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European Languages

زبانهای اروپایی

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19.01.2023

Globalization of capital and migration policies



Sources: South Wind

The migration policies of the imperialist centers have become adapted to the process of capitalist globalization. Capitalism globalized focused on the surplus value of overexploitation works, Done, based on global value chains. Same product final can be the result of the assembly of elements from Several geographical sites spread over several continents. That which It distinguishes the productions of the dominated periphery and the center Imperialist is not a difference in productivity, but a difference Wage. With productivity that tends to be equivalent, the same Workforce will be paid differently depending on whether It employs in the center or on the periphery. "The theses that explain the wage differentials as a result of the productivity differential are

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simply *Eurocentric* or *Western-centric*," In other words, they obscure the global dimension of the value chains of the major industries or make disappear what essentially characterizes globalized capitalism: "The fundamental engine that delineates the contours of the globalization of production [is] the global labour arbitration" (Davis, 2007: 264), to take up the formulation by economist John Smith.

At this level comes the question of borders and the policy of Borders. Indeed, there are two vectors to access this hand of Underpaid work: migrating production to the dominated periphery or to make the labour force migrate to the countries of the center. "The advanced economies can access the global labour pool to through imports and immigration", summarizes the IMF (2007): 180). Before the famous *globalization*, immigration was the primary vector and externalization the secondary vector. Since So it's the other way around. It is by taking this investment into account that we can Capture the logic of the new migration policies. You can formalize three key dimensions of these migration policies of the Era of Globalization: 1) Strength, with its role in fixing the Workforce on the periphery for the needs of Relocations; 2) the selected (selective) immigration and its function of attracting highly qualified labour; 3) undocumented and their role as overexploited labor for the non-relocatable economic sectors.

The systemic function of fortress logic

The barriers to immigration are of unprecedented rigor in the history of capitalism. Far from being the result of a massive and uncontrolled arrival of candidates for migration, the construction of these barriers goes hand in hand with the deployment of the European Union, in turn accelerated by the exacerbation of competition between the multinationals of the great economic powers due to the process of globalization. This is demonstrated by the pace of these barriers. These are more linked to the construction of Europe than to a substantial change in the inflows of migrant workers. Thus, in the same period the fortress was built and the establishment of the Schengen area (1985), the creation of the European Union by the Treaty of Maastricht (1992), the establishment of the euro as a currency (1999) and the gradual enlargement of the European Union, particularly to the East (from 1995 to 2013).

Far from being the reflection of European *values* or a *European culture* or the translation of the will to establish peace in Europe, or the Response to a popular aspiration to the disappearance of borders The construction of the European Union is first and foremost political and institutional accompaniment to multinationals Europeans in the process of wild competition that inaugurates the new phase of capitalist globalization. Fortress

Europe is the Migratory component of this political accompaniment to the emergence of a new economic superpower. As many works point out, the establishment of the Schengen area can be considered the point of Activation of the logic of strength.

The Schengen agreements signed by eight EEC countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Spain and Portugal) constitute the legal and police basis for the construction of the Fortress Wall: visas, penalties for carriers who do not sufficiently monitor the regularity of the documents of the passengers, common list of undesirables, exchange of information, establishment of a police cooperation tool: Europol.

In addition, historian Bernard Ravenel summarized, illegal immigrants and *false refugees* soon presented themselves as the great danger to the future of the EEC. Some official speeches sometimes do not hesitate to amalgamate them with drug traffickers, terrorists and other public dangers... To defend the strength of the assault of these *armies*, the Twelve claim the right to have recourse to all necessary means... The and Immigrants and refugees are regarded – and treated – as *enemies*. This language and the instruments of war are somehow *natural*: War on Drugs, War on Terrorism, War on (clandestine) immigration, become the modern crusades of the Fortress Europe (Ravenel, 1997: 110).

The later episodes of the logic of the fortress initiated with Schengen are only predictable consequences of this initial decision. To implement this option, you must restrict the legal travel (visa policy), militarising borders external (creation of the Frontex agency), physically blocking the People through the so-called hotspot approach [*hotspot* centers] registration] and outsource containment of migration candidates, and of refugees. Each conjunctural crisis, which causes a Equally circumstantial influx of refugees, is instrumentalized meticulous way to justify new repressive measures on the basis of of political and media campaigns that spread the fear of a tsunami human from the countries of the South. This was the case in 1991 with the Arrival of the Albanians that was used to legitimize the creation of the Frontex agency. Almost three decades later, it was the crisis Syria which was instrumentalized to legitimize the establishment of *hotspots*, A euphemism for contemporary internment camps. The two-stage script is already well defined: a political discourse and Invasive media about the existence of a supposed *migration crisis* as a tool to manufacture consent to the new repressive measures.

