zaluzhnyi had privately complained to the U.S. generals about interference by the Office of the President [...]: "Austin told us that Zaluzhnyi complained about obstructions from the Office of the President. And that has led to mistrust."

However, the Office of the President is inclined to believe that Zaluzhnyi's dismissal would be counterproductive because it would facilitate his political career.

It's high time for the Biden administration to wrap this whole thing up. Do what you always do: declare victory, go and forget it.

What happens next will be left for the footnotes.

Bernhard Horstmann, editor de Moon of Alabama.

Source: <https://observatoriocrisis.com/2023/12/05/para-el-washington-post-la-guerra-en-ucrania-ha-terminado/>

Rebellion 09.12.2023