

افغانستان آزاد – آزاد افغانستان

AA-AA

چو کشور نباشد تن من مباد بدین بوم و بر زنده یک تن مباد
همه سر به سر تن به کشتن دهیم از آن به که کشور به دشمن دهیم

www.afgazad.com

afgazad@gmail.com


European Languages

زبانهای اروپایی

By Alex de Waal

08.08.2023

Sudan, next proxy war?



Sources: Responsible State Craft. [Photo: Sudan]

Translated from English by Marwan Perez for Rebellion

Outside powers are taking sides, supplying weapons and hoping that one general or another will gain the upper hand on the battlefield.

The next stage of the battle for Khartoum will be decided, it seems, in Cairo, Ankara and Abu Dhabi.

Middle Eastern Middle Powers Talk of Peace Even while arming their favorite customers. The theory is that when one side He gets a clear advantage on the battlefield, the other will ask for peace. It's a High-risk approach.

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and his Turkish counterpart Recip Tayyip Erdogan are lining up in support of the Armed Forces of Sudan (SAF) and its leader, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, who counts every time More with the backing of the old-

guard Islamists who held power under the long reign of President Omar al-Bashir. In doing so, they are leaving Aside from long-standing differences with the Muslim Brotherhood: Turkey supports, Egypt represses them.

Mohamed bin Zayed al-Nayhan, President of the United Arab Emirates United and ruler of Abu Dhabi, he has made the opposite bet. It has supported the General Mohamed Hamdan Dagolo, known as Hemedti, the leader of the Forces of Rapid Support (RSF) and, according to some reports, [still It provides him with weapons](#). Hemedti impressed bin Zayed with his energetic leadership, especially with the paramilitaries it sent to war in Yemen, fighting on behalf of its partners Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, and opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood, [The black beast of the Emirati ruler](#). Hemedti also has a business Mutually profitable gold trading with the United Arab Emirates.

A few days after the outbreak of the civil war in Khartoum in April, the United States and Saudi Arabia convened talks in the city Saudi of Jeddah. The most immediate objectives were to secure a ceasefire. and humanitarian access, but another objective was to prevent Emergence of an indirect conflict like this.

After a period of inactivity in which two emerged peace initiatives, one led by Kenya and the other by Egypt, U.S. and Saudi diplomats boosted their talks with new vigor. But the possibility of a ceasefire is fading, and with It comes the danger of a new phase of the even more intense war.

When hostilities broke out on 15 April, Hemedti's RSF surprised to its adversary, the SAF (Sudanese Armed Forces), with its tactical acumen and their great ability to stand firm in Khartoum. As the troops of the RSF occupied strategic sites throughout the city, the SAF were reduced to enclaves and aerial and artillery bombardments. Unable to control the Capital, his claim to represent the government was in question.

But the RSF could not establish itself with these first achievements. Moreover, they definitively lost any sympathy among the inhabitants of the city, for the terrible abuses perpetrated by their Combatants: arbitrary killings, rape and looting of neighbourhoods residential as well as occupying hospitals and terrorizing staff Doctor, destroy universities and the National Museum.

Sudan's army interprets the "Declaration of Principles for the Protection of Civilians" – signed on 11 May by both sides in Jeddah, that [the RSF will withdraw](#) not only from homes and hospitals, but from virtually all positions that control in Khartoum. But the RSF rejects it.

After the popular uprising that overthrew the military leader of Long standing President Omar al-Bashir, in April 2019, Hemedti was the Sudan's most agile and energetic politician. But what he won on the battlefield, the RSF lost it in the political arena. Contradicting his horrific record of human rights, Hemedti positioned himself as a champion of the revolution and the main bulwark against the return of the old guard of the al-Bashir regime. That is why part of the civil resistance supported him.

Populist politicians thrive in the spotlight, but when fighting broke out, Hemedti disappeared, [feeding speculation](#) that he had been seriously injured. Only the week Last [Launched A short video clip](#). He looked stiff and pale. Meanwhile, he had lost The political battle.

In Darfur, where the RSF is based in operations, the RSF and its Saudi Arabia-allied militias have been carrying out brutal Ethnic cleansing campaigns, directed against [the Masalit people of Western Darfur](#) and the [Fur of Central Darfur](#). There is [evidence of mass graves](#). The militiamen burned the palace of the sultan, leader customary law of the Masalit and [murdered the Masalit governor, Khamis Abbakar](#). Violence is compared to The atrocities of twenty years ago and makes the withdrawal two years ago of the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) appears to be irresponsible.