Visa policy is the first component of strength. Historically backed by state competence in security National, visa policy is now linked to the Containment of *migratory risk*. This is

demonstrated by the changes in the information requested to obtain a visa and the most recurrent reasons for rejection:

The visa, contrary to what might have been the Case in the past, it is less aimed at ensuring the safety of States concerned that block illegal immigration. (...) Reading of the Community visa regulation, which lays down the rules common rules for the examination of visa applications by consular services, shows that irregular immigration is the main concern, summarizes the jurist Danièle Lochak (2019: 9).

The document of the German consulate in Abidjan entitled "Explanations to the rejection decision", which "identifies the most common reasons for a visa refusal", includes, for example: "the purpose of your stay according to the documents was not obvious" or "could not establish its willingness to leave the territory before the expiry of the visa"^[01]. Of course, this change in the nature of European policy Visas have tried to camouflage themselves behind the security risk, but, as underlined by Danièle Lochak (2019: 9): "This is an alibi, because the Most terrorists have proper papers, when they are not. simply citizens of the Member States."

This European visa policy reinforces the scandalous inequality global right to mobility according to nationality. "If you are European You have the possibility to move freely for three months by 173 countries, if you are Russian in 91 countries, if you are Chinese in 44 and At the end of the line are all the people we talked about: Afghans, Sudanese, Eritrean," recalls political scientist Catherine Wihtol de Wenden (2019: 23). The *Passport Index* website, which lists countries accessible by passport issuing country, establishes a classification yearly. No wonder that "the countries of continental Africa are those who are in the worst situation" and "the last places in the ranking are occupied by the countries with the lowest GDP, all in Asia or Africa, and it is Afghanistan that closes it with only 30 countries accessible" (Breteau, 2018). The double hierarchy, of wealth and color, undeniably characterizes our contemporary world in terms of the right to mobility.

European visa policy does not forget asylum seekers with the same obsession with containment. The obligation to possess a transit visa, called "airport transit visa" (VTA), is became Community in 2009 for the countries of the Schengen area. Refers to nationals from a list of countries drawn up arbitrarily by the European Union. Although it is presented as a form to combat *irregular immigration*, in fact, this Obligation is addressed directly to asylum seekers. Just read the contents of this list, which each country can complete. as you wish, to convince yourself of it. In fact, countries are in it like Afghanistan or Syria. "The VTA (...) It has above all the consequence to prevent

passengers in transit in a Member State from requesting asylum in it" (Bisiaux and Doisy, 2017: 2), summarizes the National Association of Border Assistance for Foreigners (ANAFE). To ensure the Effectiveness of the measure, airlines have the obligation, under penalty of financial penalties of up to €500,000, to ensure that passengers have a VTA. The European states are no longer even They have to refuse asylum, as the application for protection itself is It has made impossible.

The Frontex agency is the second facet of Fortress Europe. Established in 2004 as the European Agency for Cooperation Management Operations at the external borders of the Member States of the European Union, aims to *assist* the States members of the Schengen area with external borders with third parties countries in control of them. Converted into Frontex in 2006, it Agency had in 2018 a budget of 320 million euros and a Workforce that should reach 10,000 people in 2021. This true army, which is supposed to fight "irregular immigration", in Practice is a simple tool of militarized repression of asylum seekers. As with the visa airport, it is a question of avoiding the very possibility of the application of asylum or residence rejecting those who request it despite the stipulations of the Geneva Convention, international law and even the European Union's own texts. Geographer Olivier Clochard and the head of international solidarity at Cimade, Eva Ottavy sums up the ongoing violations of rights by part of the Frontex agency at the Greek borders:

By returning *manu militari* the vessels that sailing in its national waters, Greece violates ban on collective expulsion to which it is bound by European texts. The latter prohibit the expulsion of groups of people if their individual situation has not been reasonably examined, and Objective. Thus, Greece, by not allowing people looking for international protection can access a fair procedure, violates the right to asylum enshrined in the Geneva Convention on Status of Refugees and European Law. Finally, Greece It also infringes the principle of non-refoulement also provided for in several laws prohibiting the return of a person to his or her country from origin or other country where their life or freedom is threatened. These Returns are developed in secret. However, dozens of testimonies collected by Pro-Asyl (2013) and Amnesty International (2013) point out that these returns have become a *routine* of border control (Ottavy and Clochard, 2014: 150).

The creation of *hotspots* is the third facet of Europe fortress. These "regional disembarkation platforms," as he calls them. euphemistically the European Union, aim to "make the Selection" between "real refugees" and "fake refugees". For whom are classified in the second category, that is, for the great Most, *hotspots* provide for "pre-

departure holding centers." Specifically, *hotspots* are closed centers in which people exiled to waiting for your application to be considered. To put it more clearly, we are in the presence of open-air prisons. Adopted in 2015 by the European Commission, such an approach is presented as a Responding to the war-related *refugee crisis* in Syria. Once again, a conjunctural crisis is instrumentalized to establish a structural and sustainable way of managing borders. Thus, nine hotspots were opened, five in Greece and four in Italy, in addition to "mobile *hotspots*".

Taking stock of two years of operation of the centers Greeks, the jurist Claire Rodier makes the following observation:

Problems of promiscuity, coexistence of minors isolated with adults, insufficient feeding, hygienic conditions degraded due to saturation of health equipment, etc. (...) In January 2017, Amnesty International reported an occupancy rate 148% on Lesbos, 215% on Samos and 163% on Kos. During the winter 2016/2017, particularly rigorous in the region, some people were forced to sleep outdoors, wrapped in simple blankets that the snow covered during the night (Rodier, 2018: 5).

The titles of the reports of international solidarity NGOs with the refugees they are enough to measure the scandal: "Greece. Refugees detained in deplorable conditions", in April 2016 according to Amnesty International; "Greece. Insecurity and unhealthiness in *refugee hotspots*," in May 2016, according to Human Rights Watch; "EU-Turkey deal, the big deception. Mission report on the Greek *hotspots* of Chios and Lesbos", in July 2016 according to GISTI, etc. The balance of Italian *hotspots* is in line with the same line, underlines Claire Rodier based on Amnesty International's mission reports:

After four missions to Italy during the year in 2016, Amnesty International identified these practices, among which identified in particular cases of detention for periods exceeding the permitted by Italian law, from the use of coercion, violence and even torture to force recalcitrants to submit to reading fingerprints, situation assessment procedures individuals carried out expeditiously, with the sole objective to classify the person concerned in the category of *irregular migrant* rather than that of susceptible to protection, etc. (Rodier, 2018: 8-9).

The so-called policy of outsourcing control is the last major facet of fortress Europe. "Its objectives are both to move the controls as far as possible from the Union's borders and therefore therefore, to move away as far as possible the cordon sanitaire that should protect Europe, how to delegate responsibility for this policy to third States", summarizes Danièle Lochak (2019:14). The outsourcing of control has followed by two essential

pathways. The first is that of the " readmission" that commit the signatory countries, mainly Africans, to welcome not only their nationals, but also the people who have transited through its territory. By means of compensations These States thus become subcontractors of the European police. The logical consequence has been the development of very harsh policies of repression in North African countries, laying the foundations for a worrying rise in Negrophobia through Designation of sub-Saharan Africans as a problem, as a hazard and as threat.

The second path taken by outsourcing is the so-called "Khartoum process", also called the "road initiative" EU-Horn of Africa migration". Partnering a dozen countries Africans, as the name suggests, this process aims to try to make this route impracticable. Therefore, through funding, each African country is encouraged to block, reject and, therefore, Therefore, repress exiles from other countries African. These countries commit not only to welcoming the people who have transited through its territory, but also to patrol to stop departures to Europe. Countries such as Sudan or Libya have become become *partners* in European migration policies. The Libyan case alone provides insight into the consequences of the Khartoum process:

The European Union and the Member States provide a substantial aid to Libya explicitly assigned the task to intercept migrants attempting to reach Europe by sea, even when crimes against the humanity committed in that country against migrants in Libya, imputable to both State agents and militia members, or mafias: murder, slavery, torture, rape, sexual slavery, forced disappearances (Lochak, 13).

To be complete, it would be necessary to add the construction of a wall of 12.5 kilometers long and 3 meters high in Greece, using State-of-the-art technologies to detect exiles and the Reinstatement, albeit momentarily but periodically, of controls in the internal borders of the European Union. It should be remembered, although be it quickly, all these deployed means that, without a doubt, they testify to the construction of a fortress Europe. The consequences were and are largely predictable: the use of routes each time More dangerous results in unprecedented rise in deaths during the Mediterranean crossings. The International Organization for Migration (IOM), which in 2016 became a The United Nations estimates the death toll has been nearly 20,000. (including 1,600 children) since 2014. The Mediterranean has become like this on the deadliest route in the world. No wonder the deaths registered across Africa rank second, with more than 6,000 deaths in the same period (Laczko, Blaack and Singleton, 2919: VIII). The construction of fortress Europe then appears as a murder massive institutional.