Whatever happens in Khartoum, Darfur faces another round of Agitation and bloodshed, this time without any attention serious international.

By default, the leader of the SAF, General al-Burhan, has won in the political arena, and is increasingly recognized as a representative of the government. But he has shown neither political profile nor leadership, and it is unclear whether he can Manage his clique of quarrelsome lieutenants, including Islamists resurgent veterans who served under al-Bashir.

The Forces for Freedom and Change, which spearheaded the 2019 uprising, they are trying to regroup, but other civilian groups They are disenchanted with them. Most of them [refuse to engage talks with Islamists](#), a position that, during the interlude Civilian-led that [lasted until October 2021 military coup](#) pushed Islamists into the embrace of the army. Meanwhile, deposed civilian Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, It has continued its cautious pattern of consensus-seeking, disappointing who wanted to see a more forceful stance against the generals.

The Neighborhood Resistance Committees, which were the backbone of the protests, they have renamed themselves as [lifeguards humanitarian](#). Exhausted by the flight of many members, they still have to Generate a coordinated political strategy.

In June and July, a burst of diplomatic energy seemed to promise that low-voltage mediation processes between the United States, Saudi Arabia and the African Union could be overcome with more vigor. It has not worked that way, as rival initiatives have been cancelled, with each other, turning the diplomatic arena into a field of positioning tactical.

At the end of June, the regional bloc of northeast Africa, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), held a meeting summit and appointed Kenyan President William Ruto to head a "quartet" that includes Djibouti, Ethiopia and South Sudan. [Ruto He did not hide his strong views](#). He condemned the war as "senseless" and violence in Darfur as, possibly, "genocide". He said that the people Sudanese had made it perfectly clear what it wanted: a government, democratic. IGAD leaders also talked about [activating the East African Reserve Brigade](#) to intervene.

Shortly thereafter, Egypt convened a "[Summit of Sudan's Neighbouring States](#)". President Abdel's arduous diplomacy Fattah al-Sisi secured a large turnout. [The Paragraph 3 of the communiqué stressed](#) "the importance of preserving the State". Sudanese and its institutions, and avoid country fragmentation or decline to chaos."

Egypt has a long-standing diplomatic rivalry with IGAD. Ago twenty-five years, the IGAD peace process for South Sudan, led by a Kenyan general, resulted in a peace agreement that gave the South Sudanese the opportunity to vote for secession. They took that option in 2011, creating the independent state of South Sudan. One Egyptian-Libyan parallel initiative, resolutely opposed to granting the Self-determination, was ruled out.

Al-Sisi's summit fulfilled its minimal objective of blocking the IGAD, thus reducing the diplomatic arena to directionless tactical manoeuvres Strategic.

The Egyptian plan was fueled behind the scenes by Qatar and Turkey, which back Sudan's Islamists. None are impressed with al-Burhan's leadership, but they prefer it to the alternative. This gave him al-Burhan green light to boycott follow-up meeting of leaders of IGAD, and for [SAF strongly objected to IGAD](#), on the pretext that Ruto has business dealings with Hemedti and is therefore biased. (They overlooked the Ruto's comments on the genocide, which targeted the RSF and its allies).

After the Cairo summit, [the SAF generals began talking about how the war can end in a few months](#). Their hope is that Turkey, the main supplier of the state-of-the-art drone region, the Bayraktar TB2, deployed with effects devastating by Azerbaijan, Ethiopia and Libya, provide them with this technology revolutionary.

But an escalation in battlefield technology wouldn't happen. Unnoticed. The RSF already has [some drones of its own less capable](#). Put pressure on the UAE to send him high-end versions, and bin Zayed is quite capable of withstanding the pressure of Riyadh, Cairo and Ankara, and quash their own advisers to follow their own way. This would turn Sudan [into a proxy war between the powers of the Middle East](#).

With Egypt cancelling IGAD, the diplomatic pass returns to the Americans and the Saudis. After a six-week suspension, the Talks resumed in Jeddah in mid-July. Mediators insist they have a plan and can still have the influence to make The generals accept a ceasefire. But there is no sign of a strategic vision. on how to help Sudan escape its crisis.

Source: <https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2023/08/03/sudans-next-stop-regional-proxy-war/>
Rebellion 07.08.2023