The same logic works on the Mexican border with the same Dramatic consequences. Of course, it is not a question of a will. macabre that would have suddenly taken over the U.S. government and of the European Union, which would prefer to dispense with such a situation. Without However, the main economic decisions taken in recent years Decades could have no other consequences. Therefore, the function The systemic nature of this new border policy is evident: to discourage maximum the decision of the exit to fix the maximum labor in the countries of origin to fill the jobs of the Mass offshoring.

The systemic role of selective immigration

Fortress Europe does not mean the complete closure of borders. The discourse on *selective* immigration (which is consequently opposed to the immigration *suffered*) proves this. He made his appearance in June 2005 in a speech by Nicolas Sarkozy that proposed this notion as the central axis of migration policy. Since then it has been taken up by all the presidents of the French Republic. Thus, Prime Minister Édouard Philippe declared on November 6, 2019, during the presentation of the immigration plan, he wants to "regain control of our migration policy" by establishing "quotas or quantitative objectives exclusively" depending on the branch of activity. Specifying his point of view, he explained: "We will go far in opening where we believe it is good for France and far also in control where abuses are not tolerable" (Albertini and Hullot-Guiot, 2019). This approach to immigration broke with more than a quarter-century of discourse on *zero immigration*:

For the first time since the suspension of immigration In 1974, public discourse on immigration was no longer It is based on the idea of ceasing economic immigration flows and channeling other flows (family immigration, student mobility, asylum), but In the substitution of a *so-called* suffered immigration, it is that is, based on the exercise of a fundamental right (right to lead a family life, right of asylum, etc.) for a *strictly economic selective* immigration directed towards the sectors deficient of labor. This dialectic of *selective versus suffered immigration* seems to constitute a turning point for French policies in Immigration matters such as the provisional suspension of July of 1974 (Viprey, 2010: 150).

This dichotomous approach to immigration is not the first in the History of French migration policies. If the criterion of classification changes, the division of immigration into two entities, One desirable and to be encouraged, and the other undesirable and to be fought, is ancient. Establishing a chronology of the *undesirable* criteria applied to immigrants for the period 1880-1939, the historian Élie-Benjamin Loyer identifies the

following sequences: criterion dominant politician until 1880, i.e. "political commitment and revolutionary"; dominant social criterion from 1880 to 1914 with the figure of the "poor evil, undesirable because it has no roots"; dominant colonial and racial criteria in the post-First World War with the figures of the "colonials who came to France to work during the war", on the one hand, and "Germans from the recovered provinces", on the other; "national preference" criterion for collective repatriations of Polish workers during the 1930s (Loyer, 2019).

El período posterior a la Segunda Guerra Mundial se caracteriza por el retorno explícito del criterio racial. En el contexto de las pérdidas humanas relacionadas con la guerra, las preocupaciones demográficas relacionan la cuestión de la inmigración y la de la naturalización. El 12 de junio de 1945, el general De Gaulle escribió las siguientes directivas a su ministro de Justicia:

En particular, [las naturalizaciones] ya no debería depender del estudio de casos individuales, sino que la elección de los individuos debe estar subordinada a los intereses nacionales en el ámbito étnico, demográfico, profesional y geográfico. A nivel étnico, es necesario limitar la afluencia de mediterráneos y orientales. (...) Es deseable que se dé prioridad a las naturalizaciones nórdicas^[02].

Finalmente, la necesidad masiva de mano de obra para la reconstrucción y luego para los llamados *Treinta Gloriosos* orientará pragmáticamente la política migratoria francesa en otra dirección. Las preocupaciones económicas inmediatas primaron sobre el deseo de la clasificación étnica. Pero los debates de este período también se hacen eco del tema de la *inmigración selectiva* sobre otra cuestión: la de las personas refugiadas. En la posguerra se estableció un Alto Comité asesor para la Población y Familia, con el demógrafo Georges Mauco como secretario general. Este fue autor, en 1932, de una tesis titulada *Les étrangers en France: leur rôle dans l'activité économique* (Los extranjeros en Francia: su papel en la actividad económica), en la que clasifica a los extranjeros según su capacidad de asimilación. En una conferencia para la Sociedad de Naciones, en abril de 1937, resumía su pensamiento de la siguiente manera: "Entre la diversidad de razas extranjeras en Francia, hay elementos para los que la asimilación es imposible porque pertenecen a razas demasiado diferentes: asiáticos, africanos, incluso levantinos, cuya asimilación es imposible y, además, muy a menudo física y moralmente indeseable"^[03].

Georges Mauco's career was just beginning and we found him without interruption in positions of responsibility from 1938 to 1970: in 1938 in the cabinet of Minister Michel Serre as undersecretary of State in charge of immigration and alien services; from 1939 to

1940 in the High Committee of Population of the Vichy government, where he occupied the role of expert; from 1945 to 1970 in the High Advisory Committee for the Population and Family. Its membership of the French People's Party (PPF) of the fascist Jacques Doriot during the occupation does not break this longevity and continuity.

Mauco is the author of the classification of immigration into two categories: "imposed immigration" and "voluntary immigration". The first group groups refugees, considered *undesirable*, while the second category is made up of workers, defended as desirable:

During the period [between the two wars] the imposed immigration of refugees of all origins brought Russians, Armenians, Assyrians, Israelites, whose adaptation and assimilation were particularly difficult. Imposed immigration of refugees, very different from the voluntary immigration of workers, it contributes to often elements diminished psychically and sometimes physically by distress or persecution. On the other hand, most of the Refugees are not suitable for direct productive work. Herself grouped almost exclusively in overcrowded cities and professions urban areas where they raise the problem of competition and influence foreign in the nerve centers of the country (Mauco, 1942: 6-15).

Therefore, the classification of immigration as *deseable/undesirable* is nothing new, even if the content of the categories varies. By On the other hand, the hierarchy fluctuates depending on ideological needs. and the economic context. Thus, in the binary cut of *political refugees/economic immigrants*, this hierarchy was in favor of the latter until 1975, it was reversed between 1975 and 2005, when immigration was stopped, and resumed its form previous after 2005 and the return of the logic of *selective* immigration. If it is now politically fashionable to declare oneself a defender of the right to Asylum, is always adding determination to fight *fake asylum seekers*.

However, we are not witnessing a simple repetition of the past. When Nicolas Sarkozy relaunched the debate on *selective immigration* in 2005, we had already entered the new phase of globalisation. capitalist. IMF and Bank structural adjustment plans World had already destroyed most of the public services of most of the countries of the periphery. We can even consider those plans as the beginning of this new phase. The idea of imposing *structural adjustments* by blackmailing non-renewal of loans international was born in the G7. Thus, in 1979 the G7 invited the World Bank and IMF to implement structural adjustment plans (SAP) "Having as content the return to the great balances macroeconomic: through austerity and devaluation" (Domergue, 2003: 73).

One of the conditionalities imposed by the SAPs was the Privatization of public services, which were since independence the main employer of skilled labour. The researchers, teachers, technicians, doctors, etc., from the countries peripherals were quickly thrown into precariousness. Many took The path of emigration that until then had affected mainly to low-skilled labour. The figures are Enlightening, as evidenced by a 2013 study on the flight of African doctors to the United States: "The flight of *doctors* from sub-Saharan Africa to the United States United began in earnest in the mid-1980s and accelerated in the 1990s during the years of implementation of the structural adjustment imposed by (...) the IMF and the World Bank" (Benjamin, Ozden & Vermund, 2013). Algerian or Eastern doctors Media in French hospitals testify to the same process in Europe.

The discourse on *selective immigration* is nothing more than Cynical decision to empty peripheral countries of their workforce qualified without having to assume the costs of training this Complex labor. The argument of the selective *immigration* thesis does not even hide it. Nicolas Sarkozy explained his new migration policy in Le *Monde* newspaper as follows: "To attract skilled workers, researchers, university professors or business starters France needs to create a Canadian-style points system."^[04].

Fifteen years later, Prime Minister Édouard Philippe repeated the "As for professional immigration, [we must] have a Pragmatic approach to our workforce needs (...) Depending on the unmet needs, we will set the needs by profession and by territory"^[05]. Therefore, it is a question of attracting this skilled workforce in a context of competition between the countries of the center:

In the *market for brains* from Southern countries, northern countries are competing fiercely. The richer they are, the more likely they are to attract the elites of the world. Poor countries, which are further impoverished by the exodus of their elites. The phenomenon does not seem to stop anytime soon, since, in the countryside, of health, for example, all Western countries limit the Training of professionals with *Numerus Clausus* or others systems, organizing the shortage of doctors over the next ten or fifteen years and cynically counting on the arrival of doctors from the countries of the South to compensate for this lack. In all professions notes that, during the 1990s, the number of migrants qualified to OECD countries increased two and a half times more fast than that of unskilled migrants, and everything suggests that the gap has continued to widen since then (Carrère, 2007: 23).

The introduction in 2007 of a new residence permit based on "Competencies and Talents" beautifully illustrates this competence. Of fact, it is presented as a means to attract

workforces. qualified whose "talent is an asset for the development and development of influence of France". Law 2016/274, of 7 March 2016, relating to the right of foreigners in France is even more explicit. His Circular of precise application:

The creation of the individual multiannual degree, the *talent passport*, It is an important tool of attraction, expected by the economic, academic, scientific, cultural or sports actors. (...) In a competitive world, this tool should allow us to attract international talents to France^[06].

The circular itself provides for "the flexibility of the possibilities that are offered to foreign students who reach a high level of studies to prolong your stay in order to search for or occupy a employment" and specifies the field of talents in question: "Employees high-level, researchers, business start-ups, start-ups, investors, artists with international fame"^[07].

Selective immigration takes logic to the extreme utilitarian who has always been dominant on immigration, already whether in debates on – and orientation – on immigration or in the debate on immigration or in the in the migration policy that determines its legal conditions. The Accounting approaches to immigration (and the multiple controversies over the *costs and advantages* of it), which we address in the Previous chapter, they prove it. That is why such approaches are always problematic, even when used to legitimize the rights of immigrant workers. Indeed, it is not surprising that the Most serious studies of this type conclude with a gain net for French society provided that, of course, they are taken into account It counts all the *advantages*, on the one hand, and, on the other, the contribution of immigrants to the *costs* attributed to them. By legitimizing a link between *the right of residence* and *profitability*, utilitarian logic allows fraudulent instrumentalisation (by concealing certain *advantages* and unjustifying cost maximisation). which leads to the idea of an immigration that has become a economically unbearable burden that regularly returns to the center of media attention.

The *desirable/undesirable* dichotomy, regardless of the content of these categories, aims to justify the hunting of *undesirables* and their legal precariousness. Therefore, the expression *disposable immigration* is relevant to designate the true meaning of the so-called *selective immigration* policy. The closure of the borders of Fortress Europe is thus cynically flexible for skilled labour.

The systemic function of the precariousness of residence

Selective immigration is not limited to *talent*. The utilitarian logic extends its effects to other sectoral and/or temporary labor needs, and has led the legislator to multiply and

prioritize residence permits, thus organizing a generalized precariousness. Without being exhaustive, let us cite three examples [from France].

The Act on "Immigration and Integration" of 24 July 2006 establishes a new residence permit called "worker" temporary." This title legalizes the previous practice of "permitting" provisional work". It lasts less than one year and is based on the implicit principle of a duration of leave corresponding to that of the employment contract. The law does not provide, for Assumption, no renewal of this permit as is the case, for example, of the residence card of "employee" by a year. If the employer breaks the employment contract before the last ones Three months after its expiration, the residence permit can be withdrawn. In addition, in this case, the employee is not entitled to unemployment. Finally, these workers do not enjoy the right to family reunification access to which is subject to a diploma of Minimum validity of one year. The employee becomes a *de facto* captive of his employer, endowed with minimum social rights and excluded from the right to live in a family.

The second example is that of the residence permit called "seasonal worker". The notion of "seasonal work" comes defined as follows: "Tasks normally called upon to be repeated each year on approximately fixed dates depending on the rhythms of the seasons or collective lifestyles"^[08]. With a renewable duration of three years, this title allows its holder return to France as soon as he can justify the signing of a new contract. It only grants the right to remain in France for a maximum of six months per year. It is therefore under an obligation to maintain your habitual residence in your country of origin with the consequent exclusion from entitlement to unemployment benefits that is subordinate precisely to a habitual residence in France. By Of course, you do not have access to family reunification.

The third example is that of the residence card called "employee on mission." Refers to employees posted by a period determined to France by undertakings established outside France to [work in] companies in France. With a validity of three years, authorizes its holder to exercise "missions" in France. Give access the holder of the right to bring his family, who then obtains a title of "private and family life" on condition that you reside in France continuously for a minimum period of six months.

The logic of *selective immigration* translates into facts in a differentiation and gradation of the rights that the jurist Zouhair Aboudahab (2006) summarizes as follows:

Differentiation and gradation of rights Thus characterize the various statutes of migrant workers calls to meet the estimated needs of the labour market in France; mostly with

temporary and precarious status, Their social and family rights do not seem to be the main one. Concern of the law.

Selective immigration is in fact the establishment of a *precarious suffering*. The precariousness of the stay is not limited to these three examples. It extends to the conditions for the renewal of residence permits and to obtain the so-called ten-year "resident" card Fully renewable, established in 1984 after decades of struggle for the right to legal stability. The accumulation of Restrictive provisions of the various laws of the last three decades have led to structural change when it comes to Precariousness of the stay. Produces a cut between the ancient immigrants and new immigrants, making it increasingly difficult to access Residence Card:

The overlapping of laws that show the objective of *controlling migratory flows* has also had the effect of making the stay of migrants more precarious. foreigners gradually undermining the building adopted in 1984. This The process of destabilization (...) does not affect foreigners who already They have the ten-year card. (...) The restrictions affect foreigners who have arrived more recently. (...) After the Legislative changes of the 2000s, the prevailing philosophy In the law of July 1984 it is now annihilated: the resident card already It is not the first stage of an integration process, but rather It becomes the ultimate reward of an obstacle course. The Figures are there to testify to this: since 1994, the proportion Issuance of resident cards to newcomers has been divided almost by five, going from 42% to 9%. The collapse would certainly be more dizzying if the figures allowed us to go back before the second law Easter 1993, which was already very restrictive compared to the previous period (Math and Spire, 2014).

Beyond the different laws on residency, a Structural logic: the pyramidal organization of immigration according to the Legal stability criterion. At the base of the pyramid are The undocumented whose role we have highlighted for some sectors non-relocatable economic sectors. The image of the *undocumented* as a burden for the French economy does not withstand the data quantitative and its analysis. As researcher François Brun points out, Returning to the concept of "offshoring *in situ*" proposed by the anthropologist Emmanuel Terray that we presented earlier, "undocumented" people are not "unemployed":

It can be estimated that about 85% of them work: They have come to that and have no access to any subsidy. Also, not have trouble finding work as they are workers and easily exploitable workers (Brun, 2004).

Non-relocatable sectors of the economy have adapted quickly to the existence of labor without rights, without status legal and, consequently, overexploitable. The adaptation has

yet been faster because it has developed in a dominated historical sequence by the neoliberal ideology that accompanies this globalization. Today in day, what corresponds, for all companies, is the outsourcing of services, which consists of entrusting a subcontractor all or part of an activity that hitherto was directly insured by the company's employees (cleaning, custody, restoration, tailoring, etc.). The pressure to Increase working hours and the intensification of productivity, is That is, to increase the absolute and relative surplus-value, is now realized at through subcontractors: "Customers know this all too well. When in the Clothing industry certain parts are ordered from certain prices, we know that it will be done in night work and with a salary below the SMI" (Brun, 2007). A practice that affects so much public services as well as the private sector, the State as well as private companies and even local authorities. It's not It is necessary to resort to the idea of a secret state plan or a conspiracy to understand the evolution of this specific segment of the labor market in recent decades. It has been enough for the actors to economic will adapt to this particular manna of labor aroused For the new migration policy:

Far from being absent from the economic and social context, The undocumented are, on the contrary, at the heart of the system. Without ensuring that the massive presence of foreigners in irregular situation is coldly scheduled, it must be recognized that is all the more cynically managed than the place they are given. There is nothing random about the allocation in the economy. The condition of the Undocumented people is not an economic aberration, but an experiment to exclude them from labour law, the creation of an infra-right. From this experimentation to its large-scale application, the step to take it is easy (Brun, 2004).

It is the very precariousness of the economy through logic It is therefore that this neoliberal use of subcontracting, thus giving rise to the need for a hand component of Overexploitable work: "Bound by the conditions imposed on them to *maintain prices*, subcontractors resort to Naturally to this weakest fraction of the workers' force in the labour market" (Morice, 1996: 44), explains anthropologist Alain Morice citing examples of large public works that have resorted to Paperless: TAV-Atlantic, Albertville, tunnel under the Canal de La Stain, Gran-Arch, Library of France, etc.

Of course, the undocumented existed before the point of Liberal inflection of the 1980s and before the cessation of the legal immigration in 1974. This is demonstrated by the movements of struggle for the regularization following the Marcellin-Fontanet circulars of early the 1970s. All in all, the liberal turning point and the new The migratory logic that

accompanies it in the context of the deregulation of the entire labor market massifies this reality that existed previously, but until then it was marginal. This massification is developing in two ways. The first, by tightening the conditions for the granting of permits leading to an extension of the duration during which the new immigrant is assigned to this status without rights, that is, to the absence of legal status. "No We were in an irregular situation for a long time. (...) The Irregularity was therefore a stage rather than a lasting status. (...), while nowadays it is not uncommon to see people undocumented women work this way for ten or fifteen years." (Barron *et al.*, 2014), summarizes a group of researchers. The second, through the precariousness of the *regulars*, that is, the precariousness of the residence. "The tightening of Migration policies do not only affect the undocumented. Limits the obtaining or renewing residence permits for all persons foreign, so that those who are in a regular situation (re)fall more easily into irregularity and those who are already in it they have less chance of getting out of it," he adds. collective.

By these two means a permanent bag of undocumented persons is created. By nature it cannot be quantified precisely, but it can be evaluated and assessed:


The high and low estimates, made by the Ministry of Social Affairs, allow to frame the order of the magnitudes based on State medical aid benefits reserved for migrants in an irregular situation. It is plausible a estimate of around 400,000, given that the border between Legal migrants and illegal migrants is not watertight, explains the sociologist and demographer François Héran (2017: 165).

It is from this figure that the true Aim of the speeches on the "fight against immigration" irregular" maintained on a recurring basis by all governments for more than four decades. It is not, in any way, a question of Massive expulsion of the undocumented, which is impossible and costly. Impossible, because it would involve unprecedented police practices (in the form of Permanent raids, regular flights, trivial hunts for persons, systematic searches, mass internments before expulsion, etc.) and hardly bearable by public opinion, less for the moment. Current policing practices towards Undocumented they are already humanly scandalous, but they are incomparable to which such an objective would require. Such a mass expulsion would also be costly and contradictory to the liberal spending reduction rule public, as noted in a 2019 parliamentary report stating that "the Average cost of a forced removal is estimated at around 14,000 euros (13,794)"^[09]. Despite the fact that each new government is committed to increasing the number of people to be deported, this one has only experienced a modest progression in

the last decade: it went from 13,908 in 2009 to 15,677 in 2018 for the Metropolitan France. In total, the cost of expulsions is estimated €468 million, including expulsions from DOM-TOMs (Overseas Departments and Territories), much cheaper. The conclusion is obvious: no mass expulsion is possible today. We must therefore look elsewhere for the fundamentals of the policy. On irregular immigration:

Since the decrease in the number of undocumented persons is Doubtfully, this leads us to reassess the nature of policies public: what is presented as a hunt against stowaways with Temporary presence would rather be the repression of a category of the population, whose effect is not primarily expulsion. It doesn't matter here if this is what you want or not. But, above all, they are located, They name, identify, register and confine more without papers. (...) The expulsion is nothing more than a possibility for the undocumented; and given that it is only a risk and not a certainty (risk that is remembered periodically by contact with a repressive institution), results in be a powerful disciplinary factor (Barron *et al.*, 2014).

The objective that is revealed is the establishment of a pressure permanent on the undocumented to accept their assignment to overexploitation. Repressive policies seek more to discourage Demanding tendencies to fight, as they proclaim, against such *irregular immigration*. We are in the presence of a management of the survivors to the closure of borders to the benefit of economic sectors that do not can be relocated or outsourced, through the production of Undocumented people forced to sell their labor power below of its value. The staging of a political will to expel The undocumented hide this economic function.



* This article is an excerpt from Saïd Bouamama's book, *Des classes dangereuses à l'ennemi intérieur. Capitalism, immigrations, racism*. Paris, Syllepse, 2021

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Notes:

- (1) "Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland Abidjan", accessible at abidjan.diplo.de

(2) Letter from Charles de Gaulle to the Ministry of Justice, 12/06/1945, reproduced in Alain Drouard, "La création de l'INED", *Population*, 47-6, 1992, pp. 1458-1459.

(3) International relations, text of the French delegation, Paris, League of Nations, April 1937.

(4) Nicolas Sarkozy, "Lettre sur la politique d'immigration", *Le Monde*, 13/07/2005. (Applicants to enter the country are scored according to personal, family, educational criteria, etc. See <https://www.canada.ca/fr/immigration-refugies-citoyennete/services/immigrer-canada/entree-express/admissibilite/criteres-systeme-classement-global/grille.html> in French, but easily translatable with the browser translator).

(5) Guillaume Poingt, "Tout comprendre aux *quotas d'immigration*", *Le Figaro*, 8/10/2019.

(6) "Circulaire d'application de la loi relative au droit des étrangers en France – dispositions applicables à compter des 1er novembre 2016 et 1er janvier 2017", Bernard Cazeneuve, 1/11/2016, p. 4.

(7) *Ibid.*

(8) Decision of the Court of Cassation, Criminal Chamber, 17/09/2008, no. 07-42463, "Mxc/ société de Transport Qincé relatif au CDD d'usage et au CDD saisonnier".

(9) Joël Giraud, "Rapport fait au nom de la commission des finances, de l'économie générale et du contrôle budgétaire sur le projet de loi, après engagement de la procédure accélérée, de règlement du budget et d'approbation des comptes de l'année 2018", n.º 1990, Assemblée nationale, 5 juin 2019, p. 9.

Original text in French: <https://www.contretemps.eu/mondialisation-capital-politiques-migratoires-immigrations-racisme/> Translation: Faustino Eguberri for **south wind**

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Source: <https://vientosur.info/mundializacion-del-capital-y-politicas-migratorias/>